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Preface 
 
 
This report describes simulations of the future of China’s agricultural economy with the 
Chinagro welfare model. The model was originally constructed in the period 2002-2004 as part 
of the EC-funded Fifth Framework project of the same name, with support of the Natural Science 
Foundation of China (#70024001), and has been developed further in 2006 and 2007 under the 
follow-up project ‘Options for Agricultural Development in China’ funded by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality.  
 
At the same time, the publication of this report marks the beginning of the modeling activities in 
the CATSEI-project, an EC-funded Sixth Framework project started in January 2007, of which 
the three research themes (Trade, Social and Environment) can easily be recognized in the 
presentation of the current simulations. The Chinagro model will be updated and extended under 
CATSEI, integrating the research results on its three themes.   
 
Five partner institutes cooperated in the Chinagro project: the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria; the Centre for World Food Studies (SOW-VU), 
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy 
(CCAP), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; the Institute for Geographical Sciences and 
Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; and the China 
Agricultural University (CAU), also in Beijing. The first three institutes have extended their 
cooperation in the CATSEI-project, together with the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) of the University of London, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 
Washington and the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) in The Hague. 
 
We acknowledge the contributions of several of our colleagues and project partners in obtaining 
the results presented in this report, in the form of consultations, background studies, technical 
assistance and logistic support. We mention especially Peter Albersen (SOW-VU), Chen Fu 
(CAU) and Xiubin Li (IGSNRR). 
 
 
Günther Fischer 
Jikun Huang 
Michiel Keyzer 
Huanguang Qiu 
Laixiang Sun 
Wim van Veen  
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Abstract  
 
 
The report describes prospects and challenges for Chinese agriculture until 2030 under different 
scenarios, using the Chinagro welfare model. A scenario is defined as a coherent set of 
assumptions about exogenous driving forces (farm land, population, non-agricultural growth, 
world prices etc.), derived from the literature and own assessments. Under these assumptions, 
simulations with the Chinagro model analyze the price-based interaction between the supply 
behavior of farmers, the demand behavior of consumers and the determination of trade flows by 
merchants.  
 
The outcomes from the Baseline scenario seem reassuring in that foreign imports remain 
moderate relative to China’s size, though quite large as fraction of world trade. It would be 
possible to feed people as well as animals without excessive imports. There is even a potential for 
significant export flows of vegetables and fruits. Regarding concerns, the trends in per capita 
agricultural value added are problematic, because they stay in all regions behind per capita value 
added outside agriculture, albeit that they are rising steadily. This leads to growing disparity in 
per capita incomes within and across regions. The mounting environmental pressure from 
fertilizer losses and unused manure surpluses is another cause of concern. The second scenario, 
the Trade liberalization scenario, appears to hurt farm incomes more than it benefits them and to 
raise the gap with non-agriculture, also because food becomes cheaper in urban areas. Hence, it 
highlights the difficult choice between economic efficiency and poverty alleviation that 
agricultural policy makers often face. The High income growth scenario reinforces the national 
food self-sufficiency result of the baseline simulation. Even with meat demand higher than under 
the baseline, levels of imports remain manageable. The High R&D scenario shows that a 
considerable reduction in dependence on agricultural imports is possible. However, a substantial 
part of the gains will accrue to consumers rather than to farmers, due to price reductions. Finally, 
the Enhanced irrigation scenario shows outcomes similar to those of the high R&D scenario. 
Here also the agricultural trade balance improves and consumer welfare improves, but farmers 
have to cope with drops in prices, and those who do not benefit from land improvement, only 
experience losses through falling prices.  
 
The present report is written at the onset of the CATSEI-project that will analyze policy packages 
with more specificity and detail after implementing the following model improvements. First, the 
impact of China’s imports and exports on world markets will be represented explicitly. Second, 
the developments outside agriculture in rural areas will be accounted for endogenously, 
particularly to represent farm revenue from off-farm employment. Third, the trade and 
transportation margins between farm-gates and markets will be made dependent on the relative 
flexibility of the actors (farmers, processors, traders) along the chain. Finally, the various 
techniques to identify more efficient and more sustainable use of scarce water and nutrients and 
to address health risks will appear more explicitly.  
  
  
1. Introduction 
 
China’s unprecedented economic growth since the start of the reform program in 1978 and the 
gradual liberalization of its trade have dramatically improved the living conditions in rural areas, 
largely through increased off-farm employment but also through significant productivity gains 
within the crop sector and further specialization of farms particularly toward livestock production 
and horticulture. Only 8 percent of the rural population was reported as being below the 
international poverty line1 in 2004, down from 31 percent in 1990 (NBSCb, various issues). 
However, already since the 1980s the rural to urban income gap has gradually widened, from a 
ratio of less than 2.5 in the middle 1980s to nearly 3.5 currently (NBSCa, various issues). 
Containing this aspect of income disparity requires spreading industrial development inland, 
while ensuring modernization of agriculture itself so as to combine sustainable rural development 
with the necessary adjustment of the agricultural sector to the further opening for trade, in 
particular since the nation’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001, and to emerging scarcity on international agricultural markets. After decades of surpluses 
food availability is expected to become tighter as a result of continued economic growth in Asia 
and the associated rise in demand for food and animal feeds, jointly with upcoming demand for 
biofuels and, over the medium term, the impact of climate change and the associated adaptation 
and mitigation policies worldwide. Hence, prolongation of current success will require several 
issues to be attended to simultaneously. 
 
Continued trade liberalization should enable China to ease the pressure on its food markets, 
where the trend of a fast growing demand for meat and animal feeds experienced over the past 
two decades is expected to persist for another two decades or more. However, it will also 
necessitate significant adaptation in existing farming practices and regional specialization 
patterns within China, as farmers will in many areas find it difficult to sustain competition with 
imports. The options for improving productivity per farmer are restricted by limited availability 
of new arable land, loss of land due to soil degradation and urbanization, water shortages and 
exhaustion of the unused potential for yield increases on the basis of conventional technology. At 
the same time, farmers will face increasingly strict regulations to mitigate the environmental and 
health risks of intensified agriculture. Given these restrictions, farmers are left with three options: 
modernizing staple crop production, switching to higher value products such as livestock and 
horticulture, or seeking employment outside the sector. 
 
Policy response 
In response to these challenges, the Chinese government (CPC, 2003) has formulated as its major 
strategic and policy aims: (i) to increase farmers’ incomes and provide remunerative rural 
employment, so as to maintain social stability at the local level; (ii) to narrow regional and rural 
versus urban disparity, so as to preserve political stability at national level; (iii) to improve 
resource use efficiency and product quality, so as to obtain the economic sustainability needed to 
face foreign competition; (iv) to arrest environmental degradation, so as to retain environmental 
sustainability; and (v) to keep an adequate degree of self-reliance in food at national level, which 
is considered an issue of state security.  
 
Even though these strategic goals are by now well recognized and widely accepted, the ways and 
means to achieve them are still subject to intense debate. With respect to national food security, 
the basic question seems no longer to be whether China can produce sufficient amounts of rice 
                                                   
1 Defined as one US dollar of 1993 per day per person, converted into Yuan using the World Bank’s Purchasing 
Power Parity exchange rate.  
 
 2 
and wheat for its vast population but whether it can feed the vast number of animals required to 
satisfy the rapidly increasing demand for meat, and, if not, whether it should import meat or 
import feed or import both. Furthermore, China’s huge population comprises numerous ethnic 
nationalities spread over a vast territory of complex geography and topography. Consequently, 
every region has its own geographical, ecological, and socio-economic specificity. This implies 
that an effective nationwide policy needs a diverse and well-adapted development package, based 
on a thorough understanding of the underlying diversity. In this context, an optimal mix is to be 
found between public and private actions as the competitive market is in many respects better 
equipped to address diversity than any other institution. 
 
However, despite the ongoing process of decentralization and trade liberalization, a number of 
key market institutions are still underdeveloped. On the commodity markets, those related to 
product grading and consumer protection leave to be desired. On agricultural factor markets, 
better titling of land is necessary, water management needs to become more efficient, and 
environmental protection should receive higher priority. Safety regulations for workers would be 
required and workers’ health and education need to be attended to, while supervision of banking 
and insurance must ensure that agriculture receives sufficient credit while avoiding poor debt 
service and bad loans. Furthermore, income transfers will surely be needed in order to contain 
income disparity across regions and between rural and urban areas. Moreover, the 
decentralization process itself, whereby autonomy is to be transferred to or left with individuals 
and local organizations, has become all the more subtle as the wealth becomes less evenly 
distributed among the population. In short, several interventions will be needed that should be 
planned carefully and duly justified to the public as well to foreign investors worldwide.  
 
Hence, government agencies at both national and provincial level will have to draft transparent 
policy documents in which sufficient motivation is provided for each policy measure taken, in 
particular to demonstrate that the interventions proposed are necessary, not overly centralized and 
answering to the local needs of every province.  
 
The present paper intends to contribute to this process of policy design. It reports on scenario 
simulations with the Chinagro-model, originally developed under the EC-funded Fifth 
Framework project of the same name, and adapted further under ‘Options for Agricultural 
Development in China’, the follow-up project funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature Management and Food Quality. It will be updated and extended under CATSEI, an EC-
funded Sixth Framework project devoted to studying the prospects of agricultural trade between 
China and the EU. These projects seek to offer science-based decision support tools that can help 
in the formulation of adequate policy packages to facilitate the continued modernization of 
Chinese agriculture and the smooth development of trade relations with foreign partners. Against 
the background sketched above, these tools had to be designed so as to represent the following 
five aspects of agricultural planning in sufficient detail: 
 
(1) the constraints of geophysical and natural resource conditions on agriculture production,  
(2) the market forces determining the distribution of agricultural activities,  
(3) the spatial spread and social diversity of China’s population,  
(4) the impacts of policy on farm incomes and on regional disparity,  
(5) the environmental impacts of agriculture. 
 
Literature 
As these five aspects are well recognized, the literature considering them is extensive. It 
essentially falls in two parts, one the domain of agronomists and economic geographers 
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describing the geo-physical and natural resource conditions in each region, the other the domain 
of agricultural economists comparing production costs across regions. 
 
Among the agronomic studies, the study by Zhou (1993) on the theory and practice of China’s 
agricultural regional planning is widely quoted. In Zhou’s study, every region was examined 
according to its climate, temperature, precipitation, soil, landform, length of crop growing period 
etc. Based on the assessment of these factors, suggestions are made as to which type of grain and 
livestock would best match the region’s natural environment. With the recent advances in the 
geographical information system (GIS)-techniques, geographers have been able to extend this 
approach into a comprehensive spatial assessment of the impact of the natural resource 
constraints on agricultural production, for example by means of FAO’s Agro-Ecological Zones 
(AEZ) methodology (Fischer et al., 2002).  
 
This AEZ-methodology can be used to identify the geophysical limitations on agriculture 
production within every region, and to formulate options for more efficient use of the local 
natural resources, and in fact provides one of the major inputs of the Chinagro-model. However, 
while agriculture production undeniably depends on the available natural resources and 
environmental conditions, describing agricultural potentials is only a first step. Regional 
development planning has to go several steps further, as agriculture is conducted by farmers using 
inputs provided by industry and delivering outputs to the agro-processing sector and eventually to 
consumers, domestically and abroad. In short, the full supply chain and its embedding within the 
economy have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the rapid change currently 
experienced in this chain has to be accounted for. 
 
Turning to the studies on regional development planning by Chinese agricultural economists who 
focus on comparing production costs across regions, we cite Huang and Ma (2001) and Xu et al. 
(2001). These two works use the Domestic Resource Costs (DRC) method to analyze each 
province’s cost advantage in producing staple grains, economic crops, and main livestock 
products. This approach has the advantage that it takes into account the differences in prices and 
input intensities between regions for, say, labor and fertilizer. However, it only measures the 
present situation. It can at best provide a useful guideline on the direction of agricultural 
restructuring because any actual restructuring would change the prices and intensities in every 
region. A decision support tool must be able to account for these changes. 
 
Furthermore, the available studies on regional development do not consider the implications of 
changes in regional demand resulting from increased income and rural-to-urban migration, both 
of which significantly affect inter-regional and foreign trade as well as the patterns of production 
across regions. Indeed, a region with strong cost advantages may not be able to realize these 
advantages fully as high transportation cost, inter-regional trade barriers, and other trade costs can 
offset all of them. Young (2000) and Hussain (2004) point out that transaction costs play an 
important role in determining the distribution of China’s regional agriculture production. 
 
Recently, several partial equilibrium models have been developed to take the supply, demand and 
trade aspects simultaneously into consideration. Huang and Rozelle (2003) and Huang, Li and 
Rozelle (2003) use the CAPSiM regional model, a partial equilibrium model with 18 agricultural 
commodities, to analyze the impacts of WTO accession on agricultural production and 
consumption and on farm incomes in different provinces across China. These studies show that 
while trade liberalization will stimulate structural changes of China’s agriculture in favor of its 
more competitive sector (i.e. labor-intensive agricultural products) and increase the average 
farming income, it will also enlarge income disparity among regions. However, the CAPSiM 
model does not fully consider resource constraints, such as water and land availability, existing at 
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local level. Xin et al. (2002 and 2003) have also developed a regionalized partial equilibrium 
model, representing China’s domestic grain and meat trade. Their model explicitly accounts for 
transportation costs, but as grain and meat are modeled and simulated independently it cannot 
handle the interactions between grain and livestock sectors. Neither does it consider the local 
resource constraints in each region.  
 
The Chinagro models 
The importance of the five aspects mentioned earlier and the limitations of available studies 
inspired the Chinagro-project to develop and implement models of two kinds, one comprehensive 
with the county-level as the lowest-level geographical unit, and the other commodity-specific but 
spatially explicit.  
 
The comprehensive model is a 17-commodity, 8-region general equilibrium welfare model. Farm 
supply is represented at the level of 2,433 counties (virtually all), and accommodates for every 
county outputs of 28 products and 14 land use types and livestock systems. Consumption is 
depicted at regional level, separately for the urban and the rural population, each divided into 
three income groups, and domestic trade is interregional. The model structure is described in 
Keyzer and Van Veen (2005), while a comprehensive list of classifications and the data base are 
documented in Van Veen et al. (2005).  
 
The model describes the price-based interaction between the supply behavior of farmers, the 
demand behavior of consumers and the trade flows connecting them. Farmers maximize their 
revenue by optimally allocating labor and equipment to cropping and livestock activities, at 
exogenously specified land resources, stable capacities and levels of technology, while taking the 
buying and selling prices in the county as given. Consumers maximize their utility, at given 
prices, by optimally allocating their expenditures according to a utility function that is 
quasilinear, i.e. linear with unit coefficient in part of non-food consumption and obeying a linear 
expenditure system in agricultural commodities and the remainder of non-agricultural 
consumption, which acts as numeraire. 
 
Trade between regions in China and with the rest of the world is cost minimizing at exogenously 
given world prices and import and export tariff rates. Through its significant geographic detail, 
the model can incorporate location-specific information on climate, resources and technology 
while its equilibrium structure enables it to represent coordination flows among the various 
agents and describe market clearing at different levels.  
 
A model with such a level of detail in classifications is not designed to represent truly 
endogenous dynamics, as this would inevitably lead to serious accumulation of prediction errors 
over time. Therefore, a formulation was opted for that assumes an exogenous value for a wide 
range of driving variables, and statically solves for the values of the endogenous variables for 
each year of simulation separately, given the assumed values of the driving variables. Together 
these exogenous variables define a simulation scenario. 
 
Major driving forces are non-agricultural output growth, population growth, urbanization and 
interregional migration, international prices, changes in land and water resources and stable 
capacities, adjustment of food preferences, technical progress and trade liberalization. The 
important role of these driving forces requires a careful and coherent specification of their future 
trends.  
 
The present report focuses on the findings from five simulation exercises with the general 
equilibrium model over the period 1997-2030: (i) baseline, (ii) trade liberalization, (iii) rapid 
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economic growth, (iv) high agricultural R&D investment, and (v) enhanced irrigation efforts. 
Each scenario is designed to reflect different pathways for the major driving forces. The partial 
model was operated in the background to analyze spatial aspects in greater detail.  
 
The report proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the key concerns for agricultural 
development to be addressed in the report. Section 3 gives a bird’s eye view of the model 
specification expanding on the description given above. Section 4 introduces the scenarios based 
on the main driving forces that will impact upon Chinese agriculture until 2030. Section 5 reports 
on the model results for the baseline scenario assumptions, whereas section 6 discusses the 
outcomes of the other scenarios. Finally, section 7 summarizes the findings, mentioning possible 
policy implications and concludes with some suggestions for future research. Appendix A 
describes the output specification of crop and livestock activities, as background in understanding 
the tables with model outcomes, and Appendix B presents comprehensive tables with outcomes 
of all five scenarios.  
 6 
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2. Agricultural development issues 
 
 
As argued in the introduction, major determinants in shaping the future dynamics of China’s food 
and agricultural sector include: (i) increasing non-farm incomes, (ii) further urbanization, (iii) 
changing consumer demand patterns as a consequence of (i) and (ii) as well as of globalization, 
(iv) land scarcity due to substantial conversion of land for non-agricultural as well as ecological 
reasons, and water scarcity, and (v) environmental threats such as ground and surface water 
pollution that could severely affect drinking water quality in some regions. Here, we will provide 
some background to each of these determinants, culminating in the formulation of key questions 
to be analyzed with the model simulations.  
 
 
Non-farm incomes 
On average, gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at more than 9 per cent annually since the 
start of the reform program in 1978, an unprecedented record that is even more impressive in 
view of the nation’s size. In 2005, per capita GDP reached 14,000 Yuan or 1,710 US dollar, 
measured at the official exchange rate. Although the reforms started in agriculture, this sector’s 
growth rate was soon surpassed by the growth rates in industry and services, leading to sharp 
structural changes in the economy. While agriculture accounted for 40% of GDP prior to the 
economic reforms in 1970, its share had fallen to 28% in 1985 and further to 16% in 2000. 
During the same period, the share of industry, including construction, increased from 46% in 
1970 to 51% in 2000, and the share of the service sectors from 13% to 33% (Huang et al., 2003). 
In recent years the relative decline of the agricultural sector continued, reaching a share of 13% in 
2005 (NBSCa, 2006).  
 
At its early stage, the reform process outside agriculture could easily make use of local labor 
surpluses, abundantly available and well-disciplined that made it possible to achieve the initial 
high growth rates, which in nominal terms were actually quite modest in those days. Far more 
remarkable is that the high growth rates could be maintained over such a long period. Common 
explanations2 comprise the political and social stability, in part attributable to the improved rural 
and urban living conditions and the success in agriculture, the programs to improve education and 
accelerate technological progress, and the timely relaxation of migration and trade policies. These 
factors also made the country attractive to foreign investors, who increased their direct 
investments from 1.7 billion US $ in 1985 (0.5% of GDP) to 35.8 billion US $ in 1995 (4.9% of 
GDP) and 54.9 billion US $ in 2004 (2.8% of GDP). More importantly, the astonishingly high 
domestic saving rate of around 40 per cent of GDP in most years (NBSCa, various issues) made it 
possible to finance massively the investments that fueled this growth. 
 
Figure 2.1 gives an illustration of the geographical distribution of these developments, expressed 
as the average annual provincial growth rates in the industrial sector (including construction) 
during the period 1979-2004. The figure shows that over the whole post-reform period, growth 
rates were highest in the Southern and Eastern coastal areas, reaching more than 15% annually, 
but also in inland areas average growth was impressive, largely due to the success of Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVE’s) in absorbing rural labor from the own region. In all provinces 
the average growth rates reach above 7.5% and in most inland provinces even above 10%. For 
services, the differences across provinces were even less, with all growth rates ranging from 10% 
to 14% annually. Hence, per capita non-agricultural incomes have risen significantly in every 
province.  
                                                   
2 E.g. Arayama and Miyoshi (2004), Huang et al. (1999), Hubacek and Sun (2001) and Keng (2004). 
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Figure 2.1 Growth rates of industry (including construction) by province, 1979-2004 
 
 
   
  Source: calculated from NBSC, Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues. 
 
 
However, under fast economic expansion seemingly small differences in regional performance 
can eventually create significant disparity. Over a period of 25 years the difference between, for 
instance, 9 and 12% annual growth leads to 100% difference in the cumulative factor of increase 
(8.6 versus 17). Migration from the slower to the faster growing segments of the economy could 
not mitigate these gaps, especially not in the earlier, restrictive years of the reform period, and 
neither could growth in agricultural incomes. Therefore, the rapid non-agricultural expansion was 
a source of increasing inequality across regions, which is confirmed by the income data in Table 
2.1, taken from Lin et al. (2004).  
 
 
Table 2.1 Regional income disparity, 1985-2000 
 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Coast-inland income ratio     
  Urban 1.25 1.31 1.42 1.42 
  Rural 1.27 1.38 1.66 1.67 
  Urban plus rural 1.31 1.43 1.65 1.65 
  
Source: Lin et al. (2004). Coastal provinces are Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan.    
 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the relative incomes (corrected for provincial differences in inflation) of 
coastal provinces increased steadily from 1985 to 1995 and then stabilized more or less in the last 
years of the previous century. The differences are larger for rural than for urban areas, signaling 
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that in coastal provinces the rural areas benefited more from the non-agricultural expansion than 
in inland provinces.   
 
In addition, the fast expansion outside agriculture led to widening income disparities also within 
the same province, especially between urban and rural areas. The national average per capita rural 
and urban incomes in the period 1978-2004 are shown in Figure 2.2, expressed in constant 2000 
Yuan. The absolute income gap increased in all years since 1985 but the relative income gap, 
albeit less easy to see in the figure, shows an alternating picture, with its lowest value in the mid-
eighties at about 2.5, then rising until 1995, declining slightly between 1995 and 2000 and rising 
again in recent years, reaching a value of around 3.3 in 2004.    
 
 
Figure 2.2 Development of rural and urban per capita income (in constant 2000 Yuan) 
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  Source: calculated from NBSC, Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues 
 
 
The rising inequality across and within regions is also reflected in the trend of the Gini 
coefficients, which for rural areas went up from 0.24 in 1980 to 0.37 in 2003 (NBSCc, various 
issues). Ever since the mid-1990s, this rising disparity has attracted great attention from both 
policy-makers and the public at large. In response, several regional development and poverty 
alleviation programs were launched, with some success, as the gap in industrial growth rates 
between the developed and less developed regions shrank significantly since the mid-1990s 
(Huang et al. 2003, Table 9). Nonetheless, since the annual rate of net inter-regional migration is 
typically less than 1 percentage point (Liu et al. 2003, Table 11), these differences in growth rates 
still generate a widening income gap on a per capita basis. 
 
The consequences of continued growth outside agriculture would be threefold: (1) there will be 
strong competition for land and water in urban and semi-urban areas, and in some regions 
possibly also for labor, (2) food self-sufficiency becomes less critical as the country can afford 
significant agricultural imports, (3) the rising incomes will shift demand to better quality foods. 
These three developments combined define the major policy challenge of containing the 
widening income gap between the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy, and more 
generally between urban and rural areas. 
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Population dynamics 
When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, it counted a population of 540 million people. 
Two decades later the figure had risen to more than 800 million and in 2005 it reached 1.3 billion. 
Despite these enormous increases in absolute numbers, the actual growth rates have been rather 
moderate, with an average annual rise of 2.0% from 1949 to 1970 and only 1.4% since 1970. 
Indeed, population policies and campaigns have been ongoing ever since the 1950s. During the 
1970s, a campaign of ‘one is good, two is acceptable and three is too many’ was conducted, and 
in 1979 the emphasis was even more drastically placed on the benefits for the country of having 
only one child per household, promoted by a system of social control and fines. Therefore, in 
view of the medium term effects it is no surprise that natural population growth has by now 
dropped further to 0.6 per cent annually. 
 
At present, the Chinese population is still young with 36% below the age of 25, and a fraction of 
working age population of 72% (NBSCa, 2005, Table 4-6). This composition has created a 
vigorous and mobile labor force that fuels current growth and supports high levels of savings. 
Furthermore, the youthfulness of the population will inevitably keep population numbers rising 
for many years to come, despite low fertility rates. Specifically, the present demographic situation 
exhibits two counteracting trends: while economic growth, urbanization and the associated 
change in lifestyle may lead to lower fertility rates, modernization and the opening of society 
might trigger a reversal of the strict one-child policy in family planning. The latter could also 
reverse the recent unfortunate trend of increasing male surpluses in the lower age classes, as 
becoming more and more visible in the regular population figures, with 55% male among all 
children below the age of ten. 
 
Apart from the age composition, the concentration of its population in the Eastern part of the 
country is a basic characteristic of China’s current demographic situation. A large part of China’s 
land such as the Gobi Desert, the steep slopes of the Himalayas, and the vast dry grasslands of the 
north-central region remain virtually uninhabited. About 1.15 billion people, or about 90 percent 
of the population, live on little more than 30 percent of China’s land area. This agrees with 
historical settlement patterns, with population concentrated along the coast and in the fertile 
alluvial plains of the East, as well as in the Red Basin. The urban agglomerations have developed 
in these zones as well. 
 
Given the large pool of underemployed rural labor force and the important disparities in income 
and living standards, the natural push towards rural-urban migration has been strong for a long 
time. As the absorption capacity of the cities was limited, migration was kept in check through 
dedicated institutional arrangements such as the hukou registration system, the land tenure system 
and the social welfare and security system, all designed to keep the people linked to their place of 
origin. Nevertheless, under the pressure of the increasing regional and rural-urban discrepancies 
the hukou system has gradually been relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s (Liu et al., 2003). During 
that period, migration from Western and Central China to the Eastern regions, especially the 
coastal areas, has contributed significantly to the population growth of these regions. The three 
major destinations were the provinces Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong, with 3.5, 2.7 and 11.4 
million immigrants, respectively, during the period 1990-2000 (Liu et al., 2003). Yet, because of 
higher fertility the overall population growth rates have not been much lower in the poorer 
hinterland in the West than in the richer coastal regions since its fertility rates are higher. These 
regional differences in fertility rate are expected to be maintained in coming years (Jiang and 
Zhang, 1998).  
 
In spite of its persistent urbanization, China can still be considered a predominantly rural society. 
In 2000, after two decades of rapid growth outside agriculture with high demand for urban labor, 
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only some 36 per cent of the population was living in urban areas.3  This distribution could 
become an impediment to growth, as it creates the problem known as “san nong” (or “three 
nong”): stagnation of agriculture, farmers’ incomes and rural development. It is appreciated that 
the agricultural sector cannot resolve these problems by itself, as it needs labor outmigration to 
improve its productivity per hectare and its income per worker. The authorities recognize this 
hurdle and have proclaimed the promotion of urbanization as a strategic priority of China’s 
economic development in the coming decades. In line with this policy, a further relaxation of the 
hukou system was applied at the beginning of 2001 (Liu et al., 2003) allowing the urbanization 
rate to rise to over 40 per cent in 2005. 
 
 
Food patterns 
Traditionally, grains have been of overriding importance in Chinese diets, while meat, fishery 
products, vegetables, and fruits were considered rare luxuries. Obviously, the rising living 
standards have dramatically changed this picture. Nowadays, urban residents typically prefer 
a more diverse diet with a greater share of processed foods. All Chinese now eat more meat 
and dairy products, while grain consumption has levelled off and even declined in some 
regions. Table 2.2 shows the considerable increases in meat, milk and egg consumption 
between 1980 and 2000, when per capita consumption of pork more than doubled whereas 
per capita consumption of poultry meat even became six times as high, in both rural and 
urban areas. Furthermore, the table shows that per capita consumption of livestock products 
is still much lower in rural than in urban areas, and that urban consumption is now beginning 
to diversify towards ruminant meat and dairy.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Per capita consumption of livestock products 
 
 Rural (kg/person/year) Urban (kg/person/year) 
 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Pork 9.9 14.9 22.1 14.5 29.9 32.8 
Beef 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 2.5 4.8 
Mutton 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.8 2.0 2.2 
Poultry 0.8 1.6 4.8 2.0 5.0 12.3 
Milk 0.6 1.4 1.5 4.6 10.4 18.6 
Eggs 1.6 3.9 8.0 5.0 13.7 18.7 
                     
Source: CCAP data base. The figures are higher than the official ones due to 
coverage of consumption outside the own house. 
 
 
Also within rural and urban areas major differences can be observed. For example, according to 
the 2006 Statistical Yearbook of NBSC, meat consumption of poorest urban households only 
reaches 60% of the level of middle income households and even less when food eaten outside 
home is taken into consideration. By comparison, the Chinagro data base (Van Veen et al., 2005) 
reveals that in 1997 average per capita meat consumption of the poorest third of the rural 
                                                   
3
 We adopt the definition of urban population used in the Fifth National Population census of 2000. For a 
detailed comparison across different definitions, see Liu et al. (2003). 
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population was only half of the consumption of the richest third. This strongly suggests that meat 
consumption will continue to grow fast in coming decades, given the expected income rise and 
further urbanization.  
 
International comparison confirms this conclusion. According to FAO’s most recent Food 
Balance Sheets (FAO, 2007a) China’s average food calorie supply per person per day still falls 
about 15% below the level of rich developed countries, a difference almost fully due to a lower 
consumption of animal products. Current (i.e. 2003-2005 average) food calorie supply of animal 
products in China is 609 kcal per person compared to 482 in South Korea, 585 kcal in Japan, 955 
in UK, 1063 kcal in USA, 1103 in Germany and 1255 in France. These gaps are expected to 
disappear in the coming decades due to the surge in meat consumption of the poor segments of 
the population (see also Keyzer et al., 2005). Furthermore, looking more closely at the figures for 
the Asian countries, it appears that with 37 kcal against 89 kcal in South Korea and 172 kcal in 
Japan, today’s calorie intake from fish is on the low side in China as compared to these 
neighbors, suggesting that fish demand might rise quickly as well, presumably leading to 
intensified aquaculture in China, as ocean fishery would never suffice to fill the gap. Since for all 
practical purposes aquaculture can be considered a form of intensive livestock production, this 
only amplifies future feed grains requirements. 
 
 
Farmland and water resources 
Within agriculture itself, availability of arable land is generally perceived as the major 
determinant of the nation’s capacity to produce sufficient food for its huge population. Despite its 
large territory, China is severely limited in its farmland resources, which are, moreover, 
threatened by land degradation and by the expansion of non-agricultural land uses in response to 
rapid economic growth and urbanization, particularly in the river plains. Total cropland area is 
currently estimated at about 135 million hectare (or 0.1 hectare per inhabitant), of which 10 
million hectare consists of orchard land. Figure 2.3 gives a geographical overview of the land 
suitability for cereal cropping, based on the AEZ agro-edaphic suitability classification and 
assuming an intermediate level of management and input conditions (Fischer et al, 2002). In 
Western-Eastern direction, land suitability is highly correlated to the distribution of population 
but within the coastal regions the population concentrations in North and Northeast are much 
better endowed with good-quality cereal land than those in the South. 
 
According to the land monitoring data of the Ministry of Land and Resources of China (MLR), 
between 1987 and 2000 the net decrease (after compensation by reclamation) of China’s farmland 
amounted to more than 4 million hectares, which represents an annual loss of 0.3 million 
hectares, due partly to competition from other sectors, and partly to conservation measures. 
Indeed, of the total farmland lost between 1987 and 2000, 25 per cent was transformed into 
orchards and fishponds, 22 per cent into built-up lands, and 38 per cent into forestland and 
grassland for conservation purposes. The remaining 15 per cent were abandoned altogether as 
they became unusable due to severe damage by natural hazards. Because of these factors 
encroaching on farmland is generally expected to continue in coming decades. 
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Figure 2.3 Land suitability for cereal production 
 
 
  Source: calculated by IIASA following the methodology described in Fischer at al. (2002) 
 
 
Regarding environmental degradation and natural hazards several provinces of Western China are 
particularly at risk, as a significant fraction of their cultivated land is located on steep 
mountainous and hilly slopes. The 1998 Yangtze River flooding and recurring droughts in the 
Yellow River basin have heightened public awareness of the severity of Western China’s 
ecological degradation and its dire environmental and economic consequences. The loss of key 
ecosystem services has resulted in a series of severe environmental and ecological problems 
downstream. The highly fragile environments have adversely affected the livelihood and welfare 
of millions of poor farmers and herders, and act as a brake on economic development in some of 
China’s poorest provinces. Until recently, conversion of sloped farmland into forest, shrub or 
grassland has been greatly stimulated through the National Land Conversion Program, initially 
called the “Grain for Green” Program. As the ecosystem services and environmental goods 
provided by the green lands are not rewarded by the market, government has a crucial role to play 
in this domain to combat environmental degradation and to act as a trustee for future generations 
in its natural resource management. The current policy is to ensure that by 2010 all farmland on 
slopes steeper than 25° will be transformed into forest, shrub or grassland. 
 
While degradation affects the largest areas of fragile marginal lands, the drop in agricultural 
production potential is mainly caused by construction activities as these tend to take away the 
best quality farmland. Furthermore, as this loss commonly takes place in the densely populated 
urban fringes, it has undoubtedly caused a great number of farmers to lose their land. Statistical 
regression exercises using data at provincial level indicate that the annual increase in built-up 
land is highly and positively correlated with the annual growth rate of provincial GDP and 
population (Lu et al, 2004). 
 
According to the Land Management Law and related regulations, farmland converted into 
construction land should be fully compensated by an equivalent area of reclaimed, consolidated 
or rehabilitated farmland. However, the feasibility of this requirement is questionable. First, the 
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newly built-up areas will typically not be situated in the same county within a province and, 
hence, not fall under the same administrative jurisdiction as the areas where compensation is 
supposed to take place. This creates asymmetric incentives and monitoring difficulties. Second, 
the farmers who lost their land to the newly built-up areas tend to be unwilling to migrate to these 
compensation areas that are usually located in more remote and backward areas. Third, execution 
of land reclamation, consolidation or rehabilitation projects is expensive. Finally, even 
disregarding these costs, farming might not be economically viable on these compensation lands. 
Not surprisingly, in view of the difficulties, a recent land survey suggests that, on average, 
compensation takes place for only about two-thirds of newly built-up land converted from 
farmland and this only as long as reclaimable land is available within the same province (Lu at al. 
2004). On the whole, in the period 1987-2000, 9.1 million hectares of farmland was lost whereas 
5.1 million hectares was reclaimed, leading to the net loss of 4 million hectares mentioned earlier. 
 
Next to the availability of farmland itself, adequacy of water control is the major determinant of 
agricultural productivity. Nearly 45 per cent of China’s farmland (excluding orchards) is 
irrigated, and because of the common practice of multi-cropping on this land, even 54 per cent of 
all sown area is irrigated. The share of irrigated land varies significantly across regions, due to 
diverse environmental conditions, and ranges from 74 per cent in the East Region to 21 per cent 
in the Northeast. Farming is also more intensive on irrigated land. Under similar natural 
conditions, cropping on irrigated land uses 50 per cent more farm labor and 100 per cent more 
chemical fertilizers than cropping on rainfed land, and its yield is generally more than double. We 
estimate that 72 per cent of grain output is produced on irrigated land. For rice, the share is well 
over 90 per cent, for wheat over 85 per cent, whereas it only is about 45 per cent for maize and 30 
per cent for soybeans, both major feed grains.4 
 
In terms of potentials for future expansion of irrigated surfaces, the share in the Northeast is 
likely to increase, because this is a major grain producing area that has the lowest irrigated share 
of all regions but plenty of water available. By contrast, in the North region, water availability is 
a pressing problem due to fast rising non-agricultural water demand. The water resources of 
mainly the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Huai and Hai watersheds are 
severely overexploited (MWR, 2002). The difference between renewable water supply and 
demand is being made up by groundwater overpumping, lowering the water table in several areas 
of the North China Plain by 1-2 meters per year and allowing saltwater intrusion in coastal areas. 
In the coastal provinces of the South region, the share of irrigation area has been dropping. This 
trend is expected to continue due to farmland conversion to built-up land and the consequent 
disruption of irrigation systems. The remaining regions are expected to maintain their current 
share of irrigated land. As water available for irrigation will at best be stagnant and more likely 
be declining due to competing demands for non-agriculture use in the future, the key to 
preservation and expansion of irrigated areas lies in a more rational and efficient water use. In 
addition, plans have been designed and work has begun for the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project consisting of three large diversions to bring nearly 45 billion cubic meters of water per 
year from the Yangtze River to the dryer areas in the North, to be constructed phase by phase and 
to be completed in 2050.5 
 
 
                                                   
4 The figures in this paragraph are from the Chinagro data base. The definitions of the regions of the Chinagro 
model are shown in Figure 3.1. 
  
5 To give an impression of the size of these works: MWR (2002) estimates total national water use in 2002 at 
550 billion cubic meters! 
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Agricultural adaptation and environmental threats 
The gradual shift of production responsibility to farm households over the past decades, initiated 
with the dismantling of the communes and the introduction of the Household Responsibility 
System in the period 1979-1984,6 has enabled the agricultural sector to adapt to changing external 
conditions such as the process of trade liberalization and the increased demand for richer diets. 
This adjustment led to significant changes in the composition of the sector, from one that was 
“taking food grains as its key link” (the mantra during China’s Socialist period) to a dynamic 
sector in which livestock and feed grains, aquaculture, high valued fruits and vegetables can 
increase their share at a breathtaking pace. The agricultural sector in this new, commercialized, 
market-oriented setting is altogether different from the one that existed even a decade or two ago 
that primarily aimed at producing enough rice and wheat to supply the people with sufficient 
calories. Table 2.3 shows the relative decline of the foodgrain areas and the relative increase of 
vegetables, fruits and feedgrain areas since 1985, as well as the rising share of the livestock sector 
in farm valued added.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Changes in agriculture, 1985-2005 
 
 1985 1995 2005 
Total sown area, in million ha 143.6 149.9 155.5 
    of which:    
     Rice, in % 22.3 20.5 18.6 
     Wheat, in % 20.3 19.3 14.7 
     Maize, in % 12.3 15.2 17.0 
     Soybean, in % 5.4 5.4 6.1 
     Tubers, in % 6.0 6.4 6.1 
     Vegetables, in % 3.3 6.3 11.4 
    
Orchard area, in million ha 2.7 8.1 10.0 
    
Share of livestock in 
agricultural output value (in %) 
 
22.1 
 
29.7 
 
33.7 
 
Source: NBSC, 2006 Statistical yearbook. 
 
 
Following the strong improvements in yields per hectare, domestic foodgrain availability has not 
really suffered from the area decline. The Statistical Yearbooks (NBSCa, various issues) show 
that wheat yields went up from 3.0 ton per hectare (average 1985-1987) to 4.2 ton per hectare 
(average 2003-2005), while paddy yields increased in the same period from 5.3 to 6.2 ton per 
hectare and maize yields from 3.8 to 5.1 ton per hectare. Therefore, moderate food grain imports 
have sufficed so far. In the period 1995-2004 annual net wheat imports averaged 2.4 million tons 
(say, 3% of production) whereas for rice there were, on average, even net exports of 1.3 million 
tons per year. Yet, due to fluctuations across years foodgrain supply did remain an issue of major 
concern for policy makers, leading to frequent alterations of grain procurement policies, also in 
the last decade.7 In the end, the advocates of compulsory grain procurement policies seem to have 
lost their case, especially after the huge costs of stock disposal incurred in 2000-2004, as the 
                                                   
6 Under the Household Responsibility System farmers obtained individual land tenure rights, initially for a 
period of 15 years. For a discussion of the agricultural reform experience see e.g. Huang and Rozelle (2004). 
  
7 Overviews of China’s grain policies since the initiation of the agricultural reforms in the late 1970s are 
provided by e.g. Huang and Rozelle (2004), Gale et al. (2005) and Chen (2007, chapter 2).  
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procurement system was abolished and replaced by a more market-oriented national grain reserve 
system. 
 
The rise in per hectare yields, observed for grains as well as for other crops, went along with 
considerable shifts in input use. In the period 1985–2005 the availability of machinery power 
increased with 6.1% annually, and chemical fertilizer use with 5.1%. Furthermore, the share of 
irrigated land increased with 1.1%. But this was also a period of diminishing labor use. Between 
1985 and 1999, manpower input per hectare went down with 2.6, 2.3 and 1.7% annually for rice, 
wheat and maize, respectively, according to the China Agricultural Production Cost and Revenue 
Compilation (NDRCa, various issues). These reductions are seen as the combined effect of 
technological improvement and a more rational use of labor induced by better employment 
opportunities outside agriculture.    
 
Yet, these productivity increases leave much room for further improvements. For example, while 
grain yields on average achieve higher levels than in most developing countries, they lie still well 
below the average levels in developed countries: the 2003-2005 average yields for wheat were 4.2 
ton per hectare against 7-8 ton in Western Europe, for paddy 6.2 ton per hectare against 7.6 ton in 
USA and for maize 5.1 ton per hectare against 8-9 ton in Western Europe and even more than 9 
ton in USA (FAO, 2007c). Also within China, comparison of realized yields with yields achieved 
at experimental stations points to significant room for improvement (Jin et al., 2002).8 These 
gains could be achieved through wider adoption of improved HYV seeds, a more balanced 
application of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, more intensive mechanization as well as through 
the increased use of modern inputs such as plastic film and specialized equipment, improved 
water control for drainage, increased irrigation efficiency, and more generally, through improved 
extension services and related agricultural research. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Hot-spots of fertilizer consumption (kg nitrogen/ha cultivated land), 2000 
 
Source: IIASA calculations described in Ermolieva et al. (2005) 
 
 
                                                   
8 For the year 1995 this source mentions 7.2, 5.2 and 7.9 ton per hectare as adopted potentials for paddy, wheat 
and maize, respectively. These levels have risen since.  
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In raising future crop yields, special attention will have to be paid to the application of fertilizer, 
from both chemical and organic origin. Application of chemical fertilizers has now reached high 
levels, on average close to 350 kg nutrient per hectare. Continuation of this increasing trend 
would pose severe threats to ground and surface water quality, in the area of application as well 
as at more distant locations (non-point source pollution). Figure 2.4 shows the hot-spots of 
fertilizer consumption (chemical plus organic) in terms of kg nitrogen per hectare cultivated land, 
as determined for the year 2000.  
 
With respect to livestock, China is among the countries with the highest densities of pigs and 
poultry in the world. It ranks first in pig and poultry production. Pork production is typically 
classified in one of three production systems: traditional backyard production with 1 to 5 pigs per 
production unit, specialized farms/households with 5 to 1000 pigs per unit and large-scale, 
industrialized farms with more than 1000 pigs per enterprise. To satisfy the growing meat 
demand, China has, as many other countries, rapidly adopted intensified peri-urban and urban 
livestock production systems. As shown in Figure 2.5, the share of the traditional backyard 
systems in pork production decreased sharply from 95% in 1985 to about 60% in 1999. Given the 
foreseeable rise in demand for meat and the limited potential of the traditional, crop residue- and 
pasture-based production technologies, this trend will definitely persist. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Share of pork output by production system, 1985-1999 
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         Source: Somwaru et al., 2003. 
 
 
The rapid adoption of intensified livestock production systems has far-reaching geographical, 
economic and social implications, as these systems tend to be introduced in areas where feed can 
be obtained at low cost and where market outlets are favorable. Hence, they concentrate in the 
vicinity of large cities and harbors, close to consumers, with easy access to foreign markets and 
where food and feed processing industries produce large volumes of byproducts useable as feeds. 
This concentration in turn breaks the traditional link between livestock and cropping activities 
and through this strongly impacts on the economic geography of the country.  
 
In this connection, some important geographical aspects of the country need to be noted. Several 
major urban agglomerations are situated along the coast and, except in the delta region, separated 
from the hinterland by hill tracts. Since inland transport is far more expensive than ocean 
shipping, especially when transporting from locations in rugged or hilly terrain, this gives foreign 
suppliers a significant cost advantage. In other words, at competitive pricing of products it may 
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be cheaper to export meat or feedgrains from New York or Rotterdam to Shanghai than from the 
Red Basin, where much of the livestock is being produced, and similarly, transporting maize from 
the Northeast to the Southwest may be as costly as importing it from overseas. This argument 
limits the possibilities of inland farmers but it works also the other direction: farmers located 
inland have a considerable advantage in supplying nearby inland population concentrations with 
fresh products as compared to foreign traders, the more so since richer consumers prefer fresh 
meat that is not deep-frozen and hence produced locally, with little competition from far-away 
coastal areas. Figure 2.6 illustrates this by showing the hot-spots of high intensity of confined (i.e. 
non-pastoral) livestock for the year 2000.  
 
Figure 2.6 Hot-spots of confined livestock (livestock biomass in kg/ha cultivated land), 2000 
 
 
Source: IIASA calculations described in Ermolieva et al. (2005) 
 
 
Currently, close to 50% of all feed still originates from crop residuals, grass and household waste, 
mainly used in traditional livestock systems. Because of their bulky nature, these feeds are not 
transported over large distances and hence referred to as local feeds. Although availability of 
grass and crop residuals will increase further due to improved cultivation techniques, and special 
green fodder crops will play an increasing role as well, local feeds cannot satisfy the needs of the 
fast growing intensified livestock sectors that will, therefore, require rising amounts of tradable 
feeds. Figure 2.6 gives an indication of the areas where strongest increases in feed use are 
expected. It appears that these areas are mostly limited in their scope for expanding feed 
production, particularly in South, leading to the question whether it will be more profitable to get 
the feed from the grain surplus areas in the North and Northeast or to import them from abroad. 
So far, the share of imports in national feed supply is rather limited. In terms of energy content, 
imports total around 10% of tradable feed intake,9 a share that would even be much lower had we 
applied a correction for the (subsidized) maize exports realized since 1997 to get rid of excessive 
domestic stock levels.  
 
The geographical concentration of confined livestock leads to three types of environmental 
concerns: (1) nutrient burden where not enough land is available for manure disposal and 
                                                   
9 Calculated for 2003 from the Chinagro data base. 
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recycling, causing land and water pollution, (2) danger of rapid spread of contagious animal 
diseases, and (3) road congestion and pollution caused by the trucks that transport the required 
amounts of feed. Together with the above-mentioned problems of nutrient losses in areas with 
high chemical fertilizer application, as well as with the food safety regulations that may restrict 
the use of pesticides and the choice of food processing techniques, these concerns define the 
environmental constraints within which China’s agricultural sector will have to adapt further to 
the changing external conditions. Even relocation of intensified livestock farms possibly has to be 
considered, taking into account the danger of contagious animal diseases together with the 
relative costs of transportation of animals (or meat) compared to the costs of transportation of 
feed.  
 
Key questions 
The considerations above lead to the following key questions for further analysis through 
scenario simulations with the model:  
 
1. Will the increasing demand for meat under continued growth and rural to urban 
migration cause China to become a major importer of either meat or feed grains or 
both? 
2. Will the shift to luxury food, jointly with technological progress, generate a grain 
surplus to be disposed of on the world market, or will the ongoing shift in cropping 
patterns towards fruits and vegetables and the loss of farmland to urbanization offset 
this effect? 
3. Will farmers in poorer regions of China be able to increase their incomes by supplying 
the growing domestic livestock and feed grain market, or will intensive large-scale 
production units and foreign exporters be better placed particularly for deliveries to the 
coastal regions?  
4. How can the regions in Northeastern China that still have large potential for feed grain 
production, overcome the disadvantage of their long distance from the livestock 
industry? 
5. How can the irrigation requirements in the semi-arid and generally water-deficit areas 
of the North China Plain be met to turn them into major feed producing zones? 
6. What are appropriate agricultural development options in Southern provinces that are 
less suited for livestock and cereal production but enjoy ample rainfall?  
7. How will enhanced trade liberalization measures affect specific commodities with 
strong competition from outside, such as sugar, protein feeds and feed grains? How 
will this impact on the income distribution across regions and between the rural and 
urban segments of the population? 
8. To which extent are the projected developments in livestock intensities and irrigation 
requirements environmentally sustainable in the longer term, and if not, what type of 
measures should be taken to achieve sustainability? 
 
As mentioned before, the Chinagro-project seeks to address these questions by means of a 
dynamic simulation model as a device to project the developments under different assumed 
scenarios with respect to policy assumptions as well as the external environment in which the 
sector will operate. These scenarios establish plausible future trends for all important 
socioeconomic, political, and environmental processes that are and have to be treated as given in 
the simulation model. Before proceeding with the description of the scenarios, we give a short 
overview of the Chinagro general equilibrium welfare model as used for scenario simulations. 
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3. A bird’s eye view of the model  
 
 
The general equilibrium welfare model (Keyzer and Van Veen, 2005) used for scenario 
simulations is cast in the form of a single-period welfare program that is solved for selected years 
of simulation over the period 1997-2030, evaluating solutions under given scenario conditions 
with respect to resource availability, demography, non-agricultural growth, life-style changes, 
technological progress, international prices and government policies. The years selected for 
simulation are 1997, 2003, 2010, 2020 and 2030. With respect to validation, the model fully 
replicates for every county and region of China in the 1997 base-year conditions, adequately 
mimics changes over the period 1997-2003 and provides interpretable results until 2030.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the welfare model is an 8-region model, with farm supply 
described at the much more disaggregated county level. The regions are shown in Figure 3.1. The 
distinction between the eight regions is based on their respective geographic, agro-climatic and 
demographic features, and economic development levels. The regions are subdivided into 
provinces, the actual administrative units in China. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of China with provincial boundaries and the eight Chinagro regions 
 
 
 
Note: Taiwan is not included in this analysis and, therefore, absent from the map.  
 
 
Farm supply is modeled for each of 2433 counties, covering virtually the whole of China, with 
farm output cast in terms of 28 activities consisting of 14 types of crops, 9 types of animals and 5 
related activities such as collection of household waste and supply of machinery power. Crop 
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activities take place on three land use types (irrigated land, rainfed land, orchards), whereas the 
livestock activities are conducted in six different livestock systems, distinguished on the basis of 
mode and intensity of production. The output of the cropping land use types and livestock 
systems comprises both local and tradable commodities. Local commodities are traded only 
inside the own county, and even then only over limited distances. They consist of local feed 
(grass, crop residuals, household waste, green fodder), organic fertilizer (animal manure, 
nightsoil) and power (draught power, machinery power). Tradable commodities are exchanged 
across all regions and from and to abroad. Their prices are determined endogenously in the 
general equilibrium model. The model distinguishes 17 of such tradable commodities. Appendix 
A presents the supply classifications and explains the relation between agricultural activities and 
tradable commodities, for livestock production separately by livestock system.  
 
As usual in general equilibrium (see e.g. Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 2002), supply and demand are 
balanced for all commodities simultaneously through domestic (here, intra-regional and inter-
regional) and international trade, jointly with price adjustment subject to various policy 
interventions such as tariffs and quotas on international trade. The model has been implemented 
as a fully integrated software package that efficiently runs from basic data, via solution 
algorithms and simulation, to automatic production of detailed county-level maps and tabulation 
of results, mainly in GAMS (see Brooke et al., 1998) but with use of dedicated Fortran and SAS 
programs for production of tables and maps. 
 
In tandem with the general equilibrium welfare model, commodity-specific models have been 
developed that follow a common specification as a partial equilibrium model with transportation 
costs. These partial equilibrium models are spatially explicit and represent supply, demand and 
trade flows on a 10-by-10 kilometer grid, totally about 94,000 cells. They serve to provide a 
transparent geographical representation of supply, demand, and commodity flows between cells, 
and also of price transmission through the delivery chain, while accounting for transportation 
costs as well as border measures such as tariffs and quotas, and producer and consumer taxes and 
subsidies. This in particular makes it possible to calculate the density distribution of consumer as 
well as producer prices within every county and to infer average transport margins from price 
information, for subsequent use in the general equilibrium welfare model.   
 
The general equilibrium welfare model itself focuses on the description of (a) supply response by 
farmers under their prevailing technology and natural resource endowments by county, (b) the 
behavior of consumers by region and income group for rural and urban separately, (c) the 
balancing on the regional markets of supply and demand, with appropriate trade between regions 
and with the foreign markets. Together, these decisions of producers, consumers and traders are 
such that at given exogenous conditions (in particular, agricultural resources and technology, 
non-agricultural output, international prices, government policies and the country’s trade surplus) 
and at given welfare weights, optimal social welfare is obtained. Indeed, once market distortions 
have been eliminated the model in every particular year generates an optimal allocation of 
agricultural production among regions, based on comparative advantage, while accounting for 
transportation costs. 
 
The (unique) equilibrium is found at regional prices for which the net quantities purchased in 
every region coincide with the net deliveries by traders. Of the 17 traded commodities mentioned 
earlier, 13 are food commodities and 2 are feed commodities whereas 1 commodity (maize) is 
used for both food and feed and 1 commodity is non-agricultural. The price of the non-
agricultural commodity is kept equal to the given export f.o.b. price for all market locations 
considered (after conversion from the dollar to Yuan). Hence, taxes and trade and transportation 
costs on non-agriculture are not distinguished separately. Since the utility functions of consumers 
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and the public demand by government treat the non-agricultural good as residual (i.e. are linear in 
it with unit coefficient), and the non-agricultural export f.o.b. price and the dollar-to-Yuan 
conversion rate are kept constant over the years, the domestic non-agricultural price remains 
fixed and normalizes all other prices, as is necessary for this commodity to act as numeraire. 
Therefore, all resulting prices and expenditures can be interpreted as “real” and comparable to the 
1997 price and expenditure levels. 
 
The specification of the model is best understood in terms of the behavior of the individual agents 
that appear in it, i.e. consumers, farmers and traders: 
 
Consumers 
Consumers are distinguished by location (urban, rural), by region and by income group (poor, 
middle, rich). Each individual of a specific group spends revenue on food according to a linear 
expenditure system with time-dependent coefficients. As mentioned earlier, expenditures on non-
food appear in this demand system as well but also separately, as closing item on individual 
budgets of consumer groups and in the national government budget. Revenue originates from 
direct earnings (entrepreneurial income, factor rewards) and private transfers as well as from 
government transfers (which are negative in case they pay income tax). Welfare weights on group 
utility determine the level of uncommitted expenditures of each consumer group. Hence, 
consumer demand adjusts both to scenario variables and to variables determined by the model 
itself, the latter of which are referred to as endogenous variables.  
 
The scenario variables include (a) the population numbers in every group as resulting from 
natural fertility, mortality, and migration across regions and from rural to urban; (b) the shifting 
coefficients of the demand systems reflecting the change in lifestyle as consumers become richer, 
including a shift from staples to luxury foods; (c) the social welfare weight on the group; (d) the 
price of non-agricultural commodities. The “only” endogenous variables are the prices of all 
agricultural commodities, at consumer level, that is after the appropriate processing from raw 
material to retail level. 
 
Farmers 
Farms are distinguished by county. The typical farm of a county chooses its cropping pattern and 
livestock activities by allocating its labor and equipment so as to maximize its current revenue, 
i.e. the net proceeds from sales minus the cost of current inputs (purchased feeds for animals and 
fertilizer for crops), subject to technological constraints specified separately for cropping land use 
types (irrigated land, non-irrigated land, orchards) and for several types of livestock systems 
(ruminant, non-ruminant with varying degree of intensification), for given land areas and stable 
capacities.  
 
The technology of each land use type (including the livestock systems) is represented via a two-
branch production function, 10  as shown in Figure 3.2. The upper panel indicates how much 
fertilizer per hectare f (respectively, feed per stable unit) is needed to achieve a given yield y. The 
lower panel shows for a given land use type how much yield can be obtained from given labor 
per hectare (respectively, labor per stable unit). The yield appears on the horizontal yield-axis, the 
level 1y  refers to the yield obtained without any input of purchased fertilizer and formal labor 
and bullock or tractor power and equipment  (i.e. with only child labor or informal work), 2y  to 
the yield obtained with formal labor 2?  but without purchased fertilizer (resp. purchased feed), 
i.e. with locally available manure and nightsoil (resp. with locally available crop and household 
                                                   
10  Earlier experience in estimating production relations for China as described in Albersen et al. (2002), 
contributed to this specification.  
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residues), and, finally, 3y  to the yield-threshold beyond which purchased fertilizer (resp. feed) 
use becomes less effective. The curve in the lower panel shows the response with decreasing 
returns to labor, where the bio-physical cropping potential y  appears on the right-hand side as a 
ceiling (asymptote) and measures the maximal amount of biomass that could be produced through 
photosynthesis under the given climate and soil conditions. For extensive grazing, a similar 
relationship is postulated but with the herd size in the role of labor input.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Two-branch production function of a typical farm 
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The variables in Figure 3.2 are indexes, specified at county level by land use type. These indexes, 
fertilizer (or feed) input f and yield y, in turn determine demand and supply of tradable 
commodities, whereas labor input ℓ is expressed in terms of equipped labor equivalents, 
comprising labor as well as available animal draught power and machinery. Local commodities 
(organic fertilizer and local feeds) are also accounted for and reduce the demand for fertilizer and 
feed input f by shifting the intercept 2y .  
 
On the output side, every land use type produces several crop (resp. livestock) commodities, 
according to substitution possibilities within each land use type.11 For example, the non-ruminant 
farm type jointly produces pork, poultry and eggs in county-specific proportions that can change 
under shifts in the relative prices of these goods. In addition, this farm type produces manure as a 
byproduct that can be used as fertilizer, and hence substitutes for purchased fertilizer. Similarly, 
cropping systems produce various tradable goods such as grains, vegetables, fruits and marketed 
feeds, as well as crop residuals such as straw and husks that can be used as local source of feed 
for livestock. Clearly, ruminants can use feed from pastures and grazings as well as other types of 
                                                   
11 The calculation proceeds for each land use type in two steps, one describing substitution between livestock 
and cropping activities, the other associating a commodity basket to each activity. The correspondence is given 
in Appendix A. 
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roughage, while non-ruminants are more restricted in their diet. Exogenous, county-specific 
utilization rates account for the limited possibility to use all byproducts from farming.    
 
Hence, the supply model has as trend scenario variables (a) the area of rain fed land, irrigated 
land, orchard land, grazing land, forests, built-on land; (b) the stable capacities of the various 
livestock systems; (c) the total farm labor available equipped with animal and tractor power; (d) 
utilization rates of local feed and organic manure. Furthermore, (e) neutral technological progress 
enters by specified trends on the aggregate yield of a land-use type, and (f) labor-saving technical 
progress by specified trends on the labor-effectiveness in a land-use type. Most importantly, the 
prices at county level endogenously determined on the market enter as determinants of farm 
supply and input demand. 
 
Traders 
Traders minimize for every traded commodity the total cost of delivery they must incur to satisfy 
consumption and input demand, given (i) the supply in the various counties, (ii) the possibility to 
import from and export to the world market at a given, tariff ridden price possibly subject to 
quota on foreign trade, and (iii) the unit cost of transport between regions as well as the unit cost 
to process the agricultural product from county level up to consumer level. This leads to trade 
levels as well as regional and county prices at which deliveries take place. For this trade module, 
(a) government taxes, tariffs and quotas are the scenario parameters describing the policy being 
implemented. Furthermore, (b) the foreign trade prices and (c) the trend assumptions on the unit 
cost of trade, transport and processing enter as scenario variables. 
 
Non-agriculture 
Non-agricultural supply and demand is specified by region (hence, not at county level) and 
largely exogenously, thus setting the framework within which the agricultural sector operates. 
The non-agricultural scenario variables include (a) output volumes, (b) public consumption, (c) 
investment demand and (d) changes in inventories, whereas (e) technical changes may be 
implemented via trends in the input-output coefficients. Also output from fishery and forestry are 
represented exogenously. Given the dominant role of non-agriculture in China’s foreign trade, the 
country’s trade surplus (also a scenario variable) is determined in harmony with these non-
agricultural trends.  
 
 
Methodological results 
 
In the process of building the Chinagro general equilibrium model, the following methodological 
results could be obtained (see Keyzer and Van Veen, 2005, for further details).  
 
First, we could prove that the model possesses a solution that is, moreover, unique, and 
maximizes social welfare once all distortions are eliminated.  
 
Second, we have specified a modular calibration procedure through which it can be assured that 
the base year (1997) equilibrium solution of the full welfare program exactly replicates the base-
year data. Agricultural supply is calibrated, in a modular way as well, for every county so that 
production as well as factor and non-factor input use are fully replicated and maximize county 
revenue. For interregional trade, we apply a new dual programming technique to calibrate flows 
so as to meet given net export positions of each region at prices that are sufficiently close to the 
observed ones and cover the associated transportation costs. Non-agricultural stock changes are 
treated as a closing item to fit the balance of payments. We note that such a modular 
decomposition of the calibration process is essential for the future maintenance of this very large 
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model, as it makes it possible to keep database operations fully separate from the modeling work, 
while improvements in the database are in a transparent way transmitted to the model outcome 
and future replacements in specific model components can be implemented without requiring a 
new calibration full of surprises of the complete model. Moreover, initialization at a fully 
calibrated base-year solution provides a large number of checks and clues for detecting 
programming errors in the debugging phase of model building, and also speeds up computation. 
 
Third, we have specified a globally convergent algorithm to solve this very large model. This 
algorithm decomposes the problem in two components, one an 8-region exchange component that 
maximizes social welfare of consumers while treating the output and input of the 2,433 counties 
as given and is solved as a regular medium-sized convex program (via a Minos-solve statement in 
GAMS), the other an agricultural supply module consisting of a series of county-specific farm-
income maximization programs that take prices as given and are solved with a tailor-made 
algorithm that terminates in a finite number of iterations and has an exact solution. This property 
of finite and exact termination makes it possible to embed both components within a price-
adjustment loop (implemented through parameter adjustments in GAMS) and to prove global 
convergence. The algorithm proves to be remarkably fast and precise.12 
                                                   
12 Numerical performance is as follows. Starting from given data files and estimates of the consumer demand 
system, the model calibration and preparation of GAMS-input files for simulation take about 5 minutes, on a 
regular laptop (Pentium®, 4-M CPU, 512MB RAM, 1.70 Ghz). A five-period simulation (1997, 2003, 2010, 
2020, 2030) with tabulation is completed within 25 minutes, at a precision of .08% for every regional 
commodity price in every year.  
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4. Scenario Design 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the scenarios establish future trends for the important socio-economic, 
political, and environmental processes to the extent that these are treated as given in the 
simulation model. This involves consideration of a range of policies and institutional settings, to 
frame the changing context within which agriculture operates. We consider the following: 
 • regional development, • population growth, urbanization and migration of rural labor, • world agricultural prices, • land use change dynamics, including level of protection of farmland and climate 
change impacts, and water sector development, especially with regard to irrigation 
practices and inter-basin water transfers,  • stable capacities and their geographical spread, • farm labor availability and mechanization, • trends of agricultural technological change, and R&D spending in agriculture, • institutional features of agricultural markets, including policy interventions in 
domestic markets and policy decisions about the integration of China’s agriculture into 
the international trade system (WTO and bilateral agreements),  • lifestyle changes affecting consumer preferences. 
 
Apart from world prices, climate change impacts and life-style changes, these trends depend to a 
large extent on government policies.  
 
In view of China’s great socio-economic, geographic and ecological diversity, the above-
mentioned forces impact very differently on the various parts of the country and they follow 
different temporal patterns. Therefore, the Chinagro-scenarios are designed by province and 
region, leading to assumptions for scenario formulations at the county level as far as agriculture is 
concerned and separately for rural and urban areas as far as consumption and trade are concerned. 
Each scenario embodies key assumptions on the shifters of demand, supply and the external 
economy. 
 
Scenario simulations with the Chinagro-model cover the period 1997-2030. In consultation with 
all partners and a large number of experts, the main exogenous elements of the model scenario 
specification for the period 2003-2030 were identified. Decisions were made about the design of 
the scenario input file, and its transmission from data set to model software (for details of data 
files used in the Chinagro welfare model, see Van Veen et al. 2005). Then, a process of intensive 
testing and readjusting followed to arrive at a plausible and broadly accepted simulation of a 
reference scenario (BASELINE). Finally, a range of scenarios was specified. 
 
All scenario simulations start from a common assessment of the outcomes in reference year 1997 
and the latest year for which data were available, namely 2003. Policy variants are evaluated from 
there onward, for the years 2010, 2020, and 2030 as variants to the baseline. As a first set of 
simulation experiments, to provide substantive inputs to the Chinagro policy exercises, four 
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policy variants to the baseline are simulated. These policy variants address four key concerns of 
agricultural development: 
 
- full liberalization (LIBERAL) scenario: assumes gradual removal of agricultural border 
protection beyond currently planned levels, to be completed between 2010 and 2020,  
 
- high economic growth (HIGHGROW) scenario: assumes a high economic growth path in 
the non-agricultural sectors, combined with a faster rural-urban migration and hence a 
higher urbanization level than the baseline, 
 
- high agricultural R&D investment (TECHPROG) scenario: assumes high (Solow neutral) 
output increasing technical progress for crops and livestock, as well as high labor saving 
technical progress in both, 
 
- enhanced irrigation development (IRRIGUP) scenario: assumes same changes of total 
cultivated land as the baseline, but expanded irrigation development.  
 
We describe the assumptions of the baseline (section 4.1) before turning to the four variants 
(section 4.2).  
 
 
4.1 Baseline 
 
The baseline is characterized by: (1) continuation of the current growth rates in non-agriculture, 
supported by large investments in the manufacturing and service sectors and a considerable 
outflow of labor from the rural areas; (2) this urban and industrial expansion leads to increased 
pressure on agricultural land and water availability in densely populated counties; (3) at the same 
time, the higher incomes from non-agriculture lead to shifts in consumption patterns towards 
more meat and dairy; (4) to cope with possible threats for domestic food supply, government 
continues its policy of liberalization of agricultural foreign trade, reduces producer taxes and 
stimulates technical progress by sustained spending on research and development; finally, (5) the 
international agricultural price projections in the baseline show moderate changes, with increases 
for feed and meat and a mixed picture for food crops.  
 
Below we discuss these assumptions in more detail, arranged by theme. If geographically 
different, the trends are presented by region although many of these, such as the trends in 
population and agricultural resources, are actually specified at provincial level.  
 
4.1.1 Regional development 
 
In the strategy for long-term economic development as laid down in its Tenth and Eleventh Five 
Year Plans (2001-2005 and 2006-2010), China set ambitious goals to move the nation to a 
"welfare society" (Xaiokun Shehui) in the next 20 years: (a) doubling of GDP every 10 years, 
with a smooth transformation of the economy from rural to urban and from agriculture to industry 
and service based, (b) ensuring sustainable management of the environment, and (c) maintaining 
a socially balanced growth path (NDRCb, 2006). Doubling of GDP in 10 years means obtaining 
an annual average growth rate of 7.2%, and, therefore, an even higher rate in industry and 
services since agriculture cannot grow at such a pace over a prolonged period.  
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In the period 1997-2003 the industry and service sectors have realized high rates of growth of 
more than 9% and 8% respectively on average, rather uniformly distributed over the regions 
(NBSCa, various issues). High growth is likely to continue in the coming decades even though 
inevitably moving to a lower rate as the size of the economy becomes larger. Huang et al. (2003) 
have formulated three different growth scenarios about the non-agricultural sector describing the 
context within which agriculture will operate. Their central projection is used for the baseline and 
shown in Table 4.1. High growth continues in all regions, but gradually at more common rates, 
ending with 4-6% in the period 2020-30, implying that by 2020 China’s non-agricultural output 
will have grown to 3.2 times its 2003 level, whereas it will reach 5.3 times its 2003 level by 2030. 
The table also mentions the growth path for fisheries and forestry (exogenous sectors in the 
model) that are kept at constant rates of 2.5 and 2%, respectively. 
  
 
Table 4.1 Non-farm production: regional growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %) at constant prices  
Region 
 
Sector 
 
1997 output 
(billion Yuan) 
1997- 
2003 
2003- 
2010 
2010- 
2020 
2020- 
2030 
2003- 
2030 
North Industry 3248.9 9.8 7.6 5.8 4.6 5.8 
 Services 1339.9 8.3 9.2 7.6 5.6 7.3 
Northeast Industry 1248.7 8.6 6.2 5.1 3.8 4.9 
 Services 490.7 6.1 7.6 6.2 5.0 6.1 
East Industry 3830.0 9.8 8.0 6.2 5.0 6.2 
 Services 1224.2 9.5 9.6 7.7 5.7 7.4 
Central Industry 1255.6 10.5 7.0 5.7 4.0 5.4 
 Services 506.5 8.7 8.9 7.0 5.2 6.8 
South Industry 2385.5 10.5 8.7 6.9 5.7 6.9 
 Services 949.3 9.5 9.9 8.7 6.6 8.2 
Southwest Industry 876.8 7.8 6.0 5.1 3.8 4.8 
 Services 414.7 8.2 8.6 6.6 5.4 6.7 
Plateau Industry 25.1 9.0 7.1 5.7 4.9 5.7 
 Services 19.5 9.0 8.4 7.1 5.8 7.0 
Northwest Industry 530.4 9.5 6.5 5.6 4.3 5.4 
 Services 300.0 6.7 8.4 7.0 5.8 6.9 
China Fisheries 233.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 Forestry 80.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 Industry 13400.9 9.7 7.6 6.0 4.8 6.0 
 Services 5244.7 8.6 9.2 7.6 5.8 7.3 
 
 
Promoting balanced development among regions is a separate chapter in the country’s Five-Year 
Plans. This policy is reflected in the distribution of investments and public consumption. Table 
4.2 shows for the period 1997-2003 highest growth in investments in the poorest regions, 
Southwest, Plateau and Northwest. The baseline assumes gradually more moderate increases (as 
in the output projections above), leading in all regions to investment growth rates of 6.8% and 
3.8% for the periods 2010-2020 and 2020-2030, respectively. The growth rate in 2020-2030 
might seem rather low compared to the earlier period, but this reflects that it would be difficult to 
keep on spending productively more than 40% of GDP on fixed investment as is done in the 
baseline until 2020.  
 
 30 
 
Table 4.2 Exogenous non-agricultural demand: regional growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %) at constant prices  
Region 
 
Type of 
demand 
 
1997 level 
(billion Yuan) 
1997-
2003 
2003-
2010 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
2003-
2030 
North Public cons. 254.1 9.0 12.0 7.0 6.0 7.9 
 Investment 649.2 11.9 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
Northeast Public cons. 97.0 7.7 10.9 7.0 6.0 7.6 
 Investment 200.5 12.5 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
East Public cons. 150.6 11.7 14.2 7.0 6.0 8.5 
 Investment 650.6 12.7 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
Central Public cons. 93.8 7.5 10.7 7.0 6.0 7.6 
 Investment 228.5 12.0 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
South Public cons. 174.3 10.5 13.2 7.0 6.0 8.2 
 Investment 427.7 13.4 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
Southwest Public cons. 83.3 9.5 12.4 7.0 6.0 8.0 
 Investment 211.3 14.3 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
Plateau Public cons. 4.7 17.1 18.8 7.0 6.0 9.6 
 Investment 12.6 18.3 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
Northwest Public cons. 69.2 4.0 7.8 7.0 6.0 6.8 
 Investment 151.3 16.5 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
China Public cons. 927.0 9.2 12.4 7.0 6.0 8.0 
 Investment 2531.7 13.0 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.9 
 
 
When comparing non-agricultural output and non-agricultural demand in the period 2003-2030 
one may observe that the average growth rate of fixed investments is a little lower than the 
average growth rate of output, whereas the opposite applies to the average growth rate of public 
consumption to represent a steady improvement in the provision of public services. Together, 
these trends point to a gradually more pronounced role of human and institutional capital 
formation, as compared to fixed capital formation, in maintaining the growth momentum of the 
economy.  
 
Despite the expected high imports of capital goods associated to the persistently high levels of 
fixed investment, the trade surplus of the country, also a scenario variable, is assumed to grow at 
10% in real terms annually in the period 2003-2030 up to about 470 billion dollar (1997 prices) in 
2030, reflecting China’s intention to maintain its growth in offshore investments. Combined, the 
high investment rate and the high trade surplus imply that the domestic saving rate, which is well 
over 40% in 2003, is to be kept around that level in the baseline. 
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4.1.2 Population and migration 
 
As discussed in section 2, projections of the regional growth rates of the Chinese population are 
dominated by three major effects: (1) the large share of young people in the current population, 
(2) the reaction of the fertility rates, currently rather low as consequence of a long-standing 
restricted government policy, to more prosperous economic conditions, and (3) the change in 
government policy towards active stimulation of urbanization and migration, in order to support 
non-agricultural growth. Hence, the assumptions about population growth are closely linked to 
the assumed regional development strategy. 
 
Toth et al. (2003) have designed Chinagro population projections on the basis of cohort analysis, 
starting from assumptions at national level before disaggregating these to province level. 
Regarding the natural growth rate of population, the baseline supposes that national average 
fertility rates remain constant during the period 2000-2030 at levels of 1.98 and 1.58 in rural and 
urban areas, respectively, while average life expectancy rises with 4.5 years in rural areas and 3.5 
years in urban areas. Regarding urbanization and migration, the baseline assumes a total net rural-
to-urban migration of 288 million people in the period 2000-2030, of which 90 million (in each 
five-year period 15 million) are migrants to other provinces. Interprovincial migrants are assumed 
to come mainly from Sichuan, Anhui, Henan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan and Heilongjiang, 
whereas Guangdong is the major province of destination (receiving more than half), followed by 
Shanghai and Beijing.  
 
Table 4.3 presents the resulting population figures at regional level. Total population keeps on 
growing, at an average annual rate of 0.4%, reaching 1,459 million by 2030. Although the 
baseline fertility rate falls below reproduction level, the large share of young people in the 
population keeps numbers rising until 2040. Yet, at regional level a population decline can 
already be observed from 2020 onwards in Northeast, Central and Southwest, caused by high 
outflows from the rural areas to other provinces. Especially in Northeast the outflow is high, 
related to the restructuring of the old state-owned heavy industrial sector, which went along with 
massive lay-offs. Also in East the rural outflow is high but here many migrants stay in the own 
region. Population growth is highest in South, due to the enormous need for labor in this region 
with the highest projected non-agricultural growth rate. Furthermore, Plateau keeps a high 
population growth, due to a more relaxed population policy in this region.  
 
In the medium variant of its most recent projections, the United Nation’s Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs expects population to grow until 2030, reaching a level of 1.46 
billion, and then to fall slightly to 1.41 billion in 2050. In the high variant population keeps on 
growing until a level of 1.65 billion in 2050, whereas in the low variant population remains below 
1.38 billion, with the turning point around 2025 (UNDESA, 2006). Hence, Chinagro’s baseline 
projection of 1.46 billion people in 2030 closely resembles the medium variant of the United 
Nations. 
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Table 4.3 Population growth in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
 
Location 
1997 
population 
(millions) 
1997- 
2003 
2003- 
2010 
2010- 
2020 
2020- 
2030 
2003- 
2030 
North Rural 209.82 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.4 -1.0 
 Urban 94.50 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.7 2.0 
 Total 304.33 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.4 
Northeast Rural 51.92 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.9 -1.3 
 Urban 50.58 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.8 
 Total 102.49 0.8 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
East Rural 115.21 -0.7 -1.0 -1.1 -1.8 -1.3 
 Urban 76.82 2.8 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 
 Total 192.04 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Central Rural 115.22 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.6 -1.1 
 Urban 48.73 2.9 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.7 
 Total 163.95 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
South Rural 98.70 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 
 Urban 71.40 3.3 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.6 
 Total 170.10 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.4 
Southwest Rural 148.06 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5 -1.0 
 Urban 46.88 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.7 2.0 
 Total 194.95 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.1 
Plateau Rural 5.78 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.0 
 Urban 1.92 3.4 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.8 
 Total 7.69 0.9 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.0 
Northwest Rural 76.30 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 
 Urban 32.75 3.1 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.2 
 Total 109.05 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 
China Rural 821.01 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -0.9 
 Urban 423.59 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.6 1.9 
 Total 1244.60 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4 
 
 
However, the predominant feature of the baseline is the acceleration of the current urbanization 
trend, in response to the labor needs of the non-agricultural sector. In each region rural population 
declines at increasing speed, leading to an urbanization level of 58% in 2030, hence including 
more than half of the population. For a proper interpretation of these figures, it must be 
mentioned that the Chinagro-model follows the definition of ‘urban population’ as used in the 
2000 Population Census, which according to Liu et al. (2003) can be summarized as follows: (1) 
areas are designated as cities and towns on the basis of administrative rules that combine several 
types of criteria such as population density, employment, value added and infrastructural 
provisions, (2) cities and towns are subdivided into urban districts, (3) in urban districts with a 
population density higher than 1500 persons per km2 the whole population is counted as urban, 
(4) in urban districts with a population density lower than 1500 persons per km2 only people that 
live in streets, town sites or adjacent villages are counted as urban, (5) immigrants without 
official residence permit (hukou) who have resided in cities and towns longer than 6 months are 
included in the local urban population. Adopting this definition means that growth of the urban 
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population in the projections of Table 4.3 is due both to natural growth and inflow of migrants 
and to anticipated reclassification of rural areas into urban areas.  
 
Clearly, the declining numbers of rural population will put a strain on the availability of farm 
labor and make it necessary for agriculture to achieve significant increases in labor productivity 
through mechanization, land consolidation, economies of scale and technical innovations. We 
return to this aspect when discussing our assumptions on technical progress. The projections also 
indicate that the inevitable process of population ageing will be even faster in rural areas than 
average, due to the fact that most of the rural to urban migrants are from the most active, younger 
segment of the labor force. Figure 4.1 shows that by 2030 the share of people of 65 years and 
older will have increased in rural areas to about 20%, as opposed to a mere 13.5% in urban areas. 
Agricultural labor, to be specified in section 4.1.6 below, will follow the growth in rural 
population by province. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Trend of rural population by age class in baseline 
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  Source: Toth et al. (2003) 
 
 
 
4.1.3 World prices 
 
The projections of future foreign trade prices are determined independently from the other 
elements of the baseline. First, we establish trends for the period 1997-2020. For grains, meat and 
dairy they are taken from the central price scenario in IFPRI’s IMPACT model described by 
Rosegrant et al. (2001). 13   This scenario accounts for the effects of expected rises in meat 
consumption in Asia and other developing countries but does not take into consideration the 
possible future growth in demand for biofuel. For the remaining commodities we independently 
formulate assumptions for the year 2020 relative to 1997. Specifically, for ‘other staple food’, 
vegetable oil and sugar the price change in this period is assumed to be about the same as for food 
grains, whereas for carbohydrate feed and protein feed the trend follows the price change of feed 
grains. Fruits and, especially, vegetables are assumed to become cheaper relative to grains, due to 
                                                   
13 In addition, for poultry meat we make a correction for an overestimated and, hence, not representative 1997 
price, but this correction is neglected here. 
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expected worldwide export increases. For fish the price change in the period 1997-2020 is 
assumed to follow that of pork. Next, the 2030 price indices are obtained by extending the 1997-
2020 trends, whereas the 2010 prices are derived from interpolation between the observations for 
2003 and the longer-term trends, assuming for most commodities that prices will be back on their 
trend values by 2015. 
 
The last step is to express all price trends relative to the increase of the unit value of Chinese 
manufacturing trade, by converting them from the unit value of international manufacturing trade 
to this unit. Thus, the foreign trade price of nonfood remains constant in the scenario. The 
resulting trends are shown in Table 4.4.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Real* foreign price trends in baseline 
 
Price index (1997=100)  
Commodity 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Annual growth 
2003-2030 
(in %) 
Milled rice 100.0 68.3 79.0 84.2 77.5 0.5 
Wheat flour 100.0 96.0 93.1 88.6 83.6 -0.5 
Maize 100.0 83.1 90.6 94.9 92.0 0.4 
Other staple food 100.0 86.1 87.6 85.5 79.3 -0.3 
Vegetable oil 100.0 87.2 88.1 85.5 79.3 -0.4 
Sugar 100.0 76.1 83.3 85.5 79.4 0.2 
Fruits 100.0 83.8 79.9 76.3 74.4 -0.4 
Vegetables 100.0 69.5 63.1 60.2 58.8 -0.6 
Ruminant meat 100.0 87.3 94.0 97.1 93.1 0.2 
Pork 100.0 65.8 81.5 93.2 89.7 1.2 
Poultry meat 100.0 66.5 81.2 91.8 87.7 1.0 
Milk 100.0 96.9 92.1 85.5 79.4 -0.7 
Eggs 100.0 69.6 83.3 92.7 89.1 0.9 
Fish 100.0 67.2 82.0 92.6 89.0 1.0 
Non-food excl feed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Carbohydrate feed 100.0 83.1 90.6 94.9 92.0 0.4 
Protein feed 100.0 83.1 90.6 94.9 92.0 0.4 
* Price trends are expressed relative to the trend of China’s manufacturing export price  
 
 
Comparing the years 1997, 2020 and 2030 only, one may see that all agricultural prices exhibit a 
steady decline, reflecting the general trend in IFPRI’s price projections. However, we also 
account for the dramatic price fall for most commodities during the period 2000-2003 and the 
subsequent recovery that we take to last until 2020.14 Consequently, a mixed picture emerges 
when one considers the period from 2003 to 2030. With the exception of dairy, the prices of 
animal products rise, and also feed prices rise. But for food crops there is a net decline in prices, 
except for rice and sugar. Farmers will take these relative price changes, in so far as transmitted 
to the domestic markets, into account when deciding on the allocation of labor inputs and 
cropping patterns. 
                                                   
14 In view of the world price increases for grains and dairy of 2005 and 2006 (FAO, 2007b) the assumption of 
recovery by 2010 seems modest. 
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4.1.4 Availability of land and water 
 
As discussed at some length in section 2, land reclamation and rehabilitation will continue 
providing some additional cropland in the coming decades but larger will be the losses to land 
degradation, ecological conversion programs and, most importantly, to urbanization and 
industrialization. Furthermore, the process of transformation of annual crop land into orchards 
will continue for a while. Water will become a pressing problem in the North region, whereas 
Northeast will have possibilities to expand its irrigation since it still has ample unused water 
available. These considerations are reflected in Table 4.5, following the same methodology as in 
Lu et al. (2004), at regional level. The model uses provincial growth rates applied at county level. 
 
The baseline assumes that total farmland lost from conversion to built-up land is about 6 million 
hectare in the period 2003-2030, which is 4.5% of available crop land available nationwide in 
2003. Yet, this national figure masks important differences among regions, with top shares of 
10% and 15% in East and South, respectively. On average, two-thirds of crop land losses from 
conversion to built-up land are assumed to be compensated by newly reclaimed farmland, as long 
as such land is available in a province. 
 
In total, Table 4.5 predicts a continued reduction in land planted to annual crops, albeit at a 
declining rate, from 125.6 million hectare in 2003 to 122.4, 119.4 and 116.6 million hectare in 
2010, 2020 and 2030, respectively. During this period, the share of irrigated land in total rises 
from 46.6% in 2003 to 47.9% in 2030, mainly due to the expansion in the Northeast. In all other 
regions both irrigated and rainfed areas are being reduced. 
 
Conversion to built-up land is the main factor driving the reduction of farmland in the coastal 
North, East and South regions, with their rapidly growing urban population and non-agricultural 
sector. From 2003 to 2030, the absolute decline in annual crop land in these regions is 2.4, 1.5 
and 1.9 million hectare, respectively. Conversion programs to restore ecologically fragile 
cultivated land is the main reason for the changes in the Central, Southwest and Northwest 
regions with net declines of annual crop land of 0.7, 0.9 and 1.6 million hectare, respectively. Part 
of this loss of annual crop land is due to conversion into orchards that increases in the baseline 
from 2003 to 2030 by 2.3 million hectare, especially in the North. 
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Table 4.5 Available cropland: growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
 
Type of 
land 
 
1997 area 
(million ha) 
1997- 
2003 
2003- 
2010 
2010- 
2020 
2020- 
2030 
2003- 
2030 
North Irrigated 17.232 -0.51 -0.53 -0.21 -0.19 -0.29 
 Rainfed 12.137 -0.64 -0.67 -0.34 -0.29 -0.41 
 Orchard 2.008 2.37 2.06 1.23 0.81 1.29 
 Total 31.377 -0.36 -0.37 -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 
Northeast Irrigated 3.944 0.71 0.67 1.60 1.60 1.36 
 Rainfed 16.681 0.08 0.08 -0.61 -0.71 -0.47 
 Orchard 0.678 1.72 1.54 0.72 0.52 0.86 
 Total 21.304 0.25 0.25 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 
East Irrigated 9.882 -0.40 -0.41 -0.40 -0.43 -0.41 
 Rainfed 3.827 -0.41 -0.42 -0.25 -0.25 -0.29 
 Orchard 1.324 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.28 0.40 
 Total 15.032 -0.33 -0.34 -0.26 -0.31 -0.30 
Central Irrigated 8.043 -0.43 -0.44 -0.14 -0.11 -0.21 
 Rainfed 3.866 -0.54 -0.56 -0.27 -0.22 -0.33 
 Orchard 1.047 1.02 0.96 0.52 0.40 0.59 
 Total 12.956 -0.34 -0.35 -0.12 -0.09 -0.17 
South Irrigated 5.413 -0.68 -0.71 -0.88 -0.96 -0.87 
 Rainfed 4.623 -0.54 -0.56 -0.77 -0.82 -0.73 
 Orchard 2.292 0.12 0.12 -0.09 -0.45 -0.17 
 Total 12.327 -0.48 -0.49 -0.67 -0.80 -0.67 
Southwest Irrigated 6.387 -0.46 -0.47 -0.16 -0.13 -0.23 
 Rainfed 12.095 -0.26 -0.26 -0.16 -0.13 -0.18 
 Orchard 1.241 2.04 1.81 0.75 0.56 0.96 
 Total 19.723 -0.17 -0.17 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 
Plateau Irrigated 0.391 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
 Rainfed 0.644 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 Orchard 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Total 1.043 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 
Northwest Irrigated 8.703 -0.30 -0.31 -0.16 -0.14 -0.19 
 Rainfed 14.820 -0.72 -0.75 -0.17 -0.15 -0.32 
 Orchard 0.624 4.70 3.60 1.23 0.86 1.70 
 Total 24.148 -0.41 -0.42 -0.10 -0.09 -0.18 
China Irrigated 59.995 -0.38 -0.38 -0.13 -0.09 -0.18 
 Rainfed 68.694 -0.38 -0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.37 
 Orchard 9.222 1.47 1.34 0.69 0.41 0.76 
 Total 137.911 -0.25 -0.25 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 
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For grassland the baseline supposes steady but moderate decreases in surfaces in all coastal 
regions, and more or less constant surfaces inland, leading to an overall loss of 9 million hectare 
during the period 2003-2030. However, in terms of grass output the net trend is positive since the 
area of improved, sown grassland, with a yield five to eight times as high as the yield on natural 
grassland is assumed to increase by 5% annually, from 5.6 million hectare in 2003 to 21.9 million 
hectare in 2030. Table 4.6 summarizes the baseline growth rates for grassland. 
 
  
Table 4.6 Available grassland: growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
 
Type of 
grassland 
 
1997 area 
(million ha) 
1997- 
2003 
2003- 
2010 
2010- 
2020 
2020- 
2030 
2003- 
2030 
North Natural 14.481 -1.0 -1.5 -1.3 -0.9 -1.2 
 Sown 0.646 0.2 11.3 4.3 3.0 5.6 
 Total 15.127 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 
Northeast Natural 13.700 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 
 Sown 0.480 0.6 4.9 2.6 2.1 3.0 
 Total 14.180 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
East Natural 3.906 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3 -0.6 -1.0 
 Sown 0.090 3.6 6.2 3.3 2.7 3.8 
 Total 3.996 -1.5 -1.1 -1.0 -0.3 -0.8 
Central Natural 14.585 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
 Sown 0.151 4.5 8.8 4.0 3.1 4.9 
 Total 14.737 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
South Natural 11.978 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 
 Sown 0.096 3.6 8.0 3.8 3.0 4.6 
 Total 12.074 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 
Southwest Natural 35.306 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
 Sown 0.142 -1.5 16.0 5.0 3.3 7.1 
 Total 35.448 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plateau Natural 102.377 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
 Sown 0.194 0.4 25.8 6.1 3.8 10.0 
 Total 102.571 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Northwest Natural 134.645 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 
 Sown 3.874 -0.5 9.1 3.8 2.7 4.7 
 Total 138.519 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
China Natural 330.979 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 
 Sown 5.672 0.0 10.1 4.1 2.9 5.1 
 Total 336.652 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
 
 
 
4.1.5 Stable capacities 
 
As discussed in section 2, China is rapidly moving from traditional natural resource based 
management to intensified peri-urban and urban production systems, in response to the growing 
demand for livestock products. It is very hard to predict the future geographical distribution of the 
intensified livestock production in any detail, because unlike crop cultivation and grazing this 
sector tends to be footloose, and shifts in location will be determined by a wide array of factors, 
 38 
including developments in infrastructure, availability of feed, changes in relative scarcities of 
land, labor and capital, and the severity and enforcement of environmental regulations. This also 
motivates our treating of stable capacities as scenario variables that seem plausible given the 
population projections, demand growth scenarios for animal products, and consideration of 
environmental factors, while leaving it to the endogenous supply response of the model to 
determine the actual intensity of production based on prices, feed availability and other factors 
such as the availability of manpower. Stable capacities are expressed in numbers of standard 
animal places. For each land use type, a specific standard animal is defined. Animal numbers are 
converted into this unit on the basis of their annual energy intake (or potential annual energy 
intake in case their life is shorter). 
 
Rather than being purely exogenous, the projected trends have been generated, at provincial level, 
through simulations outside the Chinagro welfare model, for different livestock management 
systems, on the basis of three principles described in Ermolieva et al. (2005): (i) the future 
distribution of livestock in confined15 traditional systems is linked to projected changes in rural 
population; (ii) the geographical distribution and level of pastoral livestock follows the projected 
trends of the availability and productivity of grasslands, hence taking account of planned 
grassland improvement and rehabilitation to increase productivity above current natural 
conditions; and (iii) the number of animal places (stable units) in confined specialized and 
industrial livestock systems is expanding to compensate for decreases in traditional systems and 
to meet (approximately) the substantial growth in demand that is anticipated at provincial level.16  
 
The resulting baseline growth rates, aggregated to regional level, are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, 
for ruminants and non-ruminants, respectively. Confined ruminant livestock systems rise relative 
to pastoral systems, as grassland resources are already under great pressure and significant 
expansion of grass-based livestock systems would require major efforts beyond those assumed in 
the baseline, to rehabilitate degraded pastures and to improve grassland productivity. Table 4.6 
indicates that the baseline supposes that modest efforts are made in this direction.  
 
At the same time, for draught animals, which include all animals used in transportation, a marked 
decline is projected from 66.4 million units in 1997 to 41.2 millions in 2030. The rate of decline 
is rather uniform across regions, except in the sparsely populated, accidented and less developed 
Plateau and Northwest, where the number of draught animals keeps on rising until 2010, when a 
decline sets in. 
 
That the number of animal units in “traditionally mixed” ruminant sector is growing by as much 
as 2.3% annually over the period 2003-2030 in the baseline might be surprising given the 
pressure on the land alluded to earlier but this is because the sector includes all intensified cattle 
meat production, for which we expect the number of livestock places to rise. For milk cattle, there 
is a separate intensified land use type in the model, whose capacity grows from 1.7 million places 
in 2003 to 4.7 million places in 2030, largely in North, Northeast and Northwest.  
 
 
                                                   
15 Confined livestock systems allow for post-harvest stubble grazing but are mainly based on feeding of crops, 
crop by-products and (processed) crop residues, as opposed to grazing systems relying primarily on pastures. 
16 For the provinces Beijing and Shanghai where cultivated land is very scarce, reallocation of the intensive 
production has been assumed at a rate proportional to projected reduction of farmland. 
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Table 4.7 Stable capacities of ruminants, in million standard animal places: 
growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
Type of 
ruminant 
system 
1997 capacity 
(million 
places) 
1997-
2003 
2003-
2010 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
2003-
2030 
North Draught 13.83 -0.8 -1.3 -1.8 -2.5 -1.9 
 Grazing 1.64 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 
 Trad. mixed 20.50 0.3 2.5 1.9 1.1 1.8 
 Spec. milk 0.20 21.5 6.7 2.9 1.5 3.4 
Northeast Draught 5.59 -0.9 -1.5 -2.0 -2.9 -2.2 
 Grazing 1.77 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 
 Trad. mixed 5.78 0.5 1.9 1.3 0.3 1.1 
 Spec. milk 0.25 8.0 5.9 2.3 0.8 2.7 
East Draught 4.04 -1.1 -1.9 -2.5 -3.3 -2.7 
 Grazing 0.33 -1.2 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.9 
 Trad. mixed 4.80 -0.2 1.6 1.2 0.2 0.9 
 Spec. milk 0.09 12.2 4.9 2.1 1.0 2.4 
Central Draught 8.42 -0.8 -1.5 -2.1 -2.9 -2.2 
 Grazing 1.16 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 
 Trad. mixed 1.82 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.6 
 Spec. milk 0.01 17.3 9.8 3.6 1.5 4.3 
South Draught 9.98 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -2.4 -1.6 
 Grazing 0.85 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 
 Trad. mixed 1.64 1.1 2.6 1.6 0.8 1.5 
 Spec. milk 0.03 8.2 6.7 3.3 2.0 3.7 
Southwest Draught 15.01 -0.6 -1.1 -1.7 -2.4 -1.8 
 Grazing 7.58 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 
 Trad. mixed 7.73 0.6 3.2 2.0 1.1 2.0 
 Spec. milk 0.02 27.9 13.9 4.6 2.4 6.1 
Plateau Draught 1.02 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 
 Grazing 16.21 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 Trad. mixed 1.60 4.6 13.4 5.8 3.2 6.7 
 Spec. milk 0.01 10.3 31.1 6.7 3.5 11.3 
Northwest Draught 8.55 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 
 Grazing 15.73 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 Trad. mixed 8.45 2.9 4.8 3.4 1.8 3.2 
 Spec. milk 0.12 18.8 10.9 4.3 2.2 5.2 
China Draught 66.43 -0.5 -1.1 -1.5 -2.2 -1.6 
 Grazing 45.27 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 Trad.mixed 52.33 1.0 3.4 2.4 1.3 2.3 
 Spec. milk 0.71 15.5 8.0 3.3 1.7 3.9 
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For non-ruminants (pigs and poultry), the model distinguishes two land use types, one traditional 
covering the mixed backyard production and one intensified covering production of specialized 
households as well as industrial farms. The stable capacities of these systems are expressed in pig 
places. As mentioned earlier, the capacities in the traditional sector are assumed to follow the 
rural population. Hence, the stable capacity of this sector falls by about one percent annually 
during the period 2003-2030, as shown in Table 4.8. The intensified sector more than 
compensates for this decline not so much in stable capacities but because of the shift to intensive 
production, with a rise of 2.8%, especially in the period until 2010.   
 
These growth rates imply that the ratio of traditional to modern non-ruminant animal places fall 
from 2.8 in 2003 to about 1.0 in 2030 when each has about 270 million animal places in pig-
equivalents. In all, the regional distribution of the intensified stable capacity follows population 
rather closely. By 2030, the share in animal places differs from the population share by less than 
one percentage-point in four of the eight regions with differences largest in Northeast (3.5% 
higher) and Northwest (3.3% higher).       
 
 
Table 4.8 Stable capacities of pigs and poultry, in million standard animal places: 
growth rates in baseline 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
 
Type of 
management* 
1997 capacity 
(million 
places) 
1997-
2003 
2003-
2010 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
2003-
2030 
North Trad. mixed 75.01 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.5 -1.1 
 Intensified 21.16 6.3 5.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 
Northeast Trad. mixed 30.10 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.9 -1.4 
 Intensified 11.09 5.6 4.7 2.1 1.0 2.4 
East Trad. mixed 41.44 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.8 -1.4 
 Intensified 14.50 5.6 4.4 1.6 1.1 2.1 
Central Trad. mixed 57.08 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.7 -1.2 
 Intensified 10.90 6.7 6.5 2.7 1.2 3.1 
South Trad. mixed 41.79 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 
 Intensified 13.37 6.4 6.2 3.2 2.1 3.5 
Southwest Trad. mixed 107.94 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -1.6 -1.1 
 Intensified 13.01 6.2 5.4 2.6 1.4 2.9 
Plateau Trad. mixed 1.14 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 
 Intensified 0.11 6.6 8.6 4.2 2.9 4.8 
Northwest Trad. mixed 22.13 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 -0.8 
 Intensified 3.79 6.5 7.2 3.6 2.3 4.0 
China Trad.mixed 376.63 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.5 -1.0 
 Intensified 87.93 6.2 5.4 2.5 1.4 2.8 
* Intensified captures specialized households and industrial systems. 
 
 
4.1.6 Farm labor and machinery 
 
Baseline trends in labor availability and mechanization are summarized in Table 4.9. In each 
province, available farm labor is assumed to change in proportion with the rural population 
(regional rates of change may be slightly different due to aggregation). Hence, the baseline has a 
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general decline in farm labor, on average one percent annually between 2003 and 2030, but at 
accelerating speed, especially after 2020. Agricultural machinery affects cropping only. For the 
livestock sector, the machinery is taken to be part of the livestock system itself and labor saving 
operates, to a large extent, via the transition to more intensified production. The period 1997-
2003 witnessed high rates of growth of available machinery, ranging from 3.7% annually in the 
South to 7.5% in the North. After that, the baseline is supposed to follow a more modest but 
sustained growth path at an average of 3.1% annually, with rates highest in Central, Southwest 
and Plateau.  
 
 
Table 4.9 Farm labor and crop machinery: growth rates in baseline* 
 
Annual growth rate (in %)  
Region 
 
Type of resource 
 
1997 level 1997-
2003 
2003-
2010 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
2003-
2030 
North Farm labor 61.73 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.5 -1.0 
 Crop machinery 131.80 7.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Northeast Farm labor 12.91 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.9 -1.3 
 Crop machinery 19.15 6.5 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 
East Farm labor 36.78 -0.7 -1.0 -1.1 -1.8 -1.3 
 Crop machinery 54.22 4.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Central Farm labor 34.16 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.6 -1.2 
 Crop machinery 28.43 6.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
South Farm labor 31.81 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 
 Crop machinery 26.99 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Southwest Farm labor 51.76 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5 -1.0 
 Crop machinery 24.76 6.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Plateau Farm labor 1.46 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.0 
 Crop machinery 1.74 5.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Northwest Farm labor 22.39 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -0.6 
 Crop machinery 29.42 6.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.6 
China Farm labor 253.00 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -1.0 
 Crop machinery 316.50 6.5 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 
* Labor is expressed in million man-years (full-time equivalent), machinery in million KW and animal power 
whose availability follows from the stable capacity of the draught animal sector also in million KW. The 
Chinagro model works with the concept of ‘equipped labor’ which is labor equipped with animal and/or 
machine power. 
 
4.1.7 Technical change in agriculture 
 
The baseline assumptions about technical progress in agriculture are defined against the 
background of labor availability and mechanization of Table 4.9. The scenario simulations 
distinguish three types of technical progress, (a) labor efficiency: labor-saving technical progress 
expressed as increase in productivity of one unit of equipped labor (i.e. labor equipped with 
machinery and draught animals), (b) output efficiency: output of specified commodities per unit 
of aggregate output, at given prices; for given land use type we take progress to be Solow neutral, 
letting all outputs increase at the same rate, and (c) input efficiency: reduction in amount of 
fertilizer and animal feed needed to obtain a given (aggregate) yield by land use type. 
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While difficult to quantify, the rates of progress are highly correlated with agricultural R&D 
investment. Table 4.10 shows the assumptions for the baseline that are kept constant over the 
whole period. The baseline abstracts from increases in input efficiency. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Annual rates of technical progress in agriculture 
 in baseline (1997-2030) 
 
Land use type Rate of labor-saving 
technical progress 
Rate of Solow-neutral 
technical progress 
Cropping (irrigated, rainfed)   
 All regions excl. Northeast 0.8% 0.2% 
 Northeast 1.0% 0.2% 
Cropping (orchards)   
All regions excl. Northeast 0.8% - 
Northeast 1.0% - 
Livestock (ruminants)   
Draught 0.5% - 
Grazing 0.5% 0.3% 
Traditionally mixed 0.5% - 
Specialized dairy 0.3% 0.8% 
Livestock (pigs and poultry)   
Traditionally mixed 0.5% 0.8% 
Intensified 0.3% 0.8% 
 
 
The table shows that labor-saving technical progress is assumed to be the dominant type in 
cropping (especially in the Northeast). In livestock farming technical progress is mainly of the 
Solow-neutral type, in conjunction with the intensification represented by the trends in stable 
capacities. These various kinds of technical progress affect yields jointly with other drivers such 
as prices and also the availability of land and stable capacity that determines to which extent 
progress in input productivity is hampered as yields come closer to technological ceilings. The 
baseline appears to induce modest but steady increases of crop yields per hectare of about 0.6 
percent on average annually, on both irrigated and rainfed land. Although somewhat higher than 
the rates suggested in World Bank (2006), increases of this order of magnitude seem plausible for 
a baseline scenario, especially since the yield improvements in the Chinagro model also cover 
increases in the multiple-cropping index. For livestock, the yield changes per animal place appear 
to be around 0.4% for ruminants and around 1.2% for non-ruminants. 
 
In addition to these sector-wide forms of technical progress, the baseline specifies improvements 
in specific crop or livestock activities, implemented through changes in the mapping from 
aggregate output to tradable model commodities (shown in Appendix A). Specifically, it 
introduces the following adjustments: 
 
- improved processing of sugarcane, sugar beet and soybean in the period 1997-2010, raising 
output by 10 to 20% in total, 
- gradual shift towards more soybean processing at the expense of direct consumption,  
reducing the food share annually by 1%,  
- gradual decline (0.3% annually) in the conversion of root crops and vegetables into 
carbohydrate feed, reflecting stricter sanitary regulations, 
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- gradual increase of the meat output of traditional cattle, goat and sheep (0.5% annually) 
reflecting a gradually participation of modern enterprises. 
 
Furthermore, losses in trade and transportation are assumed to increase as exogenous demand at a 
modest annual rate of 0.5%, with higher rates for fast-growing perishable commodities such as 
fruits and vegetables (0.7%) and, especially, milk and fish (2.5%). This reflects the rise in trade 
volumes, but is not treated as a fraction of trade because it is assumed that the expanded trade will 
benefit from improved preservation techniques. 
 
Finally, we mention that the baseline keeps the efficiency of local inputs such as manure and crop 
residuals unchanged, whereas from 2010 onwards the share of household waste that is converted 
into feed is reduced annually by 5%, reflecting tightening up of the sanitary rules.  
 
4.1.8 Agricultural markets 
 
The baseline considers market policies and reforms as well as changes in trade and transport 
costs.17 Market policies and reforms distinguish interventions on foreign trade from those on 
domestic transactions. Since the 1980s, China’s foreign trade policies have been characterized by 
a gradual integration in the international agricultural trade system, culminating in the WTO-
accession in December 2001. The baseline supposes that this trend of opening up and 
liberalization is to continue and builds existing agreements and commitments regarding tariffs 
and quota into the scenario assumptions. Table 4.11 summarizes the specification, building 
on Huang (2002) and Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004).  
 
Import tariffs consist of three elements: applied official tariffs, differences with the effective 
domestic value added tax and non-tariff barriers. In the historical period 1997-2003, the applied 
tariffs are rather low for grains, root crops and soybean but high (20% and more) for other crops 
and livestock products, the value added tax rate on imports (13% to 15%) is much higher than the 
domestic rate, and various non-tariff barriers exist mainly for oilseeds, sugar and maize. The 
baseline assumes separate trends for these three elements: (a) applied tariffs are halved from 2003 
to 2010 and kept constant afterwards, (b) the value added tax difference gradually vanishes due to 
increases in the domestic rate, and (c) the non-tariff barriers are halved from 2003 to 2010 and 
then phased out. In all this leads to a rather flat rate of reduction for most commodities of about 
2% annually and the resulting 2030 rates range from 8.5% for grains to 20% for sugar. There are 
no import tariffs on the composite commodities carbohydrate feed and protein feed. 
 
 
                                                   
17 Actually, the scenario was formulated in 2004. In hindsight, the pace of tariff and tax reduction assumed for  
the period 2003-2010 is rather modest, especially for domestic taxes.  
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Table 4.11 Agricultural tariff rates* on foreign trade in baseline 
 
Tariff rate (in %)   
Commodity 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Annual growth 
2003-2030 
(in %) 
Import tariffs       
Milled rice 17.0 14.0 11.5 10.0 8.5 -1.8 
Wheat flour 5.0 14.0 11.5 10.0 8.5 -1.8 
Maize 7.0 14.0 11.5 10.0 8.5 -1.8 
Other staple food 25.0 15.0 12.0 10.5 9.0 -1.9 
Vegetable oil 47.0 23.0 15.5 14.0 12.5 -2.2 
Sugar 50.0 36.0 23.0 21.5 20.0 -2.2 
Fruits 50.0 27.0 19.0 17.5 16.0 -1.9 
Vegetables 50.0 27.0 19.0 17.5 16.0 -1.9 
Ruminant meat 60.0 27.0 19.0 17.5 16.0 -1.9 
Pork 35.0 27.0 19.0 17.5 16.0 -1.9 
Poultry meat 35.0 25.0 18.0 16.5 15.0 -1.9 
Milk 23.5 28.0 20.5 19.0 17.5 -1.7 
Eggs 33.0 23.0 16.0 14.5 13.0 -2.1 
Fish 27.0 25.0 17.0 15.5 14.0 -2.1 
Carbohydrate feed 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Protein feed 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Export tariffs       
Milled rice 8.0 4.0 3.0 1.5 1.5 -3.6 
Wheat flour 5.0 3.0 2.2 1.1 1.1 -3.6 
Fruits 10.0 5.0 3.8 1.9 1.9 -3.5 
Vegetables 10.0 5.0 3.8 1.9 1.9 -3.5 
Ruminant meat 8.0 4.0 3.0 1.5 1.5 -3.6 
Pork 20.0 10.0 7.5 3.7 3.7 -3.6 
Poultry meat 6.8 8.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 -3.6 
Eggs 4.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 0.8 -3.3 
Fish 15.0 8.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 -3.6 
* Import tariffs: applied tariff plus difference in value added tax (compared to domestic) and non-tariff barriers.  
   Export tariffs: implicit tariff minus domestic tax rebates and applied subsidies. 
 
 
Export tariff rates appear in the table only for commodities with significant commercial exports. 
These rates are also built up from three elements: (a) applied official subsidies, (b) rebates of 
domestic taxes and (c) estimates of implicit tariffs, where (c) is relatively high and dominant. The 
baseline assumes that the applied subsidies are abolished after 2003, whereas the tax rebates 
remain unchanged and the implicit tariffs are reduced by two thirds from 2003 to 2020 and kept 
constant afterwards. As shown in Table 4.11, these assumptions lead to a rather uniform annual 
decline of 3.5% for most commodities, starting from already low export tariff rates in 2003. 
 
The table does not include the subsidies on maize exports provided in 2003 that were quite 
substantial at the time and related to the policy of reducing exceptionally high stock levels, by a 
15 million ton one-time subsidized export. For wheat and rice similar huge stock decreases were 
realized but without large export volumes causing the domestic market to become flooded with 
wheat and rice and leading, together with low international prices and reduced government 
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support in grain marketing, to depressed prices. By early 2004 the situation changed, worried as 
policy makers had become about the fall in rice and wheat output in previous years.  
 
Domestic tax rates are assumed to capture the combined effect of local taxes and procurement 
policies that historically have effectively acted also as taxes on farmers (Huang and Rozelle, 
2004), even though both are hard to quantify. Local taxes to a significant extent depend on power 
relations in villages and are, therefore, not recorded accurately by central government, nor 
controlled by it, whereas procurement rules and prices have been subject to frequent changes, as 
mentioned earlier in section 2. For 1997, CCAP estimates effective tax rates nationwide at 8% for 
grain and 12% for other commodities, as shown in Table 4.12. Since then, the policy trend is 
towards a reduction of the burden on farmers, witness the rural ‘tax-for-fee’ reform introduced in 
2002-2003 after a pilot project in Anhui province (Yep, 2004), and the introduction of grain 
subsidies in 2004 to prevent another serious fall in supply (Gale et al., 2005). These changes are 
represented in the baseline through a general decline of tax rates until 2010, which are kept 
constant afterwards. By that time, tax rates will have halved to reach a level of 5% for most 
commodities and a level of 3% for oil and sugar. For grains, the conversion of taxes into 
subsidies is represented via a subsidy rate of 5% throughout the period. Under the WTO rules a 
domestic subsidy of up to 8.5% would be possible but it is assumed that government will not 
fully fill this room.  
 
In Table 4.12 the baseline taxes are shown. The 2003 rate for grains is an outlier and an exception. 
It does not represent an official tax measure but amounts to an imputed rate that was introduced 
to reflect the generally unfavorable situation for grain farmers in the early years of the 21st 
century, in part reflecting their contribution, directly or indirectly, to the financing of the huge 
stock disposal costs during these years. 
 
 
Table 4.12 Agricultural domestic tax rates in baseline 
 
Tax rate (in %)   
Commodity 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Producer taxes      
Milled rice 8.0 12.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Wheat flour 8.0 12.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Maize 8.0 12.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Other staple food 8.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 
Vegetable oil 12.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Sugar 12.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Fruits 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Vegetables 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Ruminant meat 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Pork 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Poultry meat 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Milk 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Eggs 12.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Consumer taxes on food      
Rural 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 
Urban 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.5 5.0 
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The consumer tax rates in Table 4.12 give a simplified representation of the pattern foreseen after 
effective introduction of value added taxes. They are applied across-the-board, hence without 
regional or group-specific differences.  
 
Turning from market policies and reform to trade and transport costs, we mention that 
infrastructural improvements are kept modest in the baseline but taken to reduce the trade and 
transport costs on foreign trade by 0.5% annually, with for vegetables, fruits, meat and fish that 
have large trade margins in the base year, an additional reduction of around 30% during the 
period 1997-2010. Trade and transport costs between farmers and regional market places remain 
unchanged in the baseline, except for specific improvements in oil and sugar marketing. Trade 
and transport costs between regions are kept unchanged as well. In addition, as an incidental shift, 
the general worsening of rice and wheat marketing conditions around 2003, referred to earlier, is 
represented by a temporary increase of domestic trade margins for 2003 only.  
 
Finally, regarding foreign trade two additional mechanisms should be mentioned. One is that for 
vegetables, an upper bound is imposed on the volumes the world market can absorb. These are 
relaxed in the baseline from 5.2 million ton in 2003 (i.e. about 10% of total world trade in 
vegetables) to 10.1 million ton in 2010 and then after that by 2% annually. The other is that for 
fish, the model assumes a committed export volume of 1.4 million ton in 2003 reflecting the 
heterogeneity of this commodity, which is not sufficiently captured in the commodity 
classification of the model itself. In the baseline the committed fish export volume grows with 
0.5% annually. 
 
4.1.9 Consumer demand patterns and life style 
 
As discussed earlier, consumption of meat and eggs has risen fast in the last two decades, due to 
the growth in per capita incomes and the changes in lifestyle especially related to migration from 
rural to urban areas. The baseline takes this trend to continue in line with the persistent growth in 
non-agricultural output and the sustained rural-to-urban migration specified earlier in Tables 4.1 
and 4.3.  
 
Recall from the discussion in section 3.1 that in the Chinagro model consumer expenditures on 
agricultural goods obey a linear expenditure system, hence with committed and uncommitted 
expenditures, corresponding to a Stone-Geary utility function that appears as the nonlinear 
component in a quasilinear utility function. The quasilinearity implies that the utility functions 
are expressed in money metric and, therefore, effectively apply a conversion by multiplication 
through a welfare weight. Scenario parameters are now these welfare weights, population 
numbers and the budget shares of the uncommitted expenditures, for each urban and rural income 
class. Per capita committed consumption volumes are kept constant. 
 
Since showing the shifts in model coefficients actually introduced in the model would not be very 
informative, and because consumer demand is so significantly driven by the exogenous growth of 
non-agricultural income, we describe the baseline specification in terms of total uncommitted 
expenditures on food (Table 4.13) and their distribution across commodities (Table 4.14), albeit 
that these items are to some extent endogenous within the model.  
 
We also recall that combined, the model’s price normalization on a fixed non-agricultural price, 
and the quasilinearity of the utility functions ensure that these expenditures can be interpreted as 
“real” and comparable to the 1997 expenditure levels. 
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Table 4.13 shows the development of total uncommitted food expenditures, by region and for 
rural and urban separately, and also mentions the sum of committed and uncommitted food 
expenditures in the base year as background. The larger part of food expenditures, around 60-70 
percent, is in fact committed, and changes over time merely due to endogenous price changes in 
the model. Hence, the baseline leaves about two-thirds of base year food intake volumes 
unaffected. For the remaining one-third, uncommitted demand, steady per capita increases are 
projected that do not differ much between regions, and are higher for urban than for rural  
consumers, about 3% versus 2.5%, and gradually decline over time. On average, for rural classes 
the resulting per capita uncommitted food expenditures are in 2030 about twice as high as in 
2003, and for urban classes about 2.2 times as high. We add that the consumption levels were 
checked against their nutritional content in calories, and shifts are such that a reasonable 
nutritional balance is maintained. 
 
 
Table 4.13 Food expenditures in baseline 
 
  1997 food expenditures in 
Yuan/person/year 
Annual growth of uncommitted per capita 
food expenditures (in %) 
Region Location Total Uncommitted 1997-
2003 
2003-
2010 
2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
North Rural 931.4 317.5 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 
 Urban 2090.9 689.2 4.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 
Northeast Rural 1042.0 410.3 3.6 2.3 2.3 2.2 
 Urban 1813.1 628.9 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 
East Rural 1350.3 483.0 4.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 
 Urban 3062.8 916.5 4.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 
Central Rural 1120.1 396.6 3.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 
 Urban 2078.8 674.3 4.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 
South Rural 1551.6 532.8 4.0 2.6 2.6 2.4 
 Urban 2966.3 734.8 4.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Southwest Rural 1033.1 404.3 3.6 2.0 1.9 1.7 
 Urban 2216.6 665.8 4.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 
Plateau Rural 922.2 371.7 5.7 2.1 1.9 1.7 
 Urban 1858.6 479.4 5.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Northwest Rural 705.0 281.4 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 
 Urban 1727.2 649.4 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 
 
 
On the basis of Table 4.14, we may look at these trends in more detail, for individual 
commodities and by income group (for all regions together). Two features stand out. First, one 
may note the important rise in consumption of meat, milk, eggs and fish, partly at the expense of 
the consumption of crops. Uncommitted meat expenditure levels are in 2030 for all classes two to 
three times as high as in 2003. At the same time, uncommitted expenditures on crops fall slightly 
with the exception of fruits and vegetables in rural areas and maize in urban areas. Second, the 
table shows increasing disparity in food consumption patterns, due to the fact that the rich 
become richer faster than the poor. Yet, the baseline assumes that government manages to contain 
the food expenditure gap. Under constant prices total food expenditures of the urban high income 
group in 2030 would be 1.6 times as high as in 2003, whereas the ratio would be 1.2 for the rural 
low income group. 
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Table 4.14  Annual growth (in %) of uncommitted per capita food expenditures 
by commodity, baseline, 2003-2030  
 
Commodity Rural 
low 
Rural 
middle 
Rural 
high 
Urban 
Low 
Urban 
middle 
Urban 
High 
Milled rice -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 
Wheat flour 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 
Maize -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 1.5 0.5 0.9 
Other staple food -0.1 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 -1.0 -1.1 
Vegetable oil -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 
Sugar -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 
Fruits 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 
Vegetables 0.9 0.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 
Ruminant meat 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.9 3.2 
Pork 3.3 4.1 4.5 3.9 4.2 4.9 
Poultry meat 2.5 3.3 4.6 2.6 3.6 5.0 
Milk 3.9 4.2 5.4 3.5 3.9 5.2 
Eggs 0.9 1.7 2.9 1.5 2.5 3.7 
Fish 1.0 0.8 2.1 1.5 4.0 5.3 
Total food 1.7 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.9 3.8 
 
 
The growth rates of Table 4.14 do not cover the period 1997-2003. In general, as indicated 
already, the shifts in consumption pattern in this historical period were similar to the trends 
afterwards but we should mention also that detailed study of food consumption data over the 
historical period led to a considerable reduction in shares spent on wheat and rice from 1997 to 
2003.  
 
 
4.2 Scenario variants 
 
As mentioned before, this report considers four scenario variants to the baseline. We discuss them 
by turns and at the end of the section highlight the main differences between them. 
 
4.2.1 Liberalization scenario (LIBERAL) 
 
The liberalization scenario uses the same demographic, economic growth, life style and 
technology change assumptions as the baseline. The same applies to land and water resources 
availability, i.e. the projections of cultivated land and irrigated land are the same in both 
scenarios. Only the agricultural price and border protection policies are changed. In addition to 
the WTO agreements of the baseline, the full liberalization scenario assumes a 50% elimination 
of border protection in 2010 from the 2003 levels, followed by full elimination between 2010 and 
2020. Furthermore, the upper bound on vegetable exports increases with an additional one 
percent annually. International prices are the same as in the baseline. Hence, the additional 
liberalization measures are assumed to be unilateral, and the scenario abstracts from China’s 
impact on international prices. 
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4.2.2 High income growth scenario (HIGHGROW) 
 
The high income growth scenario assumes faster GDP and income growth, driven by higher 
output of the non-agricultural sectors as compared to the baseline. By 2020 China’s non-
agricultural output will have risen to 3.5 times its size in 2003, and by 2030 it would reach 6.4 
times this size, which amount to an average annual non-agricultural growth rate of 8.3% for the 
period 2003-2010, of 7.2% in the 2010s, and of 6.2% in the 2020s, compared to respectively 
8.0%, 6.5% and 5.1% in the baseline. A substantial part of the additional non-agricultural output 
is exported, leading to a trade surplus rising at 12% annually, 2% above the baseline. 
 
Higher economic growth is associated with faster urbanization, higher investment and higher 
public expenditures. The country’s fixed investment and public consumption are now assumed to 
grow at annual rates of 8.3% and 5.6%, respectively, whereas by 2030 64% of the population will 
be urban. Higher economic growth and enhanced investment, jointly with more rapid 
urbanization, cause an additional 2 million hectares of farmland to be lost due to conversion into 
built-up areas. At the same time, the accelerated decline of the rural population leads to somewhat 
higher reduction in farm labor, resulting in 180 million manyears in 2030 as opposed to 189 
million in the baseline. This is partly compensated by higher technical progress in agriculture 
with an additional 0.15% of output increasing technical progress in cropping and an additional 
0.1% in livestock production annually. 
 
Higher urbanization leads to more rapid changes in consumption pattern of migrants but also for 
those who remain within the same area, the better incomes raise food expenditures, especially on 
livestock products. This exogenous component of the adjustment operates via rural to urban 
migration as well as via an additional shift in budget shares, leading to uncommitted per capita 
food expenditure levels between 3 and 5% higher than in the baseline, with an additional upward 
shift for meat and milk.  
 
Finally, population growth is a little higher in this scenario in response to income improvements, 
and total population reaches 1,462 million people by 2030, 3 million more than under the 
baseline.  
 
4.2.3 High agricultural R&D investment scenario (TECHPROG) 
 
The high agricultural R&D investment scenario assumes that additional policy efforts would be 
made to increase funding and investment in R&D for agriculture. This is supposed to lift 
technical progress in agriculture with an additional 0.2% of Solow-neutral productivity growth in 
annual cropping, and an extra 0.15% in pork and poultry production and the specialized dairy 
sector. Furthermore, the scenario assumes an annual improvement of fertilizer efficiency of 0.5%. 
Feed efficiency remains as in the baseline.  
 
The assumptions build on Huang and Hu (2002) who estimate that China’s internal rate of return 
on research in agriculture is 55 – 60% in terms of value added gain, only slightly lower than the 
average of 120 studies in Asia (67%), but higher than the world average (49%) reported in the 
comprehensive assessment by Evenson (2001). Nonetheless, in the scenario the increase is purely 
disembodied, and while not out of line from a historical perspective, the assumed growth rates 
neglect possible setbacks due to new animal and plant diseases, and are too general to have a 
direct link to ongoing research efforts. Rather this scenario is primarily intended to point to some 
of the bottlenecks that might be alleviated through effective research and development. 
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4.2.4 Enhanced irrigation development scenario (IRRIGUP) 
 
In specifying the enhanced irrigation simulation experiment the aim is to investigate the impact 
of an assumed further irrigation expansion. The scenario uses the same demographic, economic 
and urbanization assumptions as the baseline. This also leads to the same trends in farmland 
conversion, i.e. a total land area of 116.6 million ha cultivated with seasonal crops in 2030. The 
main difference compared to the baseline is a gradual shift from rainfed to irrigated land that 
increases the country’s effectively available irrigated land with 2.5% in 2010, 6.1% in 2020 and 
10.0% in 2030, while orchard land is kept at baseline level. Then, by 2030, the irrigated land 
amounts to 61.5 million hectare, compared to 55.9 million hectare in the baseline. 
 
The additional transformation of rainfed into irrigated land is regionally distributed building on a 
special study by Chen et al. (2005). Additions are largest in Northeast, North, Northwest and 
Central with 1.3, 1.1, 1.0 and 0.9 million ha, respectively, in 2030. In East, South and Southwest 
the additions are smaller (0.6, 0.3 and 0.4 million hectare, respectively) and in Plateau the 
difference is negligible.  
 
Since irrigated land requires more labor and machinery per hectare, the scenario also assumes that 
government stimulates additional investments in machinery, as part of the enhanced irrigation 
program, and that increased labor requirements lead to a slightly lower decline of farm labor. 
Furthermore, the (exogenous) allocation of manure, animal draught power and machine power to 
rainfed and irrigated land is adjusted to the scenario shifts. These assumptions are implemented 
so as to keep average yields on irrigated and rainfed land close to their baseline level in each 
province. For the country as a whole, farm labor in 2030 is 0.5% higher than under the baseline, 
and farm machinery 7% higher.  
 
We conclude this section by an overview of the main differences in the specification of the five 
scenario variants, at national level. They are summarized in Table 4.15. 
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Table 4.15 Key parameters underpinning the Chinagro scenarios at national level 
 
Major driving forces Scenarios 
 BASELINE LIBERAL HIGHGROW TECHPROG IRRIGUP 
Non-agricultural output (index)      
2003 100 100 100 100 100 
2010 172 172 175 172 172 
2020 323 323 352 323 323 
2030 533 533 642 533 533 
Population (millions)      
2003 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 
2010 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
2020 1429 1429 1431 1429 1429 
2030 1459 1459 1462 1459 1459 
Urbanization (%)      
2003 39 39 39 39 39 
2010 44 44 45 44 44 
2020 50 50 55 50 50 
2030 58 58 64 58 58 
Cropland with orchards  (mill.ha)      
2003 136 136 136 136 136 
2010 133 133 133 133 133 
2020 131 131 130 131 131 
2030 129 129 127 129 129 
Irrigation share (%)      
2003 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6 
2010 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6 47.8 
2020 47.2 47.2 47.2 47.2 50.1 
2030 47.9 47.9 47.8 47.9 52.7 
Farm labor (million manyear)      
2003 245 245 245 245 245 
2010 235 235 233 235 235 
2020 219 219 212 219 219 
2030 189 189 180 189 190 
Import tariffs (index)*      
2003 100 100 100 100 100 
2010 70 – 80 50 70 – 80 70 – 80 70 – 80 
2020 60 – 70 0 60 – 70 60 – 70 60 – 70 
2030 55 – 60 0 55 – 60 55 – 60 55 – 60 
Export tariffs (index)      
2003 100 100 100 100 100 
2010 75 50 75 75 75 
2020 38 0 38 38 38 
2030 38 0 38 38 38 
Yearly neutral technical progress       
Cropping 0.20% 0.20% 0.35% 0.40% 0.20% 
Livestock 0.80% 0.80% 0.90% 0.95% 0.80% 
 
* In case of differences across commodities, the range is indicated. 
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5. Results of the baseline model simulation 
 
 
Based on the scenarios described in the previous section, simulations were conducted with the 
Chinagro welfare model over a 30 year time horizon. The present section discusses the outcomes 
of the baseline scenario, reporting on: (1) production, consumption and trade at national level, (2) 
prices, (3) production, consumption and trade by region, (4) farm incomes and value added, and 
(5) environmental pressure. Outcomes of the scenario alternatives will be reported on in the next 
section. With respect to crops, the results are presented in terms of the Chinagro commodity 
classification, noting that they are also available at a more detailed level, viz. the 17 crops listed 
in Appendix A. 
 
 
5.1 Food production, consumption and trade at national level 
 
We discuss general tendencies before reporting on commodity-specific developments. Overall, 
the outcomes from the baseline show that China can produce most of its food domestically in the 
coming thirty years. However, with the fast growth of income and urbanization, it will have to 
import large amounts of animal feeds for its fast growing livestock herds, and eventually import 
white meat (pork and poultry). 
 
Given China’s relatively low labor cost and the ample farm population available to raise more 
livestock, given also the large scope for productivity improvements in livestock production as 
well as the relatively high cost of ocean transport of frozen meat, it seems efficient for China to 
make all efforts at producing its meat domestically. Yet, as decreasing returns in yield 
improvements eventually set in and urbanization proceeds, availability of farm-land will fall, 
labor cost will rise, and environmental pressures mount, reducing the room for expansion of 
stable capacity. Such considerations motivate the assumed general decline in the baseline growth 
rates of stable capacities in the intensified non-ruminant sector, specified earlier in Table 4.8, that 
trigger the growth in meat imports found in simulation.  
 
In monetary terms, the meat and feed imports are projected to amount to 29 billion USD18 in 
2030. To a significant extent (10 billion USD) they are offset by exports of fruits and vegetables 
as well as rice. Revenues from net exports of fruits and vegetables have already been rising very 
steeply in recent years, reaching 2.5 and 3.3 billion USD in 2003 and 2004, respectively (NBSCa, 
2005). Imports of milk (6 billion USD) and other food crops, mainly vegetable oils and sugar (7 
billion USD) will also rise. In all, our model simulations suggest that in 2030 China will have an 
agricultural trade deficit of 29 billion USD. Hence, as China’s trade surplus in non-agriculture 
already exceeds 100 billion USD in 2005 (NBSCa, 2006), it would under the assumed trends in 
non-agriculture not be difficult to finance the agricultural trade deficit in 2030.  
 
The demand system postulated in the model assumes that per capita consumption of food grains 
will decrease with income and even more so with migration to urban areas, while demand for 
livestock products will increase. The baseline outcomes reflect these trends, in particular the 
major impact of rural-to-urban migration on the resulting averages. For example, from 1997 to 
2030, per capita demand of rice declines slightly for both rural and urban households, but because 
of urbanization, the national average per capita demand of rice drops from 96.7 kg to 87.3 kg in 
2030. In certain regions or periods such per capita declines even lead to declining absolute grain 
consumption levels, as will be seen below. Per capita demand of other food crops will 
                                                   
18 Throughout, USD refers to US dollars of 1997. 
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approximately keep their current levels or increase modestly. For livestock products the demand 
pressures are so high that even considerable price increases cannot forestall high growth in per 
capita consumption. 
 
Turning to commodity-specific developments (shown in Table 5.1 for food crops, Table 5.2 for 
livestock products and Table 5.4 for feed, with in Table 5.3 more detail on consumption) and 
focusing on the period 2003-2030, we note the following. 
 
 
Rice. Initial self-sufficiency turns into moderate exports (4 million ton) from 2020 onwards. We 
recall from the scenario description that in 2003 exports were related to stock disposal, whereas 
production was at its lowest level since years.19 Given the current world market trade in rice of 
close to 30 million ton, the export levels in 2020 and 2030 do not seem excessive. Per capita 
consumption declines from 95.2 kg at present to 87.3 kg, largely due to urbanization. That 
exports do not rise faster, given this drop in per capita demand, the ongoing technological 
progress and new developments of irrigation is due to modest but steady population growth, and 
the loss of irrigated land to urbanization. 
 
Wheat. The trends generated are similar to those of rice: production in 2003 is at its lowest level 
since years, exports in 2003 are due to stock disposal and the market turns into self-sufficiency 
afterwards, while per capita consumption declines from 61.8 to 55.7 kg. The drivers behind these 
trends are similar as well: population growth and loss of land to urbanization compensate for 
demand satiation and technological progress. However, unlike rice, wheat does not end up in an 
export regime. 
 
Vegetable oils and sugar. There are steady increases of import volumes, leading to 9.1 
million ton oil imports and 3.1 million ton sugar imports in 2030. Production of vegetable oil 
stagnates, and even declines somewhat, due to unfavourable prices. Per capita consumption 
of oil remains almost constant at about 9.5 kg, while sugar consumption increases modestly 
from 7.1 to 8.4 kg because of rise in income and urbanization. Clearly, this increase in imports 
assumes unchanged policies, in particular regarding the development of new sugar refineries in 
the South. For reference, current world trade levels are around 42 million tons of sugar 
(refined-equivalent) and 60 million tons oils (incl. animal fats).  
 
Fruits and vegetables. Exports of fruits grow steadily from 2.3 million ton in 2003 to 4.7 million 
ton in 2030 while per capita consumption increases modestly, from 45 to 48 kg. Similarly, 
vegetable exports rise from 4.6 million ton in 2003 to 13.3 million ton in 2030, while per capita 
consumption declines slightly from the 2003 level of 165 to 163 kg, which is still high by 
international standards. The baseline scenario imposes an upper bound on these exports that 
increases from 5.3 to 15.4 million ton, as this volume is high relative to the current world exports 
of about 50 million ton according to FAO. 
   
Meat. Per capita consumption rises from 3.5, 26.1 and 6.3 kg in 2003 for ruminant meat, pork and 
poultry meat to 5.6, 40.1 and 11.8 kg, respectively, in 2030. Until 2010 China can maintain self-
sufficiency in meat but beyond that year it will import some poultry (4% of consumption). After 
2020 imports accelerate, reaching 16 percent of poultry consumption and 10 percent of pork 
consumption, mainly because the stable capacities grow less than demand. Self-sufficiency is 
                                                   
19 We note, however, that, the baseyear (1997) production levels for rice and wheat are both at an all-time high. 
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maintained in ruminant meat and eggs throughout the next thirty years.20 Nonetheless, with 9.1 
million ton altogether, the meat import flows will be considerable relative to the current level of 
world trade in meat of about 25 million ton. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of major 
food crops for China under baseline (million tons) 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Supply      
Rice (milled) 124.7  111.7  129.8  136.5  136.0  
Wheat flour 80.6  68.3  83.5  85.2  84.1  
Vegetable oil 8.7  10.6  9.8  10.1  10.2  
Sugar 7.3  8.4  9.0  9.5  9.5  
Fruit 54.0  63.2  69.2  74.7  78.3  
Vegetables 216.4  244.0  253.7  268.3  278.7  
Demand      
Rice (milled) 124.0  127.7 129.8  132.1  131.7  
Wheat flour 81.4  82.9  83.4  85.2  84.1  
Vegetable oil 11.0  15.3  16.6  18.3  19.4  
Sugar 7.7  9.7  10.7  11.7  12.6  
Fruit 53.8  60.9  65.2  70.8  73.6  
Vegetables 214.7  239.4  246.1  260.5  265.4  
Net outflow      
Rice (milled) 0.7  1.5  0.0  4.4  4.3  
Wheat flour -0.9  1.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  
Vegetable oil -2.3  -4.7  -6.8  -8.2  -9.1  
Sugar -0.4  -1.3  -1.7  -2.2  -3.1  
Fruit 0.2  2.3  4.0  3.8  4.7  
Vegetables 1.8  4.6  7.6  7.8  13.3  
Self-sufficiency rate (%)      
Rice (milled) 101 101 100 103 103 
Wheat flour 99 103 100 100 100 
Vegetable oil 79 69 59 55 53 
Sugar 95 87 84 81 75 
Fruit 100 104 106 105 106 
Vegetables 101 102 103 103 105 
  
 Note.   In 2003 the net outflow of wheat and rice is not equal to supply minus demand since  
  stock decreases of 17.5 and 16.5 million ton, respectively, are omitted from the table. 
 
 
                                                   
20 The existence of trade and transportation costs and tariffs results for each of the (homogeneous) commodities 
in a domestic price range in which neither imports nor exports are profitable. Hence, the relatively high 
frequency of self-sufficiency rates of 100. 
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Table 5.2 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of livestock products  
for China under baseline (million tons) 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Supply      
Beef and mutton 4.6  5.0  6.0  7.4  8.5  
Pork 28.7  34.7  40.9  49.0  53.3  
Poultry meat 6.5  8.2  10.2  12.6  14.6  
Milk 10.0  13.7  18.8  24.5  28.7  
Egg 12.7  16.2  20.3  25.4  29.2  
Demand      
Beef and mutton 4.5  5.0  6.0  7.4  8.5  
Pork 28.4  34.7  40.9  49.0  59.5  
Poultry meat 6.3  8.2  10.2  13.2  17.5  
Milk 10.0  15.6  22.7  36.6  57.6  
Egg 12.7  16.2  20.3  24.6  29.2  
Net outflow      
Beef and mutton 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Pork 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  -6.2  
Poultry meat 0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.6  -2.9  
Milk 0.0  -1.9  -3.9  -12.1  -28.9  
Egg 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  
Self-sufficiency rate (%)      
Beef and mutton 102 100 100 100 100 
Pork 101 100 100 100 90 
Poultry meat 103 100 100 96 84 
Milk 100 88 83 67 50 
Egg 100 100 100 103 100 
 
Milk. Per capita consumption increases from 11.6 kg in 2003 to 38.7 kg in 2030. Domestic supply 
cannot follow that pace, basically because the scenario assumptions are rather moderate for the 
specialized dairy sector,21 which also starts from a very low base. By 2030 imports of 28.9 
million ton of milk equivalent cover half of consumption, which is significant given the fact that 
world trade in dairy currently reaches around 90 million ton in whole, fresh milk equivalent. 
Eggs. Per capita consumption rises from 12.0 kg in 2003 to 19.5 kg in 2030, a considerable 
increase that can, however, be met from domestic supply. Hence, the country remains in self-
sufficiency, and even has some exports in 2020.  
Fish. Production is purely scenario driven and grows steadily, while consumption keeps on rising 
at about 2.5 percent annually, which amounts to a per capita consumption increasing from 15.5 
kg in 2003 to 27.7 kg in 2030. Exports are fully exogenous and assumed to grow from 1.4 to 1.6 
million ton. 
                                                   
21 Compared e.g. to Fuller et al. (2006). 
    
5
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Per capita consumption of main agricultural products in China, rural and urban (kg/person/year) 
 
Rural  Urban  National 
 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
  Milled rice 107.3 107.9 106.1 105.0 105.3 76.2 75.2 74.6 74.1 74.0 96.7 95.2 92.3 89.5 87.3 
  Wheat flour 70.6 71.7 70.2 70.3 70.7 47.2 46.3 45.5 45.2 44.7 62.6 61.8 59.3 57.8 55.7 
  Maize 16.1 17.3 17.0 16.7 16.4 7.4 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 13.2 13.7 13.2 12.5 11.9 
  Other staple food 14.4 15.6 15.5 15.3 15.1 20.5 22.4 22.1 21.5 20.6 16.4 18.2 18.4 18.4 18.3 
  Vegetable oil 8.7 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.5 8.0 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.5 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.2 
  Sugar 3.5 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.4 9.9 11.6 11.7 11.6 11.4 5.7 7.1 7.6 8.0 8.4 
  Fruits 29.6 31.2 30.4 30.9 30.6 65.6 66.9 65.2 63.8 61.1 41.9 45.1 45.7 47.4 48.2 
  Vegetables 138.9 152.2 149.6 152.4 153.3 177.8 185.6 180.7 176.6 170.6 152.1 165.2 163.2 164.5 163.3 
  Ruminant meat 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 7.1 7.1 7.6 8.3 8.5 3.3 3.5 4.2 5.0 5.6 
  Pork 16.5 19.4 21.2 23.4 27.3 33.6 36.8 39.8 43.7 49.6 22.3 26.1 29.4 33.6 40.1 
  Poultry meat 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.4 5.4 9.4 10.6 11.8 13.7 16.5 5.2 6.3 7.4 9.1 11.8 
  Milk 0.9 2.0 2.9 4.7 7.3 20.9 26.7 33.1 45.3 61.9 7.7 11.6 16.1 25.0 38.7 
  Eggs 5.9 7.2 8.2 8.9 9.5 17.4 19.7 22.2 24.6 26.8 9.8 12.0 14.4 16.7 19.5 
  Fish 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.7 26.9 28.6 31.2 36.3 42.5 13.9 15.5 17.8 21.9 27.7 
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Table 5.4 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of tradable feeds  
for China under baseline 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Supply      
Maize 98.8  107.1  113.1  118.9  118.8  
Carbohydrate feed 303.5  305.6  297.8  289.8  275.8  
Protein feed 191.9  190.8  203.7  212.3  213.4  
Demand      
Maize, food 16.9 18.4 18.4 18.3 17.8 
Maize, feed 81.7  95.2  108.0  120.6  123.0  
Carbohydrate feed 304.2  327.3  336.6  348.3  332.5  
Protein feed 205.3  251.0  284.4  320.1  327.0  
Net outflow      
Maize 6.4  13.4  -13.4  -20.1  -22.0  
Carbohydrate feed -0.7  -21.6  -38.8  -58.5  -56.7  
Protein feed -13.4  -60.2  -80.7  -107.8  -113.6  
Self-sufficiency rate (%)      
Maize 107 114 89 86 84 
Carbohydrate feed 100 93 88 83 83 
Protein feed 93 76 72 66 65 
Notes: - maize volumes are expressed in million tons, carbohydrate feed and protein feeds in million Gcal, 
 - for maize the 1997 and 2003 stock decreases of 6.2 and 20.0 million ton are omitted from the table. 
 
 
Animal feeds (maize, carbohydrate feeds and protein feeds). Supplies of maize and protein feeds 
grow at an average modest rate of 0.4% in the period 2003-2030. This is less than the growth rate 
of the main staples wheat and rice, basically because the latter had to recover from a serious 
production dip in 2003. For carbohydrate feed the situation is different since its supply appears to 
decline, due partly to a weak performance of root crops (in response to price reductions) and 
partly to the tighter sanitary measures assumed in the baseline that reduce the possibilities of 
using household waste and crop residuals as feed. In contrast, feed demand keeps on rising, 
especially the demand for protein feeds from the intensified livestock sectors. At the same time, it 
precisely is this transition to intensified production that keeps the growth of total feed demand 
limited, through the higher feed efficiency as compared to the traditional sectors. It also appears 
that in absolute amounts the role of local feeds is not diminishing. We will expand on this in 
subsection 5.4. 
 
Consequently, feed imports rise steadily but the volumes do not become excessive. By 2030, for 
maize, 16 percent of domestic use is imported, for carbohydrate feeds 17 percent and for protein 
feeds 35 percent. Converting the carbohydrate quantities into grain equivalent through division by 
a factor 3.4 mcal/kg (see appendix A), gives an import of 16.7 million ton grain equivalent in 
2030. Similarly, for a factor of 3 mcal/kg the 2030 imports of protein feed can be expressed as an 
import volume of 37.8 million ton of cake/bran equivalent. For reference, current world trade 
levels of maize are around 90 million ton, other coarse grains around 15 million ton, bran around 
5 million ton and soybean cake around 50 million tons, whereas world trade in wheat reaches 
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around 120 million ton (food plus feed). We note that wheat used as animal feed could be 
considered part of carbohydrates and protein feeds, since it substitutes for these. In all, the 
imports of animal feeds are spectacular, not so much from the perspective of China itself that can 
easily cover them from exports but purely as a strain on the world market. 
 
These commodity-specific outcomes confirm that for non-feed crops self-sufficiency is largely 
preserved, which is especially significant for rice and wheat, the two dominant food grains in the 
country. Self-sufficiency in these two commodities has long been seen as major yardstick of the 
country’s food security. After 2020, rice will even be exported, although one may, given the 
thinness of the world rice market, put to question that this would be possible without causing the 
international price to fall, as was assumed in this scenario. In addition, China will also export 
significant volumes of fruits and vegetables while importing oils and sugar. This comfortable 
situation for non-feed crops is mainly because technical progress in agriculture and higher input 
intensity more than compensate for the reduction in total land area available, and because the 
drop in per capita food-grain consumption with rising income and urbanization, is stronger than 
the increase in demand due to the, modest, overall rise in population.  
 
As China’s integration into the world market becomes deeper, its strength in exporting labor 
intensive products will become more evident, while land-intensive products will lose. Hence, an 
orientation on livestock and horticulture would seem natural. Yet, it appears that the country will 
have to import livestock products towards the end of the period, and also that the imports of feed 
grains are quite high from the perspective of the world market, especially if one takes into 
account that the baseline scenario keeps world market prices fixed at scenario values and 
disregards any “new” demands for biofuels from agriculture by China as well as by other 
countries. 
 
 
5.2 Prices 
 
Domestic prices of main products in the crop sector will more or less follow the same pattern of 
recovery after 2003 as the world market prices in the scenario specification that mainly reflects 
the upcoming demand for livestock products in Asia while disregarding future growth in demand 
for biofuels. The recovery is assumed to last until 2020, and followed by a period of slight 
reduction in world prices. Yet, the domestic pattern is not exactly the same for each crop due to 
decreasing tariff rates, decreasing trade and transport margins and switches of trade regime 
(import, export, self-sufficiency). Below, we will discuss it crop by crop. By contrast, beef and 
mutton, pork, and poultry meat that face high trade and transport margins on import and start 
from autarky, will witness a steady price increase, significantly above the world price scenario.  
 
The market clearing prices are listed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 for crops and livestock products, 
respectively. They appear by region, since the Chinagro model operates with regional markets 
and has no national market.22 Clearly, prices are determined simultaneously with supply and 
demand, as in any equilibrium model. Farmgate prices do not appear in the table. They are 
calculated by county and differ from the regional market prices due to processing (including trade 
and transport) and domestic producer taxes. In our discussion of farm value added below we 
comment on notable price developments at county level. Consumer prices are computed as the 
regional market price plus consumer tax and processing margin, specific for each rural and urban 
income group, and are not discussed separately. 
                                                   
22 The national market balances of the previous subsection are obtained by summation of the regional market 
balances. 
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Table 5.5 Regional market price of main crop products under baseline (Yuan/kg) 
 
  North Northeast East Central South Southwest Plateau Northwest
Rice  1997 2.34 2.02 1.93 1.77 2.29 2.20 2.39 2.28 
 2003 1.94 1.62 1.54 1.37 1.89 1.80 1.99 1.88 
 2010 2.06 1.75 1.66 1.50 2.02 1.93 2.12 2.01 
 2020 2.12 1.80 1.72 1.55 2.07 1.98 2.17 2.06 
 2030 1.96 1.65 1.56 1.40 1.92 1.83 2.02 1.91 
Wheat 1997 1.62 1.63 1.53 1.57 1.79 1.64 1.76 1.65 
 2003 1.23 1.24 1.14 1.18 1.40 1.25 1.37 1.26 
 2010 1.38 1.40 1.29 1.33 1.55 1.40 1.53 1.41 
 2020 1.33 1.35 1.25 1.29 1.51 1.36 1.48 1.36 
  2030 1.23 1.25 1.15 1.18 1.40 1.25 1.38 1.26 
Maize 1997 1.11 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.20 1.18 1.20 1.16 
 2003 0.99 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.08 1.04 
 2010 1.05 1.12 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.14 1.10 
 2020 1.09 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.17 1.13 
 2030 1.04 1.10 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.08 
Vegetable oil 1997 7.40 7.30 7.36 7.39 8.23 7.39 7.36 7.34 
 2003 5.74 5.64 5.71 5.74 6.58 5.74 5.71 5.69 
 2010 5.44 5.34 5.40 5.44 6.25 5.43 5.41 5.39 
 2020 5.23 5.14 5.20 5.23 6.00 5.23 5.21 5.19 
  2030 4.89 4.80 4.86 4.89 5.62 4.89 4.87 4.85 
Sugar 1997 3.84 3.73 3.86 3.85 3.84 3.82 3.97 3.83 
 2003 2.79 2.68 2.81 2.80 2.79 2.77 2.91 2.77 
 2010 2.71 2.60 2.73 2.72 2.70 2.69 2.83 2.69 
 2020 2.72 2.62 2.75 2.74 2.72 2.70 2.85 2.71 
 2030 2.54 2.44 2.56 2.55 2.54 2.52 2.66 2.52 
Fruits 1997 1.24 1.46 1.54 1.48 1.36 1.51 1.51 1.08 
 2003 1.36 1.58 1.66 1.60 1.48 1.63 1.63 1.20 
 2010 1.51 1.73 1.80 1.74 1.62 1.77 1.78 1.34 
 2020 1.52 1.74 1.82 1.76 1.64 1.79 1.79 1.36 
  2030 1.54 1.76 1.84 1.78 1.66 1.81 1.81 1.38 
Vegetables 1997 0.87 1.04 0.78 0.71 0.87 0.99 0.96 0.90 
 2003 0.80 0.96 0.71 0.64 0.79 0.92 0.88 0.83 
 2010 0.94 1.10 0.84 0.77 0.93 1.05 1.02 0.97 
 2020 0.99 1.15 0.89 0.82 0.98 1.10 1.07 1.02 
  2030 1.04 1.14 0.94 0.87 1.02 1.10 1.12 1.06 
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Table 5.6 Regional market price of main livestock products under baseline (Yuan/kg) 
 
  North Northeast East Central South Southwest Plateau Northwest
Beef and mutton 1997 10.45 9.59 10.97 9.87 10.68 9.42 8.19 9.53 
 2003 15.14 14.28 15.66 14.56 15.37 14.11 12.88 14.21 
 2010 15.39 14.53 15.91 14.81 15.61 14.36 13.13 14.46 
 2020 17.45 16.59 17.96 16.87 17.67 16.42 15.19 16.52 
 2030 21.44 20.58 21.96 20.86 21.67 20.41 19.18 20.52 
Pork 1997 11.03 10.00 12.14 10.60 12.67 9.77 10.13 9.58 
 2003 12.75 11.69 13.86 12.32 14.47 11.49 11.82 11.29 
 2010 14.78 13.72 15.88 14.35 16.51 13.52 13.85 13.32 
 2020 19.02 17.96 20.13 18.59 20.74 17.76 18.09 17.56 
 2030 21.81 20.91 22.62 21.39 22.09 21.14 21.04 21.34 
Poultry meat 1997 10.75 11.41 13.18 12.84 16.79 15.77 14.59 11.83 
 2003 12.28 12.95 14.72 14.38 18.32 17.30 16.13 13.37 
 2010 14.16 14.83 16.59 16.26 20.19 19.18 18.00 15.25 
 2020 18.06 18.73 20.50 20.16 21.70 20.68 21.90 19.15 
 2030 20.43 21.09 22.86 22.52 20.74 21.80 23.05 21.51 
Milk 1997 3.08 2.67 2.97 2.85 2.76 2.73 2.79 2.53 
 2003 3.09 2.68 2.98 2.86 2.77 2.74 2.80 2.54 
 2010 2.82 2.41 2.71 2.60 2.51 2.48 2.54 2.27 
 2020 2.63 2.24 2.53 2.43 2.34 2.31 2.35 2.10 
 2030 2.46 2.10 2.36 2.27 2.18 2.21 2.18 2.00 
Egg 1997 5.52 5.87 6.33 7.39 8.20 7.61 6.44 5.80 
 2003 5.23 5.58 6.04 7.10 7.91 7.32 6.15 5.51 
 2010 4.85 5.20 5.66 6.72 7.53 6.94 5.77 5.14 
 2020 5.44 5.78 6.24 7.31 8.11 7.52 6.35 5.72 
 2030 5.91 6.26 6.72 7.78 8.59 8.00 6.83 6.20 
Note: The 1997 beef and mutton prices appearing in the table are too low, due to statistical problems that no 
longer exist in 2003. Hence, the price rise from 1997 to 2003 is to some extent an artefact.  
 
 
We may recall from section 3 that all prices are “real” and, through deflation of the non-
agricultural price, comparable to the 1997 level. As the differences between regions are small, we 
focus on average trends over regions. In fact, regional differences mainly arise when a region 
changes its trade regime, such as Southwest where in 2030 the continuing increase in vegetable 
output leads to a lower price relative to other regions, as can be seen in Table 5.5, allowing 
exports to some of these regions. We also focus our discussion on the period 2003-2030, hence 
disregarding the price fall experienced by most crops between 1997 and 2003 and starting, 
therefore, at relatively low crop prices.  
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Rice prices end up slightly higher in 2030 as compared to 2003. However, they are lower than if 
they purely followed the world price. The main reason for the difference is the transition to an 
export regime that reduces the domestic prices. Although this negatively impacts on domestic 
supply, production levels remain sufficiently high to maintain positive exports.  
 
Wheat prices in 2030 are about as high as in 2003. They do not follow the fall in the world price 
because wheat operates in a self-sufficiency regime, which implies that domestic supply and 
demand drive price formation. It appears that demand is strong enough to keep prices above the 
level where export becomes profitable.  
 
Maize prices in 2030 are about 4% higher than in 2003. Maize remains in import regime, 
implying that the domestic prices are equal to the foreign price incremented by import tariffs and 
the trade and transport margin on imports. Since both the import tariff rates and the import 
margin are gradually being reduced, the domestic price increases less than the foreign price which 
ends up in 2030 10% higher than in 2003. Other feeds are not mentioned in the table but their 
price patterns are similar to those of maize.  
 
Vegetable oil and sugar are both imported in all years. Therefore, they follow the same pattern as 
maize, with their prices dropping more than the world price, and by 2030 end up about 15% and 
9% below their 2003 level, respectively. For fruits and vegetables the pattern is different, since 
these commodities are exported and the gradual decrease in their export tariff and export trade 
and transport margins raises domestic prices, leading to steadily rising prices. For vegetables, this 
trend is maintained despite the upper bound on exports that becomes active in 2030 in some 
regions, thereby depressing the domestic price.  
 
Developments in meat prices (beef and mutton, pork, poultry meat) were already discussed 
above. Prices rise significantly as demand grows faster than domestic supply, causing transition 
to an import regime. For example, the price of pork in 2003 is about 12 Yuan/kg and it will 
almost double relative to 2003 reaching 22 Yuan/kg by 2030.  
 
For milk, which remains in import regime throughout the baseline simulation, the domestic prices 
fall steadily, say, from 2.9 to 2.4 Yuan/kg. This decline is the combined outcome of three effects, 
a falling world price, a reduced import tariff rate and a lower trade and transport margin on 
imports.  
 
Finally, egg prices are increasing steadily. By 2030 they are about 12% higher than in 2003. 
Since eggs are largely in the self-sufficiency regime, this outcome results from domestic market 
clearing with a gradually stronger demand pressure. 
 
 
5.3 Food production, consumption and trade by region 
 
We now present the regional commodity balances that correspond to the national balances of 
subsection 5.1. Obviously, the main national trends also show up at regional level. Therefore, 
we only mention relative differences across the regions.  
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Table 5.7 Per capita consumption of grain and meat in different regions under baseline (kg/caput) 
 
Grain Meat and egg 
 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Rural consumer  
   North 195.3 199.0 196.0 196.7 197.7 24.7 29.5 33.6 37.4 42.5 
   Northeast 176.7 183.4 180.4 180.1 182.3 27.9 33.2 37.4 41.5 47.4 
   East 202.4 205.4 202.5 202.4 204.7 30.1 35.3 39.7 44.8 52.7 
   Central 204.9 208.1 204.4 202.3 203.4 25.6 29.8 32.7 35.8 40.8 
   South 204.7 205.3 203.1 201.7 202.3 31.1 36.3 40.1 45.8 56.3 
   Southwest 190.9 192.1 187.1 182.4 180.7 29.7 34.7 37.2 39.0 41.9 
   Plateau 142.3 141.9 137.6 134.9 132.1 17.1 17.6 19.5 20.6 20.7 
   Northwest 169.6 172.9 169.1 168.7 168.4 16.6 19.7 22.5 25.1 27.9 
Urban consumer           
   North 130.2 129.6 128.3 128.0 127.6 70.5 78.2 86.9 96.3 107.6 
   Northeast 131.4 130.7 129.3 128.7 128.2 59.9 66.1 73.5 81.1 89.7 
   East 135.4 133.4 131.3 129.7 128.4 74.1 81.3 88.6 97.0 107.0 
   Central 124.6 123.2 121.6 120.3 119.6 60.5 67.0 73.9 82.1 92.1 
   South 137.7 136.1 135.6 135.4 135.2 66.6 72.3 78.7 88.5 103.5 
   Southwest 117.2 116.4 115.4 115.1 114.9 76.0 82.4 88.9 97.4 108.0 
   Plateau 141.2 140.9 140.3 140.6 140.8 63.0 68.8 76.3 85.6 97.0 
   Northwest 133.8 132.8 131.2 130.7 130.1 55.2 60.8 68.0 75.8 83.6 
Total population           
   North 175.1 174.1 168.0 163.9 158.8 38.9 46.9 55.6 65.5 78.6 
   Northeast 154.4 155.1 151.1 148.4 145.9 43.7 50.9 58.1 65.9 75.8 
   East 175.6 173.0 166.6 161.1 155.8 47.7 56.0 64.4 74.4 87.5 
   Central 181.1 179.1 171.9 165.1 159.2 36.0 42.5 48.9 56.8 67.8 
   South 176.6 172.7 167.5 162.7 158.0 46.0 53.3 60.4 70.9 87.5 
   Southwest 173.2 170.8 163.6 156.2 150.0 40.8 48.1 54.1 61.7 72.7 
   Plateau 142.0 141.6 138.5 137.1 136.1 28.5 32.4 38.3 45.6 55.5 
   Northwest 158.8 159.1 154.4 151.7 148.5 28.2 33.8 40.2 47.7 56.8 
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It appears that for many commodities the distribution of production across regions remains 
remarkably stable, despite the significant changes in farm population and in land availability in the 
scenario, and the marked shifts in overall output composition in every region. The changes in the net 
trading position of the regions largely originate from the demand side, driven by income changes and 
migration, with price adjustments (discussed in the previous subsection) as mitigating factors. The 
resulting fast rising internal trade flows place significant demands on domestic trade and transport 
infrastructure. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the development of per capita demand in each region, as well as the separate figures 
for urban and rural consumers.23 For grain, one may observe a slight drop in per capita demand in 
both rural and urban regions. Total per capita demand drops faster in all regions, due to urbanization. 
For meat the individual trend and the urbanization effect are mutually reinforcing, leading to 
significant per capita increases at regional level. Trends in per capita demand are rather similar 
across the regions. Per capita meat demand in 2030 (including eggs) is in all regions 1.5 to 1.7 times 
higher than in 2003. Per capita grain demand falls everywhere, ending up 6% to 12% below the 2003 
level, with the highest fall in Southwest and Central regions, where urbanization is fast and urban 
grain intake relatively low. 
 
The effect of interregional migration and natural population growth on demand is better captured in 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 with absolute demand volumes. Although population continues to grow in all 
regions, the rate of growth is not always sufficient to compensate for per capita declines in demand. 
Therefore, significant differences show up across regions. For rice and wheat, demand rises in some 
regions and falls in others. Rice consumption decreases in Northeast, Central and Southwest, 
whereas wheat consumption decreases in Northeast and also, despite net immigration from other 
regions, in North and East. Naturally, the absolute levels of meat demand increase everywhere at a 
higher rate than the per capita intake mentioned above. It almost doubles in North and even more 
than doubles in South. 
 
Turning to the supply side, we remark that the regional volumes as shown for 2003 and 2030 in 
Tables 5.8 through 5.10 are actually derived as aggregates of county-specific outcomes. As 
mentioned earlier, the regional distribution is rather stable over time for many commodities but there 
are a few exceptions to this general trend, which we discuss here. Supply increases of rice are higher 
in Northeast, Central and Southwest than elsewhere. The acceleration in Northeast is clearly the 
result of the enlargement of its irrigated area. The large rice producers Central and Southwest do not 
have this advantage, as none of the other regions, but their loss of irrigated area is relatively small 
and dominated by the benefits of technical progress. In the two other important rice producing 
regions, East and South, the loss of irrigated land goes faster, although also here a production 
increase results. For fruits, supply is stagnating in South due to the decline of orchard land, whereas 
it is growing elsewhere. For vegetables, we see stagnation in East where it is the main crop and has a 
relatively high farmgate price, due to favorable crop composition. Consequently, a given absolute 
rise in price means less percentage-wise for this region, that also suffers from a loss of irrigated and 
rainfed land, especially in the counties close to urban areas where vegetable production is most 
intense. The rates of growth in meat and milk production largely follow those of stable capacities 
that vary across regions. This explains that meat increases are largest in South, with about a doubling 
of output between 2003 and 2030, and that milk increases are largest in North, Northwest and 
Plateau, where output in 2030 is more than 2.5 times as high as in 2003. By contrast, feed supply 
increases at a rate that is remarkably uniform across regions.  
 
                                                   
23 Actually, the Chinagro model operates at a lower level of detail, viz. with three urban and three rural classes by 
region. 
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Table 5.8 Regional supply, demand, and net outflow of main food crop products under baserun (1000 tons) 
 
Rice Wheat Vegetable oil Sugar Fruit Vegetable 
 
2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 
Supply             
North 3550 4120 36721 44151 2847 2669 69 79 23154 30120 71516 81720 
Northeast 9442 13970 1855 2401 960 896 393 430 3796 4465 21745 24392 
East 25698 28863 11060 13246 1973 1818 107 105 5729 6387 37544 38022 
Central 32396 40341 2442 3209 1960 1960 489 515 4739 5640 36032 42082 
South 20875 23649 151 166 519 537 5098 5496 13101 13249 29792 33736 
Southwest 18239 23123 5697 7458 980 979 1556 1964 4160 5403 32079 39357 
Plateau 3 4 616 758 81 80 0 0 23 24 481 580 
Northwest 1486 1921 9727 12746 1243 1298 695 876 8492 13009 14795 18804 
Demand             
North 6873 8701 43395 41940 3652 4552 2060 2744 18389 23181 67740 74395 
Northeast 9160 8627 4502 4473 1341 1486 548 569 6251 6246 26089 25755 
East 24952 24415 9954 9487 3149 4214 2106 2470 12381 13642 32003 33761 
Central 28197 25320 2590 2823 2314 2442 1059 1276 6949 7450 29263 30515 
South 29124 37171 2479 4169 1928 3378 1961 2914 6229 9327 29726 40117 
Southwest 26293 23390 4996 5073 1692 1765 1341 1716 5325 6858 36479 37994 
Plateau 138 194 1032 1289 71 92 44 70 308 449 1189 1577 
Northwest 2951 3920 13969 14879 1137 1456 599 836 5067 6473 16924 21303 
Net outflow             
North -2776 -4581 1980 2211 -805 -1883 -1991 -2665 4765 6939 3776 7324 
Northeast 1697 5343 -2115 -2072 -382 -589 -155 -139 -2455 -1781 -4345 -1363 
East 4778 4448 3932 3759 -1176 -2395 -1999 -2365 -6653 -7255 5540 4260 
Central 9387 15021 504 386 -354 -482 -571 -761 -2210 -1809 6769 11567 
South -4972 -13521 -2290 -4003 -1409 -2841 3138 2581 6872 3922 66 -6380 
Southwest -5261 -267 2056 2384 -712 -786 215 248 -1165 -1455 -4400 1363 
Plateau -135 -190 -274 -531 10 -12 -44 -70 -285 -425 -708 -997 
Northwest -1217 -1999 -1941 -2133 107 -158 95 40 3425 6536 -2129 -2498 
Note.   In 2003 the net outflow of wheat and rice is not equal to supply minus demand since the stock decreases are omitted from the table, as in table 5.1.  
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Table 5.9 Regional supply, demand, and net outflow of main livestock products under base 
scenario (1000 tons) 
 
Beef and mutton Pork Poultry meat Milk Egg 
 
2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 
Supply           
North 1635 2838 6416 9330 2131 3409 3673 8745 6862 11782 
Northeast 572 819 2555 3905 1193 1858 2306 3982 2161 3462 
East 377 533 4501 6524 1449 2074 1074 1925 2581 4267 
Central 303 343 6459 9682 532 1039 568 587 1052 2106 
South 192 227 4990 10045 1632 3963 823 964 1031 2870 
Southwest 432 618 7749 10342 1037 1864 1320 2215 1465 2676 
Plateau 250 636 80 138 2 2 761 2123 19 62 
Northwest 1210 2515 1968 3369 193 386 3132 8170 1039 1951 
Demand           
North 1322 2281 6585 11997 1594 3345 4115 16989 5871 10412 
Northeast 772 1108 2470 3584 527 834 1713 5150 1867 2754 
East 620 987 5947 9885 1870 3292 4164 13653 3045 5011 
Central 389 660 4587 7014 818 1439 879 3028 1602 2852 
South 494 1107 5817 12875 2082 5735 1236 5322 1569 3710 
Southwest 391 639 7355 10535 929 1991 1188 4076 1228 2163 
Plateau 124 207 112 266 9 26 428 1414 39 116 
Northwest 860 1539 1845 3369 340 798 1876 7982 988 2159 
Net outflow           
North 313 557 -169 -2667 537 65 -442 -8244 991 1371 
Northeast -200 -289 85 321 666 1024 594 -1168 294 707 
East -243 -454 -1446 -3362 -421 -1218 -3090 -11727 -464 -744 
Central -86 -317 1872 2667 -285 -400 -311 -2441 -550 -745 
South -302 -881 -827 -2830 -450 -1772 -413 -4358 -538 -840 
Southwest 42 -21 395 -193 108 -126 131 -1862 237 513 
Plateau 126 429 -32 -128 -7 -23 333 709 -20 -54 
Northwest 351 976 123 0 -147 -412 1255 189 51 -207 
 
 
After combining demand and supply sides, one obtains the net trade positions of the regions. 
With respect to specific crop production, calculated by summation over counties, we see in Table 
5.8 that by 2030 the geographic specialization in rice and wheat production will continue to make 
the Central, Northeast and East regions be the leading sellers of rice and East, Southwest, and 
North the leading sellers of wheat. On the buying side, the current number one buyer for rice, the 
Southwest, will likely become close to self-sufficient in rice, while South, the most industrialized 
region, would become number one buyer for rice and remain number one buyer for wheat. North, 
the main wheat region, with about half of the country’s supply and demand, remains a modest net 
seller.   
 
For vegetable oil and sugar, demand increases faster than supply, largely since prices become 
unfavorable relative to other crops (as was seen in Table 5.5). All regions remain or become net 
buyers of vegetable oil, whereas for sugar South remains a large seller while Southwest and 
Northwest manage to keep a supply surplus, albeit of modest size.  
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The present leading position of South as seller of fruit will likely be overtaken by North and 
Northwest, for reasons discussed earlier. The current top three buyers, East, Northeast and 
Central, keep their position. For vegetables, the Central, North and East will continue to be 
leading sellers, with East losing dominance, due to stagnation of its production. Southwest also 
becomes a net seller but South, the most industrialized region, will give up its position in 2003 as 
a seller to become number one buyer by 2030. 
 
Table 5.9 shows that the largest buyers of livestock products will be the industrialized coastal 
regions South, East and North, with increasingly large net inflows of meat and milk,. Although by 
2030 meat supply in these regions is 50% to 100% above the level of 2003, this is not sufficient 
to keep up with the demand increases resulting from rising per capita incomes and immigration-
induced population growth. Also the traditional meat surplus region Southwest would become a 
deficit region due to rising demand. Northeast and Central will continue to be the leading net 
contributors but the rise of their surpluses is moderate. East will remain the largest milk buyer, 
with an inflow more than three times as high as in 2003. In North, a similar increase of milk 
inflow will be required in spite of the considerable supply increases. South is the third milk-
buying region, although their per capita demand levels remain far below the levels in East and 
North. Remarkably, Northwest does not become a major milk-exporting region since its own 
demand rises just as fast as its production. For eggs, there is no significant change between 2003 
and 2030, with North, Northeast and Southwest keeping up as selling regions. 
 
Given the impressive surge in meat production and the lower growth rates in crop production, the 
large increases in feed inflows into the three industrialized coastal areas North, East and South 
appearing in Table 5.10 do not come as unexpected. Yet, some qualifications are in order. First, 
North, traditionally a maize-selling region, by 2030 has turned into a maize buyer, albeit a modest 
one. South and East were in 2003 net sellers of carbohydrate feed and remain so, but with lower 
outflows. The picture is similar across the three regions for protein feed only, with large increases 
in inflow throughout. While every region (with the exception of Plateau in 2003) will continue to 
be buyer of protein feed, the net inflow is going to double in South, East, and North. Only for 
Southwest the demand increase for protein feed will be rather modest, due to the relatively large 
share of draught animals and traditionally raised pigs and chicken in its livestock system. 
Compared with protein feed, the changes in net outflows will be less pronounced for 
carbohydrates, with the exception of North and Northwest. 
 
One may observe in Table 5.10 that maize output in the two major maize-producing regions 
Northeast and North is increasing only at a limited pace, for North even surpassed by its own 
demand for maize, despite their often mentioned high potential referred to in section 2. As a 
result, North becomes a maize importer. Net maize exports from Northeast remain about constant 
(if one disregards the impact of the stock reducing operation of 2003), as high as about 18 million 
ton. Figure 5.1 provides more detail. The upper panel shows the distribution of maize production 
over the counties in 2003, distinguished by level of county output. Apart from some areas in 
Southwest and far Northwest, the major maize producing counties are indeed concentrated in 
Northeast and North. However, as shown in the lower panel, the increases between 2003 and 
2030 are distributed more evenly over the four producing regions and do not show a strong 
advantage of North and Northwest. In fact, in both regions several counties have no increase at all 
(green-colored).  
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Table 5.10 Regional supply, demand, and net outflow of feed products under baseline 
 
Maize Carbohydrate feed Protein feed 
Products 
2003 2030 2003 2030 2003 2030 
Supply       
North 36.9  39.2  61.8  53.8  47.7  52.4  
Northeast 30.7  32.5  23.3  21.6  19.0  21.0  
East 5.1  5.5  45.6  41.0  36.6  39.0  
Central 2.5  3.0  43.7  41.5  32.8  37.4  
South 2.3  2.6  42.2  36.3  14.9  17.1  
Southwest 14.7  18.1  56.5  52.3  20.4  24.1  
Plateau 0.0  0.0  2.5  2.2  1.0  1.1  
Northwest 15.0  17.8  29.9  27.0  18.5  21.4  
Demand       
North 32.6 40.9  104.6  113.8  58.0  76.6  
Northeast 12.8 14.7  27.3  25.7  29.0  35.0  
East 8.4 9.5  27.3  24.0  46.3  59.1  
Central 8.6 10.9  23.0  19.0  40.6  48.3  
South 11.5 19.2  28.9  30.7  26.0  41.7  
Southwest 32.8 35.9  88.9  82.0  30.9  32.9  
Plateau 0.7 1.3  5.1  8.7  1.0  1.7  
Northwest 6.1 8.5  22.1  28.5  19.4  31.7  
Net outflow       
North 10.9  -1.6  -42.8  -60.0  -10.2  -24.2  
Northeast 23.8  17.8  -4.0  -4.1  -10.0  -14.0  
East -2.4  -4.1  18.4  17.0  -9.7  -20.1  
Central -5.6  -7.9  20.7  22.5  -7.8  -11.0  
South -8.8  -16.6  13.3  5.6  -11.1  -24.6  
Southwest -15.5  -17.8  -32.4  -29.8  -10.5  -8.8  
Plateau -0.7  -1.2  -2.6  -6.6  0.1  -0.6  
Northwest 11.8  9.3  7.7  -1.4  -0.9  -10.3  
Notes: -  maize volumes are expressed in million tons, carbohydrate feed and protein feeds in million Gcal, 
 - maize includes both food and feed, 
 - the 1997 and 2003 stock decreases of maize are omitted from the table, as in table 5.3. 
 
 
We observe that in Northeast, where the baseline scenario assumes a conversion of 2 million ha 
of rainfed land into irrigated land and orchards, the moderate increase of maize output must 
primarily be written on account of the relatively poor profitability as compared to other crops. 
Table 5.8 shows that the output of all other crops, except oil crops, grows faster than maize. 
Given the presence of the city of Dalian as one of the largest ports for maize import and export, 
world prices have a strong influence on the maize market in this region. The resulting increase in 
farmgate prices by about 0.8% annually is apparently insufficient. Especially the newly irrigated 
land is seen to stimulate primarily rice output. In North, the same profitability issue plays a role 
but here both irrigated and rainfed land area is diminishing in the baseline scenario, hence ruling 
out the possibility of significant expansion in maize production. We return to this issue when 
discussing the outcomes of the enhanced irrigation scenario in the next section. 
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 Figure 5.1 County level maize production in baseline in 2003 and 2003-2030 increase  
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5.4 Farm incomes and composition of value added 
 
The combined effects of economic growth, urbanization, trade liberalization, environmental 
protection and technical progress will lead to significant changes in agricultural systems, with 
major consequences for farm employment and farm incomes, especially compared to the non-
agricultural sector. The present subsection reports on these impacts. As mentioned earlier, the 
impacts are to some extent already captured exogenously through the scenario specification of 
available farm labor, machinery, crop land, grass land and stable capacities, because this 
specification has to anticipate all interactions at play, and is, therefore, not truly exogenous in a 
conceptual sense. 
 
Nonetheless, given these resources, the farmers in each county decide endogenously on the 
intensity at which they will use crop land and stable types. They basically do this by shifting 
labor across the different land use options in response to their relative profitability, as determined 
by technical change and the prevailing market prices of inputs and outputs. 
 
We may recall from section 3 that the model distinguishes three land use types in cropping 
(irrigated, rainfed and orchard), four land use types in raising ruminants (grazing, draught, 
traditionally mixed and specialized dairy) and two land use types in raising non-ruminants 
(traditionally mixed and intensified). As seen in Table 4.5, the baseline crop land scenario 
assumes declining irrigated and rainfed areas, with irrigated land in Northeast as the only 
exception, and increasing orchard areas. For ruminants, the scenario assumes declining stable 
capacities of draught animals but increasing capacities in grazing – made possible via grassland 
improvement and more than compensating for the effect of declining areas –, in traditionally 
mixed farming, and, very significantly, in specialized dairy farming (Table 4.7). We note that 
intensified cattle meat production, relatively unimportant in 2003, is not being distinguished as a 
separate land use type but included in the traditionally mixed system, whose gains in efficiency 
and stable capacity should partly be understood as intensification. For non-ruminants, the 
scenario assumes declining stable capacities of traditionally mixed farming and increasing 
capacities of intensified systems (Table 4.8).  
 
As indicated earlier, output follows a somewhat different path, since the intensity of use of stable 
capacity is endogenous and trends of technical change may differ (Table 4.10). For crops, it 
appears that yields per hectare (expressed in terms of dry matter) increase between 2003 and 2030 
in each region on irrigated as well as rainfed land, on average at about 0.6% annually, which is in 
each region higher than the rate of loss in crop land. Hence, crop output increases on both 
irrigated and rainfed land. For livestock, output developments for the different land use types are 
presented in Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11 indicates that expansion of the traditional modes of production will continue in the 
next three decades, despite the declining stable capacities. Their profitability remains good, due 
to increased demand for meat and milk, resulting in steadily increasing farm gate prices. 
However, intensified systems will dominate eventually. For example, in 1997 the intensified pork 
production system accounts for 20% of pork output, against 52% in 2030. The shift is even more 
evident in poultry production, from 43% in 1997 to 78% in 2030. For milk the changes are also 
spectacular, with a nationwide increase of the output share of the specialized sector from 23% in 
1997 to 62% in 2030.  
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Table 5.11 Livestock production under different farming systems (million tons) 
 
 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Beef and mutton      
    Grazing system 1.01 1.11 1.24 1.44 1.66 
    Trad.mixed system 2.99 3.24 4.12 5.40 6.36 
    Other (draught and intens. dairy) 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.51 
Pork      
    Trad. mixed system 22.98 25.05 25.59 26.79 25.39 
    Intens. system 5.67 9.67 15.36 22.17 27.94 
Poultry meat      
    Trad. mixed system 3.68 3.71 3.59 3.56 3.26 
    Intens. system 2.80 4.46 6.64 9.09 11.33 
Milk      
    Draught animal system 1.88 1.82 1.67 1.41 1.09 
    Grazing system 2.49 2.43 2.64 2.87 3.09 
    Trad. mixed system 3.32 3.57 4.56 5.87 6.73 
    Intens. dairy farming 2.35 5.84 9.93 14.37 17.80 
Egg      
    Trad. mixed system 7.29 7.51 7.16 7.11 6.49 
    Intens. system 5.43 8.70 13.10 18.28 22.69 
 
 
In view of the rising scarcity of animal feeds, the turn to intensification is a necessary step, as the 
traditional systems, while effective in their use of crop and household residuals, have far more 
unfavorable feed-to-meat conversion rates.24 Table 5.12 shows the development of feed demand 
in the different systems, for local and tradable feed separately. We observe that the role of local 
feed, although declining in relative terms, remains important. Measured in absolute amounts, its 
use even increases. Together with the Solow-neutral technical progress and the shift to intensified 
systems, this persistence of local feed supply keeps growth of the demand for tradable feed 
moderate compared to the output growth of the livestock sector, as was already apparent in Table 
5.4.  
 
At the same time, the trend towards intensification has important social implications, since the 
traditional livestock sector offers essential income earning opportunities to poorer farmers. The 
distribution of farm labor and farm value added reflects the rising importance of the intensified 
sectors. Table 5.13 indicates that between 1997 and 2030, total farm labor will decrease from 253 
million to 189.1 million full time equivalents (as specified in the scenario). But with the 
expansion of livestock production, the farm labor employed in this sector will increase from 38.7 
million to 45 million in 2030, of which 11.8 in the intensified pork and poultry production, 
whereas farm labor employed in the cropping sector will decline from 214.3 million to 144.1 
million, due to labor-saving technical progress but also due to labor shifts to livestock sectors.  
 
 
                                                   
24 For non-ruminants (pork and poultry) the average energy input-output ratio of the traditional sector is 8.4 in 
1997, declining to 6.5 in 2030. For the intensified sector it is 5.5 in 1997 and declines to 4.3 in 2003. 
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Table 5.12 Feed use under different farming systems (thousand Gcal) 
 
 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Draught animal system      
     Tradable feed 165.5 159.2 146.0 123.1 95.6 
     Local feed 205.1 199.7 186.8 163.1 133.3 
Grazing system      
     Tradable feed 7.1 15.0 11.6 13.9 17.8 
     Local feed 132.6 131.4 144.9 158.1 172.0 
Traditionally mixed ruminants      
     Tradable feed 97.7 101.0 121.4 147.8 163.7 
     Local feed 99.1 107.1 140.9 184.7 214.4 
Specialized dairy      
     Tradable feed 2.3 7.4 12.8 17.7 20.3 
     Local feed 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Traditionally mixed non-ruminants      
     Tradable feed 396.7 415.0 388.6 366.3 301.7 
     Local feed 174.3 173.6 173.0 172.0 166.6 
Intensified non-ruminants      
     Tradable feed 128.2 210.8 315.3 418.6 487.2 
     Local feed 10.1 10.3 10.6 11.0 11.5 
Total livestock      
     Tradable feed 797.5 908.4 995.7 1087.4 1086.3 
     Local feed 622.4 623.3 657.4 690.1 699.0 
 
 
 
Table 5.13 Allocation of on-farm labor to land use type under baseline  
(million full-time equivalent year) 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Crop sector 214.3 202.2 190.9 171.6 144.1 
   Irrigated land 120.4 105.3 101.5 89.5 73.6 
   Rain-fed land 85.4 87.8 79.7 72.4 61.2 
   Tree cropping land 8.5 9.1 9.7 9.7 9.3 
Livestock sector 38.7 43.2 44.3 47.1 45.0 
   Draught animal system 5.1 4.8 4.2 3.3 2.4 
   Grazing system 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 
   Trad. mixed ruminant farming 4.4 4.5 5.3 6.3 6.6 
   Intens. dairy farming 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 
   Trad. mixed nonruminant farming 25.2 27.6 25.8 25.4 22.1 
   Intens. nonruminant farming 2.4 4.6 7.0 10.0 11.8 
Total on-farm employment 253.0 245.3 235.1 218.7 189.1 
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Somewhat surprisingly, more labor is used on rainfed land in the period 1997-2003, whereas 
irrigated land sheds more than 10% of its labor. This difference is related to the difficult situation 
of food grains in those years of which the large majority (98% of rice, 85% of wheat) grows on 
irrigated land. After 2003, labor use on irrigated and rainfed land declines at about the same rate. 
Considering regional differences, employment in crop production declines above national average 
in East and Northeast, and below in South, Northwest and Southwest, as shown in Table 5.14. 
Rises in employment in livestock production are mainly found in South and Northwest.    
 
 
Table 5.14 Allocation of on-farm labor to cropping and livestock by region under baseline 
(million full-time equivalent year) 
 
  North Northeast East Central South Southwest Plateau Northwest
2003         
  Crop sector 49.0  9.6  31.1  27.2  26.6  39.9  1.0  17.9  
  Livestock sector 10.6 2.8  4.2  5.8  4.7  10.4 0.5  4.1  
  Total on-farm employment 59.7  12.3 35.3  33.0  31.3  50.3  1.5  22.0  
         
2030         
  Crop sector 33.8  6.0  20.6  18.7  21.2  29.6  0.7  13.5  
  Livestock sector 11.4  2.6  4.1  5.4  6.5  9.0  0.7  5.3  
  Total on-farm employment 45.2  8.6  24.7  24.1  27.7  38.6  1.4  18.7  
 
 
Next, we turn to value added. Table 5.15 shows the farm value added (normalized to the 1997 
price level) of the different land use types and the percentage of farm value added in total GDP. 
Before discussing the figures, we should emphasize that we consider in this section only the 
incomes from farming and not the incomes of farmers or incomes of farm households, which 
could be much higher due to off-farm activities and remittances from migrants. We observe that 
total farming value added is steadily growing from 1,223 billion Yuan in 2003 to 2,871 billion 
Yuan in 2030, which means a fair increase of 3.2% annually. However, this rate is not enough to 
keep up with the non-agricultural sector that grows each year with 6.3%. Hence, the share of crop 
and livestock farming in total GDP falls dramatically from 9.8% in 2003 to 4.4% in 2030.25  
 
Whereas the value added in the crop sector rises slowly at an average annual rate of 2.3%, 
reaching 1.8 times the 2003-level in 2030, the value added in the livestock sector will increase 
from 369 billion Yuan in 1997 to 1,340 billion in 2030, amounting to an annual growth rate of 
4.9%. Therefore, its contribution to farm value added will rise from 30 to 47 percent, mainly 
earned in the production of pork and poultry. In conformity with the trends in output growth in 
Table 5.11, the share of the intensified sector in the earnings of pig and poultry farms rises 
significantly, from 28% in 2003 to 55%, hence by more than half, in 2030. We remark that the 
negative sign of farm value added in the draught animal system is due to the fact that the value of 
the draught animal power for crop production and local transportation is not accounted for in the 
table. This exclusion implies that the value added of livestock is underestimated and the value 
added of the crop sector is overestimated.  
                                                   
25 Farm value added is relatively low in 2003 due to the reduced output and unfavorable farm price of rice and 
wheat. The Statistical Yearbook (NBSCa, 2004) mentions for 2003 a higher percentage (13.5%) but this figure 
includes also forestry and fisheries, together close to 3% of GDP. 
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Table 5.15 Farming value added and its share in total GDP under baseline (billion Yuan) 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping sector 819.2 834.4 1250.3 1481.1 1525.6 
   Irrigated cropping 498.0 406.9 699.7 819.2 827.4 
   Rainfed   cropping 277.3 371.3 477.7 582.5 614.2 
   Tree cropping 43.9 56.2 73.0 79.4 84.1 
Livestock sector 155.4 369.3 568.4 987.0 1339.8 
   Draught animal system -34.0 -23.6 -24.2 -20.9 -14.0 
   Grazing ruminant farm 11.9 16.1 19.7 24.7 34.0 
   Trad. ruminant farm 2.4 24.4 32.4 54.0 91.9 
   Intens. dairy farm 3.7 9.5 14.0 17.9 20.9 
   Trad. nonruminant farm 136.8 245.3 323.1 481.3 549.0 
   Intens. nonruminant farm 34.5 97.5 203.5 430.0 658.0 
Related sectors 20.3 18.7 14.0 8.9 5.3 
Farming GDP 994.8 1222.5 1832.7 2476.9 2870.7 
Total GDP 7658.6 12484.8 21326.1 39679.6 64768.9 
Share of farming in GDP (%) 13.0 9.8 8.6 6.2 4.4 
Note: related sectors cover collection of household waste, nightsoil and green feed 
 
 
By combining Table 5.15 with Table 5.13, we can obtain the value added per farm worker, shown 
in Table 5.16. On average it grows at the rate of 4.3% annually, about 3.6% in cropping and 4.7% 
in livestock farming. Although less than in non-agriculture, these rates are appreciable, and 
mainly due to the labor out-migration from agriculture leaving more land per remaining worker, 
to the intensification of the livestock sector, and to the expansion of fruits and vegetables, as well 
as to the rising prices of livestock products. 
 
Nonetheless, per capita growth of overall GDP of around 5.8% is much higher, which means that 
the income gap between the farm and non-farm sector will widen in the next three decades, and 
suggests that stronger labor outmigration will be required and that development of the non-farm 
sector should extend deeper into rural areas so as to provide sufficient off-farm employment to 
farm family members. Indeed, the “New Rural Development Program” initiated in early 2006 
recognizes these tendencies and has, therefore, adopted targeted and far-reaching measures 
including abolition of agricultural tax, direct income support, input subsidies, and large increases 
in agricultural R&D and rural infrastructure investment to address the problems.26   
 
                                                   
26 The New Rural Development Program was launched just before the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (NDRCb, 2006). 
In fact, its main content coincides with the latter’s second chapter ‘Building a new socialist countryside’. Its text 
can be found on http://news.sina.com.cn (in Chinese). 
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Table 5.16 Value added per farm worker, by land use type 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping sector 3820 4127 6552 8632 10584 
   Irrigated cropping 4135 3863 6893 9157 11237 
   Rainfed   cropping 3244 4231 5997 8041 10040 
   Tree cropping 5148 6173 7545 8197 9013 
Livestock sector 4028 8578 12841 20968 29800 
   Draught animal system -6605 -4939 -5778 -6323 -5813 
   Grazing ruminant farm 8715 12415 14585 18319 25969 
   Trad. ruminant farm 544 5462 6104 8621 13924 
   Intens. dairy farm 24800 25730 24509 25183 26821 
   Trad. nonruminant farm 5438 8898 12512 18950 24829 
   Intens. nonruminant farm 14315 21344 28946 42830 56000 
Average 3852 4908 7736 11288 15153 
 
 
Finally, we remark that Table 5.16 clearly shows that the level of value added per unit of labor is 
higher in the livestock than in the cropping sector, and that the gap will increase over time. This 
reflects the differences in the amount of capital (buildings, machinery, animals, land) per worker, 
leading to a steeper decline of the marginal labor productivity curve in the livestock sectors and, 
therefore, to a larger discrepancy between average and marginal labor productivity. The gaps are 
large especially for the intensified sectors but also grazing and traditional pork and poultry appear 
to have considerably higher levels of value added per worker than cropping. For intensified dairy 
the development over time is not that promising in this scenario, due to the gradual decline of 
world milk prices and the reduction of import tariff rates that have a depressing effect on the 
domestic market prices, as seen already in Table 5.8.  
 
Regarding the regional distribution of value added, the highest growth rates in cropping are found 
in Southwest (2.8%), Northwest (2.6%) and South (2.6%), and the lowest rates in Northeast 
(1.6%) and Plateau (1.8%), as can be inferred from Table 5.17. As a result, the North region will 
keep the largest value added in crop production, but Southwest and South will come close, 
leaving East and Central behind. Although these rates may seem rather similar, compounding 
over thirty years they lead to a value added in 2030 that is 2.1 times as high as in 2003 in 
Southwest but only 1.5 times as high as in 2003 in Northeast.  
 
The low growth of Northeast is surprising, given the expansion of its irrigated area and its 
relatively high rate of technical progress assumed in the scenario. The question is, therefore, 
whether it is due to low output prices, high input prices or shortage of labor (and equipment). It 
appears that the trends in the market prices are relatively uniform across regions, as was seen 
already in Table 5.5, and this also holds for farmgate prices (not shown here separately).27 Hence, 
labor availability would seem to be the basic constraint. Although crop labor input requirements 
per hectare are low in Northeast (due to the short growing season), the baseline scenario 
assumption of 1.3% annual decline in farm labor, as specified in Table 4.9 following the decline 
                                                   
27  Although the farmgate price level of certain crops (rice, vegetables and especially wheat) is lower in 
Northeast than in other regions, this difference cannot explain the low growth rate. 
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in rural population, appears to be severe causing aggregate crop yields to improve only slowly 
between 2003 and 2020 and even fall afterwards, in contrast to all other regions. 
 
 
Table 5.17 Gross value added of crop and livestock sector and total GDP 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Crop sector (billion Yuan)      
   North 167.2 175.1 264.5 296.6 299.5 
   Northeast 66.7 56.2 84.4 93.2 86.6 
   East 144.7 138.0 196.6 229.5 232.5 
   Central 131.7 123.1 177.0 204.1 212.6 
   South 123.1 142.9 221.5 277.7 282.4 
   Southwest 122.7 133.7 203.6 258.0 282.8 
   Plateau 2.6 2.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 
   Northwest 60.4 63.0 99.3 118.2 125.2 
Livestock sector (billion Yuan)       
   North 26.9 79.1 117.1 205.4 283.5 
   Northeast 16.2 36.2 52.2 89.0 119.6 
   East 23.6 49.3 73.5 121.4 160.2 
   Central 27.8 56.4 85.9 147.7 193.8 
   South 30.7 60.6 102.6 184.2 240.9 
   Southwest 10.6 50.1 82.5 148.3 206.0 
   Plateau 2.1 3.8 5.7 9.1 14.2 
   Northwest 17.5 33.8 48.9 82.0 121.6 
Total GDP (billion Yuan)      
   North 1895 3123 5376 10016 16240 
   Northeast 725 1091 1711 2884 4321 
   East 1713 2867 5024 9543 15736 
   Central 810 1306 2158 3818 5846 
   South 1287 2204 3996 8117 14382 
   Southwest 733 1130 1818 3098 4719 
   Plateau 27 43 71 129 215 
   Northwest 469 722 1172 2078 3317 
 
 
With respect to value added in the livestock sector, the largest increases are in Southwest (5.4%), 
South (5.2%) and Plateau (5.0%) and the smallest increases in East (4.5%) and Northeast (4.5%). 
In 2003, North, South and Central are the top three largest earners. In 2030, North and South 
maintain their ranking but Central is replaced by Southwest.  
 
North is one of the traditional maize production areas. Given this ample availability of home 
grown feed, the easy access to imports and the vicinity of a number of large cities, the North 
region is well-placed to lift its livestock production. The Southwest region has been known for its 
low cost pork production in past decades, but the poor transportation facilities, hilly roads and the 
greater distance from many of China’s major cities did hamper its exports of meat to other 
regions in recent years. With the increased demand from inside the own region, the assumed 
gradual reduction in transportation costs and the ample availability of farm labor, in the absence 
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of sufficient non-agricultural employment, the livestock sector in this region will receive a boost 
in coming decades. In the South region, the increase of livestock production is largely driven by 
internal demand that actually surpasses its capacity, as was seen earlier in Table 5.5. Finally, we 
remark that in Northeast the livestock sector, although also suffering from scarcity in farm labor, 
becomes the dominant contributor to agricultural value added.  
 
The maps of Figure 5.2 show how crop value added is distributed across the counties. We 
observe that the legend classes define absolute values irrespective of the size of the county, as 
opposed to per hectare values. As the regional boundaries also appear on the maps, distribution of 
value added across counties within a region can readily be read off. The upper panel shows the 
situation in 2003. The maps confirm that counties with the highest value added in crops are 
concentrated in the coastal areas North, East, South and in Central and Southwest, but not all over 
these regions. The lower panel shows the absolute increases between 2003 and 2030. The picture 
that emerges is rather differentiated, showing counties with large increases throughout most 
regions, intermingled with areas with lower increases. This shows that there is not a single 
compact ‘booming area’ that outperforms the rest of the country. For instance, in the Southwest 
region besides the area around the city of Chongqing, the province of Yunnan also performs very 
well. Figure 5.3 shows the corresponding maps for the livestock sector. In the upper panel we see 
that the areas with highest value added are concentrated in the hinterlands of the big cities, 
especially in South, East, Central and Southwest, whereas the lower panel indicates that the major 
increases from 2003 to 2030 generally take place in subsets of these areas. 
 
 
Table 5.18 Share of cropping and livestock in total GDP (in %) 
 
  1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
   North 10.2 8.1 7.1 5.0 3.6 
   Northeast 11.4 8.5 8.0 6.3 4.8 
   East 9.8 6.5 5.4 3.7 2.5 
   Central 19.7 13.7 12.2 9.2 7.0 
   South 11.9 9.2 8.1 5.7 3.6 
   Southwest 18.2 16.3 15.7 13.1 10.4 
   Plateau 17.4 14.6 12.8 10.0 8.4 
   Northwest 16.6 13.4 12.6 9.6 7.4 
China 12.7 9.6 8.5 6.2 4.4 
 
 
Table 5.18 shows the relative importance of farming in each region measured as its share in total 
GDP. The shares are calculated from Table 5.17. Southwest will retain the highest share in 2030, 
but not reaching more than 10.4%, of which 6.0% crops and 4.4% livestock. Next, Plateau, 
Northwest and Central follow with shares from 8.5% to 7.0%, while for Northeast, North, South 
and East the shares are in the range from 4.8 % to 2.5% only. Clearly, as such these low shares of 
farming value added do not have to be interpreted as signs of trouble but they reinforce the point 
that outmigration has to be significant. To highlight the income position of the farming activities, 
we consider in Table 5.19 the value added per farm worker in the different regions, as derived 
from Tables 5.17 and 5.14. 
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Figure 5.2 County level value added from cropping in baseline 
in 2003 and 2003-2030 increase 
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Figure 5.3 County level value added from livestock in baseline 
in 2003 and 2003-2030 increase 
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Table 5.19 Regional value added in Yuan per farm worker, baseline 
 
 
 
Table 5.19 would more than Table 5.18 be a source of concern. For crops, the national growth 
rate of 3.6% for the value added per worker, seen in Table 5.16 above, appears to be rather 
uniform across regions. The outlier on the high side is Southwest with 4.0% and on the low side 
Plateau with 3.0%. For livestock, the growth rate of the value added per worker, nationally 4.7%, 
varies more. It is highest in Southwest with 6.0% and lowest in South with 4.0%. Nonetheless, in 
all regions it is below the growth rate of per capita GDP, with the exception of Southwest. But 
also here, growth rates are attributable to the intensified sectors as opposed to the traditional ones. 
Hence, the danger of increasing income gaps between farmers and non-farmers, expressed earlier 
at national level would seem to apply throughout China, across all regions.  
 
Finally, we mention that the South region contrary to the concerns raised in section 2 in relation 
to its limited possibilities for expansion of feed output, has the highest rate of crop yield increase 
of all regions (in terms of dry matter, about 1.1% against 0.6% as national average), whereas in 
terms of value added the annual increase of 2.6% ranks third. Also for livestock, output increases 
of the livestock sector are among the highest, as seen in Table 5.9, and although these require 
more than a doubling of feed imports, the livestock value added rises at a rate of 5.2%, ranking 
second. Hence, agricultural developments in the South do not seem particularly alarming as 
compared to other regions, albeit that the degree of self-sufficiency becomes lower. The main 
concern is, as in all regions, the widening income gap with the non-farm sector.  
 
 
 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping sector      
   North 3186 3571 5777 7328 8862 
   Northeast 6368 5880 9561 12257 14389 
   East 4380 4436 6860 9131 11275 
   Central 4534 4532 6980 9105 11368 
   South 4471 5375 8507 11243 13303 
   Southwest 2927 3351 5344 7438 9558 
   Plateau 2519 2490 3707 4583 5479 
   Northwest 3199 3527 5791 7507 9289 
Livestock sector      
   North 2912 7450 10633 17228 24784 
   Northeast 6675 12964 18985 31235 45824 
   East 6301 11846 17249 27393 39066 
   Central 5446 9739 14816 24824 36030 
   South 7161 12957 20074 30546 36943 
   Southwest 1075 4803 8065 14781 23021 
   Plateau 4929 8378 10000 13368 19944 
   Northwest 5009 8182 10769 15802 23162 
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5.5 Environmental pressure  
 
Expansion of agricultural production creates strong pressures on the environment, of two kinds, 
one due to the intensified use of chemical inputs such as herbicides and fertilizers, the other to the 
discharge of organic manure and residuals from food processing.  
 
China is the largest consumer of chemical fertilizer and worldwide accounts for 90 per cent of the 
increase in fertilizer use since 1981 (Liu and Diamond, 2005). Though there is significant scope 
for improving input use efficiency, the level of crop production anticipated for China in the next 
thirty years may require even further increases in fertilizer application. The next two tables report 
on the demand for chemical fertilizers projected by the model simulations, as well as on the use 
of organic manure. Table 5.20 presents the amounts per hectare and Table 5.21 the absolute 
volumes, both by region. The figures are weighted averages of the underlying separate figures for 
irrigated and rainfed crop land.28  
 
 
Table 5.20 Organic and chemical fertilizer used per hectare, by region, 
 under baseline (kg/ha) 
 
 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Organic fertilizer      
North 72  76  84  89  90  
Northeast 32  32  32  33  32  
East 59  61  63  65  63  
Central 91  94  99  98  90  
South 100  109  123  143  155  
Southwest 100  101  106  106  100  
Plateau 27  29  42  49  52  
Northwest 25  28  34  40  44  
China 63  66  71  75  74  
Chemical fertilizer      
North 424  457  479  492  495  
Northeast 199  199  203  211  215  
East 509  526  543  561  568  
Central 444  460  494  525  551  
South 456  472  520  576  601  
Southwest 273  279  294  313  330  
Plateau 90  89  84  83  84  
Northwest 142  145  151  154  154  
China 325  338  354  369  376  
 
 
 
                                                   
28 In Tables 5.20 and 5.21 as well as in Figure 5.4, fertilizer use is measured in terms of its nutrient content, as 
the sum of N, K2O and P2O5. Furthermore, they actually report on purchased (tradable) fertilizer, as opposed to 
local fertilizer. Since 10% of organic manure is considered tradable, the real share of organic manure is 
somewhat higher and the share of chemical fertilizer correspondingly lower than indicated.  
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Table 5.20 shows moderate increases in the application per hectare. For the whole of China, on 
average, fertilizer use per hectare of cultivated land will increase from 404 kg in 2003 (of which 
66 kg organic fertilizer and 338 kg chemical fertilizer) to 450 kg in 2030 (74 kg organic fertilizer 
and 376 kg chemical fertilizer). Organic fertilizer applied on irrigated land increases from 97 kg 
per hectare in 2003 to 108 kg in 2030 and on rainfed land from 38 to 43 kg per hectare. During 
the same period, chemical fertilizer applied on irrigated land increases from 508 kg per hectare in 
2003 to 559 kg in 2030, whereas on rainfed land it increases from 189 to 207 kg per hectare. In 
terms of absolute amounts, the increases are even less since total arable land drops from 125.6 
million hectare in 2003 to 116.6 million hectare in 2030. In 2003, total chemical fertilizer use in 
China is 42.5 million tons, and it will rise to 43.8 million ton only, as seen in Table 21.  
 
 
 
Table 5.21 Total organic and chemical fertilizer used by region, 
under baseline (1000 tons) 
 
 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Organic fertilizer      
North 2127 2156 2275 2370 2335 
Northeast 652 659 682 691 657 
East 807 810 825 812 758 
Central 1088 1089 1103 1073 977 
South 1007 1052 1137 1214 1208 
Southwest 1842 1837 1874 1854 1723 
Plateau 28 30 43 51 53 
Northwest 586 630 734 867 936 
China 8139 8263 8673 8931 8646 
Chemical fertilizer      
North 12439 12986 13049 13048 12834 
Northeast 4106 4147 4293 4414 4444 
East 6984 7042 7064 7042 6867 
Central 5293 5322 5528 5774 5971 
South 4580 4565 4804 4901 4673 
Southwest 5040 5061 5208 5447 5674 
Plateau 93 93 87 86 86 
Northwest 3346 3296 3303 3307 3258 
China 41882 42511 43336 44018 43807 
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Figure 5.4 Per hectare fertilizer used at county level in baseline in 2003 and 2030 
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On the basis of Table 5.20, we can summarize the regional differences with respect to chemical 
fertilizer application as follows. North has high levels (634 and 205 kg/ha in 2003, on irrigated 
respectively rainfed land), but the growth rates are below average. In Northeast levels are rather 
low (333 resp. 166 kg/ha in 2003), and constant over the simulation period. East has high levels 
(601 resp. 333 kg/ha in 2003), with growth rate slightly below average. Central has average levels 
on irrigated land (525 kg/ha in 2003) and rather high levels on rain fed land (321 kg/ha) and 
growth rates are above average (0.7 resp. 0.6%). The South has both high levels (580 resp. 346 
kg/ha in 2003) and high growth rates (0.9 resp. 1.0%), supplementing the already high use of 
organic fertilizer. Southwest applies at moderate levels (421 resp. 205 kg/ha in 2003), but growth 
rates are above average (0.8 resp. 0.5%). Plateau naturally has very low levels (102 resp. 82 kg/ha 
in 2003), that even decline over time because the availability of animal manure increases 
considerably. Finally, in Northwest levels are low (262 resp. 74 kg/ha in 2003), whereas also 
growth rates are below average. 
 
It is important to note that chemical fertilizer use is far higher in densely populated regions than 
in remote areas. This only exacerbates the prevailing environmental problems. For example, in 
1997 the use of chemical fertilizer already reaches on average 456 and 509 kg per hectare in the 
most developed regions South and East, respectively, and it would rise to 601 and 568 kg per 
hectare in 2030. If one includes organic manure, the amounts will be even as high as 756 and 631 
kg per hectare, as was shown in Table 5.20. The distribution of this pressure over the counties is 
depicted in Figure 5.4. The upper panel applies to 2003, the lower panel to 2030. Both panels 
have the same legend classes, for ease of comparison. We observe that in 2003 the highest 
applications are found in pockets of the coastal regions North, East and South, and that by 2030 
these hotspots have expanded considerably, especially in the South. 
 
High application levels per hectare may lead to serious environmental problems since not all 
fertilizer applied by farmers can effectively be taken up by crops. In a study related to the 
Chinagro project, Ermolieva et al. (2005) present detailed nutrient supply and uptake calculations 
showing that nitrogen (N) uptake by crop and fruit production in 2000 amounted on average to 
110 kg N per hectare of cultivated and orchard land. Due to different agro-ecological conditions, 
the provincial averages vary in the range of 50 kg N per hectare (e.g. Southwest) up to 200 kg N 
per hectare (e.g. Jiangsu province in the East). The authors estimate that crop production in 2000 
has taken up about 15 million tons of nitrogen in total. This compares to applied amounts of 
about 24.5 million tons of nitrogen in chemical fertilizer and an estimated 8.5 million tons of N in 
livestock manure. Hence, given China’s overall surface, the nitrogen released to the environment 
amounts to about 20 kg N per hectare of total land. For Jiangsu and Zhejiang, both in the East, 
and Henan and Hubei, adjacent provinces in North respectively Central, this value reaches well 
over 100 kg N per hectare, pointing to a substantial environmental pressure on soils and 
watercourses. 
 
Regarding livestock production, the geographic concentration and increasingly intensive 
utilization of stable spaces may also cause serious nutrient overloads in surface water, 
groundwater and soils, and generate major emissions of manure-related gases into the atmosphere 
(methane, nitric and nitrous oxide, etc.). The manure composition in terms of nutrients, heavy 
metals and organic matter depends on a variety of factors, such as livestock category, production 
system and feeding characteristics. As an illustration, ex-post calculations based on the 2003 
outcomes of feed intake by livestock system, estimate the aggregate amount of nutrients produced 
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by stall-fed and otherwise confined livestock in China to be in the order of 15.5 million tons.29 
This amounts to approximately 114 kg of nutrients per hectare of cultivated and orchard land, 
which can be subdivided into 59 kg nitrogen (N), 26 kg phosphate (measured as oxide P2O5) and 
29 kg potassium (measured as oxide K2O). Pigs and poultry contribute about 50 percent of these 
nutrients. When comparing these figures with the cropping use of organic manure of Table 
5.20,30 we may conclude that in 2003 on average about 47% of confined animal manure nutrients 
is actually applied in cropping. The remaining 53% is a potential source of pollution, unless used 
for other purposes. In this environmental assessment it is assumed that manure from pastoral 
livestock is recycled on the grazing land or to a limited extent used as domestic energy source for 
heating and cooking. 
 
Applying the same ex-post calculations to the 2030 baseline outcomes leads to a nutrient 
production in confined livestock systems of around 17.5 million tons in 2030, which amounts to 
136 kg per hectare of available cultivated and orchard land, consisting of 70 kg nitrogen, 31 kg 
phosphates and 35 kg potassium. This amounts to an increase in manure nutrient supply per 
hectare of around 20% at national level between 2003 and 2030. As such, this average growth 
percentage would seem moderate, and must be seen in conjunction with the assumed steady rates 
of Solow-neutral technical progress in the livestock sectors. However, as was extensively 
discussed earlier the differences are large between as well as within regions.31 
 
To sum up, both unused animal manure surpluses and losses in the application of fertilizer (of 
chemical and organic origin) lead to serious environmental concerns, now and even more in the 
future. Especially since the geographical variation in the ratios of stable capacities to crop land is 
wide, nutrient pressure may be strong locally, creating health risks to the population almost 
inevitably. Use of pesticides is likely to add to these problems but we cannot substantiate this 
claim on the basis of the Chinagro simulations, since pesticides are not identified as separate 
inputs in the model.  
                                                   
29 The coefficients used in these calculations are reported in Appendix A. For the base year, they are consistent 
with the nutrient supply coefficients used in Ermolieva et al. (2005), i.e. 78.0, 11.8 and 1.0 kg per animal per 
year for respectively large animals, pigs and poultry. 
  
30 To make an exact comparison, we should undo the shift of organic to tradable fertilizer (+10%), deduct 
nightsoil (-20%) and make a correction for orchard land (-7%) in Table 5.20. 
 
31 Ermolieva et al. (2005) report a nutrient growth rate of more than 50% between 2003 and 2030 at national 
level. The difference with our outcomes is largely due to faster increases of the herd sizes of pigs, poultry and 
sheep in their baseline scenario. 
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6. Results for other scenarios   
 
 
Here, we discuss the outcomes of the specified variants of the baseline scenario, and compare 
these to the baseline. We recall that the Chinagro model was designed as a tool for consultation 
on upcoming policy issues rather than as one that is tightly tailored to a fixed set of issues. The 
model produces outcomes through numerous and detailed tables and maps. A policy analyst in 
search of the answer to a particular question will have to consult these so as to follow the chain of 
causation from scenario to result. In general the question posed will be rather general, and at the 
beginning of the round of simulation exercises more oriented to a subject area than to a specific 
policy. The scenarios described in section 4 ask such questions: “How will opening up of trade in 
agriculture affect trade, regional distribution of production and incomes?”, “How would faster 
growth impact on this?”, and “To what extent can faster technological progress and reform of the 
sector help in addressing the problems?”, and, finally, “What about the consequences of faster 
expansion of irrigation?”. 
 
Every such question can be expressed in a number of scenario runs, each of which produces a 
number of tables and maps far too large to be reported on in full in any paper. In fact, at a future, 
more practical stage of model application, the questions will hopefully become more focused, and 
the policy packages more specific but at present we report on scenario outcomes as a separate 
exercise that may highlight the model’s response and future use. 
 
The discussion of results will start with the impacts on prices and national commodity balances, 
followed by the regional effects on production, incomes, employment, and, finally, on the 
environment. We summarize in separate sections the main findings of each scenario: trade 
liberalization in 6.1, high income growth in 6.2, high R & D in 6.3 and enhanced irrigation in 6.4. 
Maps with county-specific effects are included in these sections but the tables with numerical 
outcomes are, for ease of comparison, presented jointly for all variants, in Appendix B.  
 
  
6.1 Trade Liberalization Scenario 
 
The trade liberalization scenario assumes a stronger reduction of agricultural border protection 
than the baseline assumption from 2003 to 2010, halving the 2003 tariff levels, and eliminates all 
taxes on international agricultural trade after 2010. Nonetheless, it can only be interpreted as 
depicting partial liberalization, because it maintains at their baseline level: world prices, prices of 
specific non-agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and margins for trade and transportation, as well 
as production factor availability in agriculture (total farm labor, machinery, farm land and stable 
capacities). Allowing for adjustment of world prices would presumably dampen the effects 
reported, accounting for cheaper non-agricultural input costs would make them more favorable 
for farm incomes, and including overall adjustments in factor availability to price changes would 
make these effects more pronounced.  
 
Since, traditionally, China’s trade regime in agriculture amounted to penalizing imports as well as 
exports of most commodities, liberalization promotes both imports and exports as it leads to a 
reduction of prices of imported goods (vegetable oil, sugar and, especially, milk and after 2010 
also white meat), whose production drops and consumption increases, and a rise in the price in 
exported goods (rice, fruits and vegetables), whose production increases while consumption falls. 
Most pronounced is the effect on sugar, where abolition of protection leads to a significant drop 
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in supply, which in combination with an increase in demand causes imports to rise appreciably. 
For the commodities in autarky in the baseline, the effect of liberalization is not easily predicted 
but it appears that wheat and eggs remain in autarky and ruminant meat is imported but only in 
small amounts. The supply-demand balances are shown in Tables B.1 – B.3 and the prices in 
Tables B.5 and B.6,32 whereas Table B.4 expresses consumption of grain and meat in per capita 
terms. 
 
Maize had an effective subsidy of some 15% on exports in 2003 (to reduce the high stock levels), 
keeping prices slightly above world level, which turned after 2003 into a supply deficit with a 
limited tariff in the baseline. Eliminating this tariff incites increased use and also somewhat 
discourages production of maize, leading to increased imports. 
 
Protein feeds and carbohydrates are produced domestically and traded internationally but tariff 
rates are neglected in the model for these composite commodities. They are used in compound 
feeds that compete with maize and various locally produced feeds or grown as fodder or derived 
as crop residuals, in which case their feed value only constitutes part of the product value of the 
crops they originate from. At the same time, demand for these feeds primarily depends on the 
value of the livestock they nourish. Consequently, the effects of liberalization on these markets 
are rather intricate. The simulation shows that, nationwide, production volumes of carbohydrate 
feed and protein feed are not affected very much but their intermediate use declines slightly 
causing net import volumes to go down somewhat, with about one percent compared to the 2030 
baseline outcome.  
 
Overall, the net agricultural trade deficit appears to increase but not dramatically, from 28.9 
billion USD in the baseline to 35.2 billion USD. On balance consumers gain from lower prices: 
per capita grain consumption rises from 155.0 to 155.2 kg per year, meat and egg consumption 
from 77.0 to 79.5 kg per year, and energy intake from 2828 to 2866 kcal per day, all in 2030 
(Table B.4). National self-sufficiency in grains is hardly affected, with the rate for rice going up 
from 103% to 105%, for wheat constant at 100% and for maize falling from 84% to 82%. 
 
The supply effects summarized above for the country as a whole are generally found in all 
regions, with the relative changes in each county depending on the magnitude of the price 
impacts and the substitution possibilities. Figures 6.1 – 6.4 show the geographical distribution of 
the effects for four commodities (maize, sugar, fruit and pork), measured in thousand metric ton 
of output difference in 2030 compared to the baseline. Evidently, these absolute magnitudes of 
change to a large extent depend on the importance of the county for the production of the 
commodity concerned.  
 
 
                                                   
32 The market price trends are rather similar across all regions. Therefore, to reduce the amount of information, 
Tables B.5 and B.6 show the prices for only three regions (North, Central and Southwest).  
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Figure 6.1 County level maize production: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 County level sugar production: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.3 County level fruit production: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 County level pork production: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
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Declines in maize output are found all over Northeast, North, Southwest and Northwest, the 
major producing regions. Yet, more scattered increases can be observed also, especially in South 
and Southwest where maize apparently replaces sugar, whose price drops even more. Sugar 
output decreases in all producing regions, as shown in Figure 6.2, both for sugarcane in South and 
Southwest and for sugar beets in Northeast and Northwest. Fruit output increases almost 
everywhere, with emphasis on North, East and South. These increases refer only to annual crop 
land and are, therefore, limited in size, since the scenario keeps orchard land the same as in the 
baseline. The effects on pork output are rather subtle, since farmers in remote counties are 
protected to a certain extent by trade margins that are relatively high for animal products, making 
them less vulnerable for price falls. Figure 6.4 shows a clear distinction between the coastal 
regions North, East and South with lower output and the more remote regions Northeast, 
Northwest and Southwest with higher output. In this respect, we may also note that the overall 
difference with the baseline is relatively small, nationwide a decline of only 260 thousand ton. 
 
The allocation of inputs between sectors naturally reflects the changes in commodity prices and 
outputs under trade liberalization. For example, since the rice, fruit, and vegetable prices are 
higher due to elimination of export tariffs while the livestock price drops, labor is attracted to the 
crop sector (Table B.7). Farm employment accordingly has shifted by 0.7 million man-years from 
livestock to cropping in 2030. The effect on farmer’s incomes turns out to be negative: whereas 
cropping value added remains about constant in 2030, value added in livestock activities declines 
from 1,340 billion Yuan to 1,224 billion Yuan, hence by 10 percent almost (Table B.8). Whereas 
this decline in livestock incomes hits every region, it is highest in the densely populated coastal 
regions East and South, with about 16 percent (Table B.9). For South, the negative impact of 
falling sugar prices on cropping value added appears to be compensated by the other crops, 
especially rice and vegetables. The same trends show up in Table B.10 that reports on the value 
added per laborer: for cropping the growth rate in the period 2003-2030 is about the same as in 
the baseline, but for livestock it is clearly lower (4.4% instead of 4.7%), especially in South 
(3.4% instead of 4.0%) and East (4.0% instead of 4.5%).     
 
Figures 6.5 – 6.7 show the effects on value added at county level, expressed in million Yuan 
difference in 2030, compared to the baseline, for cropping, livestock and total farming, 
respectively. Although total cropping value added is about the same as in the baseline, Figure 6.5 
reveals a mixed pattern of increases and decreases, with the winning counties mainly in the rice-
producing regions East, Central and South and the losing ones in the maize-producing regions 
North and Northeast. Livestock value added appears to decrease everywhere, despite the cheaper 
maize feed, with the largest absolute declines in the counties of the coastal regions East and 
South, as was seen earlier. In only a very few counties the positive effects on crop value added 
can dominate the negative effects on the livestock value added. Hence, under liberalization most 
counties lose in total value added (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.5 County level crop value added: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 County level livestock value added: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.7 County level total farm value added: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 County level fertilizer use per hectare: difference between Liberal and Baseline, 2030 
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As far as environmental pressure is concerned, liberalization has not much effect. Feed use and, 
hence, production of manure decrease somewhat (Table B.3), whereas fertilizer use increases 
with on average 1 to 4 kg per hectare (Table B.11). Yet, as shown in Figure 6.8, the largest 
increases are again in counties of East, Central and South where fertilizer use is already high, 
thereby adding to the environmental pressure.   
 
The effects of this agricultural trade liberalization scenario, in particular the negative effects on 
farm value added and the positive effects on consumer welfare, reflect the critical choice 
agricultural trade policies are facing worldwide in weighing economic efficiency and overall 
consumer interests against considerations about income distribution and poverty alleviation in the 
short to medium term. The lower prices that farmers face as consumers are insufficient to 
compensate for their loss in value added. 
 
Yet, even though we refer to Chinagro as a general equilibrium welfare model, we should 
reemphasize that the results are to a significant extent partial in that they take many scenario 
variables as given and through this neglect various feedbacks. We did already mention the 
assumed non-reaction of world prices that may cause some overestimation of the effects, and the 
non-reaction of agricultural resources (total farm labor and equipment as well as farm land 
availability and stable capacities) that limits the size of the effects. Furthermore, the lower food 
prices could reduce the cost of living and through this promote growth, also in rural areas 
providing more off-farm employment to the population and allowing for rural to urban migration.  
 
Nonetheless, we may conclude that our simulation does not support the common view that 
agriculture will after a transition period automatically benefit from the liberalization. Compared 
to other studies on trade liberalization such as Anderson, Huang and Ianchovichina (2004), 
Huang, Li and Rozelle (2003) and Huang and Rozelle (2003), we are less optimistic about, 
especially, the effects on the livestock sector in the coastal areas. On the other hand, our results 
are more favorable for agriculture than those of Diao, Fan and Zhang (2003) who report across-
the-board decreases of about 9% in rural incomes due to the elimination of all agricultural tariffs. 
In all, the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization for the farm sector will greatly depend on 
the package of measures adopted to improve the sector’s labor productivity and ecological 
performance that could allow expansion at higher wage rates and lower environmental costs. The 
success of such policies critically hinges on the extent to which the non-farm sector can absorb 
additional labor in and from rural areas. 
 
 
6.2 High income growth scenario 
 
Under the high income growth scenario, the main concern is finding out to which extent China’s 
dependence on world food markets will increase if incomes and hence food demand grow faster 
than under the baseline and whether maintaining some agricultural protection is helpful in this 
situation. To this end, the scenario assumes higher growth rates in the non-agricultural sector, 
together with increased migration to urban areas and higher fertility rates. The scenario also 
assumes that the higher growth rate is associated to faster loss of farm land and farm labor to the 
urbanization process. Technical progress is faster as well. Stable capacities are kept at baseline 
level. The impacts are as follows. 
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The faster income growth and urbanization shift demand away from cereals. Per capita 
consumption of grain in 2030 is 151.6 kg, meat and egg intake increase to 83.6 kg and calorie 
intake to 2857 kcal/day, as opposed to 155.0 kg grain, 77.0 kg meat and eggs, and 2828 kcal/day 
in the baseline (Table B.4). Combined with the faster technical progress, and in spite of the loss 
of farm land, the shift in demand leads to higher rice exports: 8 million tons in 2030 as opposed 
to 4.3 under the baseline. For wheat the demand reduction causes domestic prices to be about 5 
percent lower in 2030 but this still is too high for wheat exports to become profitable (Tables B.1 
and B.5). Because of increased demand not fully offset by increased production the self-
sufficiency rates of vegetable oil, sugar, and fruit will be lower. In 2030, imports of vegetable oils 
increase by 1.0 million ton and sugar imports increase by 0.8 million tons, whereas fruit exports 
fall by 4.0 million ton (Table B.1).  
 
High growth makes the livestock sector more profitable, particularly its ruminant component 
(Table B.6), while crop prices remain constant or even fall, as in the case of wheat due to 
reduction in demand. Consequently, labor shifts towards livestock where more value added can 
be earned (Table B.7). Total farm GDP is higher than that under the baseline. Table B.8 shows an 
increase of livestock value added of 153 billion Yuan and a decrease of cropping value added of 
51 billion Yuan in 2030, making the livestock sector even larger than cropping. Yet, due to the 
reduction in farm labor input, income per worker grows also in the cropping sector faster than 
under the baseline, viz. 3.7% annually compared to 3.6% under the baseline. For livestock the 
annual growth rate becomes 5.1%, against 4.7% under the baseline (Table B.10).   
 
However, because the scenario keeps the international prices and stable capacities the same as in 
the baseline, while farm labor availability becomes less, the positive effect on livestock output is 
modest and so is the effect on feed imports: the scenario essentially by construction supposes that 
because of the favorable employment opportunities outside agriculture and the already existing 
environmental pressure in densely populated areas, additional demand for livestock products does 
not trigger much increase in domestic production. Therefore, the demand increases are largely 
met by additional meat imports, as shown in Table B.2. Meat imports in 2030 now also comprise 
ruminant meat (0.7 million ton), while pork imports increase from 6.2 to 9.7 million ton, and 
poultry meat imports from 2.9 to 5.1 million ton. Milk imports shift from 28.9 to 39.8 million ton. 
As domestic meat production does not rise much, feed imports are only little higher: maize 2%, 
carbohydrate feed 10% and protein feed 3% (Table B.3).  
 
The 2030 agricultural trade deficit increases significantly from 28.9 billion USD in the baseline to 
48.2 billion USD. Since the growth rate of non-agricultural GDP rises from 6.4% to 7.1% this 
would not seem to create financing problems for China but it would definitely create scarcity on 
world markets, and cause increases in world food prices not accounted for in this scenario. 
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Figure 6.9 County level crop value added: 
difference between High Growth and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 County level livestock value added:  
difference between High Growth and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.11 County level fertilizer use per hectare: 
difference between High Growth and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 County level total fertilizer use:  
difference between High Growth and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
  
 
98
Geographically, the decreases in crop value added are distributed rather uniformly over the 
regions (Table B.9). The same applies to the increases in livestock value added, albeit that East 
and South benefit somewhat less than the other regions that either have a larger share of 
ruminants or are inland areas. Inland areas gain more from white meat price increases than 
coastal areas where the possibility of direct foreign imports tends to keep these prices closely tied 
to the world price. The distribution of the changes in value added over the counties is shown in 
Figures 6.9 and 6.10, for crops and livestock, measured in millions of Yuan difference in 2030 
compared to the baseline. For crops, we note that value added is not decreasing everywhere. 
There are counties in which it is higher than under the baseline. This can be attributed to a slight 
rise of the price of vegetables for which the export constraints become less tight, due to the 
increased domestic demand. However, such improvements are modest and visible only in 
counties where wheat output is relatively unimportant. For livestock, the map offers an 
illustration of the earlier conclusion from Table B.9 that, with few exceptions, the counties with 
highest increases are not located in the coastal regions East and South.  
 
The shift in labor away from the crop sector causes chemical fertilizer use per hectare in 2030 to 
drop from 376 kg in the baseline to 366 kg, amounting to 2.7 per cent decline in total, and the 
total fertilizer use, organic as well as chemical, declines from 450 kg to 439 kg (Table B.11). 
Together with the reduced availability of arable land due to urbanization, this leads to a 
somewhat lower use of fertilizer, especially of chemical fertilizer that in 2030 drops from 43.8 to 
42.0 million ton, a 4.2 percent decline (Table B.12). The distribution of the changes over the 
counties is shown in Figures 6.11 and 6.12, for all fertilizer taken together (chemical plus 
organic), measured respectively in kg per hectare and thousand ton. The map confirms that 
absolute levels of fertilizer application decline throughout the country, excepted some scattered 
counties inland. However, the application per hectare is not declining everywhere, and 
particularly not in the densely populated coastal provinces of East and South where a reduction 
would be welcome as environmental pressure is already high under the baseline. The fertilizer 
intensification in these regions is also coupled to increased labor-substituting mechanization.   
 
The other aspect of pollution we report on, pollution from livestock, is directly related to feed 
intake. In general, changes are modest, as observed in the discussion of Table B.3. Therefore, we 
may conclude that growth outside agriculture and faster technical progress only make a modest 
contribution to alleviation of environmental pressure in agriculture. 
 
To sum up, the higher income growth scenario does not create major problems for food self-
sufficiency or the environment. The scenario assumptions about stable capacities might, however, 
be on the conservative side. Assuming higher growth in these capacities would lead to 
substitution of meat imports by feed grain imports. Farmer incomes in the livestock sector would 
be higher, but environmental pressure also. 
  
 
6.3 High R&D scenario 
 
In the baseline outcomes two issues come to the fore as problematic. The first is that the income 
gap between agriculture and non-agriculture is mounting, especially for crop farmers and less for 
livestock farmers, when measured in terms of farm value added per worker, recalling that our 
calculations say nothing about family income that could include off-farm earnings. The second is 
the increasing environmental pressure, especially in densely populated areas. Another salient 
feature of the baseline outcomes, albeit less problematic, is that the agricultural trade deficit is 
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rising fast in response to the increasing demand for livestock products, too fast to be offset by 
higher exports from horticulture. Can faster technical progress help in these respects? This is the 
question addressed by the high R&D scenario that assumes higher Solow-neutral technical 
progress in annual cropping, in pork and poultry production and in the specialized dairy sector, as 
well as improved efficiency in fertilizer use. Total factor availability, urbanization, growth 
outside agriculture and international trade conditions are kept as in the baseline. 
 
It appears that additional technical progress leads to higher output, as could be expected, 
especially of commodities that can remain in a stable import or export regime. For other 
commodities, such as those in autarky, a drop in price occurs that incites farmers to substitute 
away from them. Among the crop commodities, vegetable oil, maize and rice show the largest 
growth, ending up in 2030 respectively 9.8%, 9.3% and 8.4% higher than under the baseline 
(Tables B.1 and B.3). Among the livestock commodities, pork benefits most, with a 5.4% higher 
output in 2030 (Table B.2). To put these rates into perspective, without substitution the output of 
annual crops would be 6.8% higher and the output of white meat 5.1% higher than under the 
baseline. Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show how the additional output of rice and poultry meat is 
distributed over the counties, measured in thousand ton difference with respect to the baseline. It 
appears that the distribution of these increments closely follows the projected baseline production 
patterns. 
 
Food consumption is not changing much since in this scenario there is no change in non-
agriculture income and urbanization. Consequently, supply changes are absorbed largely by 
foreign trade, as shown in Tables B.1 – B.3. Exports are higher in 2030, especially for rice: 
reaching 15.6 instead of 4.3 million tons under the baseline. For fruits 6.4 instead of 4.7 million 
tons are exported, and for vegetables 15.4 instead of 13.3 million tons, the latter reaching now 
nationwide the export quota imposed in the scenario to avoid deterioration of world prices. 
Imports of both food and feed are lower in 2030. For instance, maize 11.1 instead of 22.0 million 
tons, vegetable oil 8.2 instead of 9.1 million tons, sugar 2.4 instead of 3.1 million tons, pork 4.0 
instead of 6.2 million ton, carbohydrate 37.0 instead of 56.6 million gcal, and protein feed 97.7 
instead of 113.6 million gcal. Milk imports are lower as well in 2030 but compared to the total 
volume the difference is small: 27.8 instead of 28.9 million tons. Overall, the higher technical 
progress reduces the 2030 agricultural trade deficit from 28.9 billion USD to 13.4 billion USD. 
This reduction reflects the overall increase in self-sufficiency in food and feed. 
 
With respect to farm incomes, outcomes are less favorable than might be expected on the basis of 
the output increases. Cropping value added only reaches 1,565 billion Yuan by 2030 (Table B.9), 
against 1,526 billion Yuan in the baseline, hence an increase of 2.6% whereas an increase of 
around 6% could be expected on the basis of the scenario assumption of 0.2% higher annual 
productivity. This happens because half of the gains end up with the consumers, due to lower 
prices of, especially, wheat and vegetables (Table B.5). The livestock sector does not face such 
price decreases and is, therefore, able to retain most of its productivity gains: its value added in 
2030 is 1,387 billion Yuan which is 3.5% more than in the baseline, only slightly less than the 
output increases. Similar increases are obtained for the value added per worker (Table B.10) since 
the allocation of labor to crops and livestock adjusts only marginally. 
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Figure 6.13 County level rice production: difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 County level poultry production: difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.15 County level crop value added:  
difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 County level livestock value added:  
difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.17 County level fertilizer use per hectare:  
difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18 County level total fertilizer use:  
difference between High R&D and Baseline, 2030 
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The distribution of the increases in value added is shown in Figures 6.15 and 6.16 for crops and 
livestock. Almost all counties in Northeast, East, Central, South and Southwest benefit from the 
boost in technical progress but there are also counties that lose income, especially in North, 
Northwest and Plateau. These are counties that suffer from the price reduction of wheat and 
vegetables and those that do not benefit much from the assumed technical progress since they 
depend more on orchard land, traditional livestock and grazing ruminants.  
 
Regarding the environment, the scenario assumes an increase in the efficiency of fertilizer use, 
with 0.5% per year. This leads to lower amounts of chemical fertilizer use per hectare: 510 kg per 
hectare on irrigated land and 195 kg per hectare on rain-fed land in 2030, compared to 559 and 
207 respectively in the baseline. The average level becomes 346 kg per hectare as opposed to 376 
in the baseline (Table B.11). The rate of reduction of fertilizer use is lower than the technical 
progress would allow at the same yield, since the farmers react to the gain by applying more 
fertilizer so as to raise the yield. The largest reductions, both in terms of application per hectare 
and in absolute amounts, are found throughout the coastal areas and the Central region, hence in 
the areas with the highest environmental pressure (Figures 6.17 and 6.18). With respect to 
emissions of pollutants from livestock production, we observe that the scenario assumes no 
specific increase in feed efficiency (only Solow-neutral progress in the livestock sector) and 
keeps stable capacities unchanged. Therefore, overall feed intake hardly changes (Table B.3) 
keeping the production of manure close to baseline level as well. 
 
In summary, the technical progress scenario indicates that higher R&D expenditures will indeed 
reduce China’s reliance on the international food and feed markets significantly and relax the 
environmental pressure somewhat (provided that the expenditures lead to the order of magnitude 
of technical progress assumed by the scenario), but in terms of farm incomes the improvement is 
minor and the gap with non-farm income hardly diminishes.  
 
In the present scenario, world markets are supposed to absorb most of the additional farm output 
and through this they enable Chinese farmers, in terms of value added per farmer, to maintain a 
large part of the gain from productivity increases. However, farmers also depend on goods that 
are not exported, and the mechanism causing the limited impact of technological intervention is 
that for commodities in autarky a rise in farm output triggers a price reduction that shifts part of 
the benefits to the consumers. This mechanism is well known and points to the classical problem 
facing agricultural policy makers worldwide that, unless the market can absorb additional output, 
demand remains inelastic and technical progress in farming goes to a significant extent at the 
expense of farmers themselves. Farmers are in this respect very different from high-tech 
companies that engage in R&D but reap the fruits through patents and (temporary) monopolies. 
Indeed, short of resorting to protectionism, in agriculture policy makers eager to supply the cities 
with ample food at affordable prices do not have too many options available, which generally 
have to be pursued simultaneously. One is promoting labor outmigration from agriculture into 
off-farm employment, so as to reduce the number of people dependent on farm value added, and 
to add non-farm income to family income. At the same time the outflow, when sufficient, makes 
it possible for farmers to increase in farm size and engage in mechanization, possibly with 
improved financial intermediation. Another parallel option is to help product differentiation with 
a focus on improved qualities for market segments that are willing to pay for it. Clearly, 
improvements of trade and transport infrastructure and of competition among intermediaries will 
help reducing the income gap. R&D has an important role to play in this context, but only as part 
of a wider package, as the present scenario has illustrated. A final element in such a package is 
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improved irrigation, which stands for a general improvement of the resources in farming. The 
next section reports on a scenario with enhanced irrigation. 
 
 
6.4 Enhanced irrigation scenario 
 
Much like the high R&D scenario, the enhanced irrigation scenario aims at raising farm incomes 
and reducing the country’s agricultural trade deficit by improving the conditions under which 
farmers can operate. However, the difference is that irrigation is more location-specific. Hence, 
the improvements are less evenly distributed across counties than under the high R&D scenario, 
which means that deprived counties will lack opportunities to compensate for falling crop prices. 
With respect to environmental pressure, the outcomes are rather predictable in this scenario since 
more fertilizer is applied on irrigated land than on rainfed land, whereas livestock manure 
production will not change much as stable capacities remain unchanged.  
 
The scenario assumes that part of rainfed land is shifted to irrigated land whereas total cropland 
remains the same in each province. In all, some additional 5.6 million hectares are irrigated in 
2030 as compared to the baseline, which amounts to 10% of total irrigated area. The differences 
are specified by province, with, compared to the 2030 baseline levels, the largest relative 
additions in the Northeastern provinces with 22%, followed by the Central and Northwestern 
provinces with 12%. Less spectacular expansions are considered feasible in the provinces of 
North (except Beijing), East (except Shanghai), South and Southwest with 7.2%, and only limited 
increases are assumed for Beijing, Shanghai, Tibet and Qinghai with 2.4%. This geographical 
distribution further builds the large irrigation potential of the Northeastern provinces, already 
present in the baseline specification. Furthermore, since irrigated land requires more labor and 
machinery per hectare, the scenario also imposes compensating resource shifts to avoid shortages 
and keep aggregate yields (in terms of dry matter per hectare) the same as in the baseline, on both 
rainfed and irrigated land. All other elements of the baseline scenario remain unchanged. We 
should emphasize that this assumption also applies to international trade, making large changes in 
China’s exports possible at the same exogenous world price for all commodities except 
vegetables. We return to this point later on. 
 
In terms of output, the simulation not unexpectedly generates a shift towards the crop-mix 
prevailing on irrigated land. At national level the main effects in 2030, compared to the baseline, 
are (Tables B.1 and B.3) a rise in rice production of 15.4 million ton (11%), wheat 1.8 million ton 
(2%), maize 1.7 million ton (1.5%) and vegetables 3.5 million ton (1.2%). Furthermore, the 
supply of composite feeds expands, especially for protein feed (4.5%), due to additional 
availability of rice bran. Output diminishes for ‘other staple’ (minor grains, root crops, soybeans, 
groundnuts), in total with 1.1 million ton of soybean equivalent (5%), as well as for sugar with 
0.3 million ton (2.5%) and fruits with 1.5 million ton (2%). As in the high R&D scenario, for 
wheat and vegetables output rises are dampened by price falls (Table B.5). Without substitution, 
wheat would have gone up with 4.1 million ton. The other two major grain commodities benefit 
from the substitution process. Maize would have declined even by 0.3 million ton. Output of the 
livestock sector is hardly affected in this scenario (Table B.2).  
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Figure 6.19 County level rice production: 
difference between Enhanced Irrigation and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.20 County level wheat production: 
difference between Enhanced Irrigation and Baseline, 2030 
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Figure 6.21 County level maize production:  
difference between Enhanced Irrigation and Baseline, 2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22 County level crop value added:  
difference between Enhanced Irrigation and Baseline, 2030 
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Regionally, the changes in grain supply can be summarized as follows. Rice, almost exclusively 
grown on irrigated land, expands everywhere, with the largest relative increases in Northeast, 
Central and Northwest, hence following the area shifts specified in the scenario. Figure 6.19 
shows the absolute changes by county in 2030, measured in thousand ton difference with respect 
the baseline. Indeed, also in absolute terms the largest increases are found in Northeast and 
Central but not in Northwest, which is a minor producer. Wheat, largely grown on irrigated land, 
goes up in North, Northwest and South but decreases elsewhere, due to its fall in price. Figure 
6.20 details these outcomes at county level. Maize, grown on irrigated and rainfed land, is on the 
rise in North and Northwest, and contracting in the other regions, as illustrated in Figure 6.21. 
  
With respect to the potential of the North China Plain to become a major feed producing zone, 
one of the key questions raised in section 2, we observe that in this scenario, by 2030, the 
conversion of 1.1 million hectare rainfed land into irrigated land generates significant increases in 
feed supply, including 1.4 million ton maize, 0.4 million gcal carbohydrate feed and 1.8 million 
gcal protein feed. Yet, this is not enough to keep North in a net maize exporting position beyond 
2010. Maintaining this position would require a larger volume of land conversion or higher feed 
prices.  
 
In the absence of price effects, the output shifts would lead to an increase in crop value of about 
30 billion Yuan in 2030, whereas expanded irrigation causes an increase in use of chemical 
fertilizer by approximately 2 million ton in 2030, amounting to an additional application of 350 
kg/ha on 5.5 million hectare, with a value of 5 billion Yuan. Thus, a rise in cropping value added 
of about 25 billion Yuan would result, relative to the baseline. However, crop farmers fall in the 
same ‘sales trap’ as in the high R&D scenario, with price drops for wheat trapped in autarky and 
for vegetables trapped at upper bounds on regional exports. Consequently, a substantial part of 
the gain in cropping value added vanishes to the benefit of consumers, leaving 12.5 billion Yuan 
for value added (Table B.8).   
 
Table B.9 shows that from a regional perspective net changes in value added are not everywhere 
positive. In particular, they are negative in North, South and Plateau that apparently suffer more 
from the price falls than they benefit from the expanded output. For North and Plateau this is due 
to the dominance of wheat and vegetables. In South that hardly grows wheat the negative sign can 
only come from vegetables, but the relatively small difference in value added per hectare between 
irrigated and rainfed land also helps explaining the result. Figure 6.22 shows the county 
distribution of the absolute differences in value added with respect to baseline, measured in 
million Yuan, and reflects the signs at regional level.  
 
In this scenario the environmental pressure from fertilizer use increases. For the country as a 
whole, the average application of chemical fertilizer reaches 395 kg per hectare in 2030, as 
opposed to 376 kg per hectare in the baseline. The trend is the same in all regions (Table B.11). 
As mentioned already, this is a rather direct consequence of the scenario.  
 
The lower prices of wheat and vegetables lead to an increase in per capita consumption in 2030, 
from 55.7 to 56.8 kg and from 163.3 to 164.6 kg, respectively. Consumption of other 
commodities is hardly affected as exports absorb the rise in supplies, particularly for rice. Hence, 
the agricultural trade deficit in 2030 drops to 24.2 billion USD, as compared to 28.9 billion USD 
in the baseline.  
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In short, enhanced irrigation improves consumer welfare and the agricultural trade balance but 
this abstracts from the cost of the investments in irrigation, which are not shown explicitly. The 
simulation also finds a limited and sometimes negative effect on farm incomes, due to price 
reductions. Furthermore, the environmental pressure mounts further. Hence, like technical 
progress, irrigation can contribute to agricultural development but needs to be matched by 
accompanying measures to compensate farmers in negatively affected areas.  
 
Finally, with respect to scenario specification, the resulting amount of rice exports (almost 20 
million ton in 2030) can arguably not be realized without lowering the world prices, if exportable 
at all. It might, therefore, be more realistic to impose export bounds as for vegetables. However, 
this would not change the main sense of the results as it would shift even more benefits from 
farmers to consumers. Another objection to the model outcomes could be that the assumed degree 
of substitution among crops is too low33 and that farmers will be able to maintain a larger part of 
the irrigation benefits by switching faster to other crops. This would need further empirical 
testing.  
                                                   
33 In the current specification of the Chinagro model, the substitution elasticity among crops, based on empirical 
simulation exercises, is 0.6 on irrigated as well as on rainfed land. 
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7. Summary and policy implications 
 
 
This report has described prospects and challenges for Chinese agriculture until 2030 under 
different scenarios, using the Chinagro welfare model. We recall that a scenario, rather than 
referring to a set of purely exogenous assumptions, is defined as a coherent set of assumptions 
about exogenous driving forces (farm land, population, non-agricultural growth, world prices 
etc.), derived from the literature and own assessments.  
 
Under these assumptions, simulations with the Chinagro model analyze the price-based 
interaction between the supply behavior of farmers, the demand behavior of consumers and the 
determination of trade flows by merchants. For each scenario the simulations result in a 
consistent set of outcomes for the endogenous variables such as market prices, farm output and 
input volumes, food intake and domestic and foreign trade flows. In addition to the baseline 
scenario, four variants have been analyzed: trade liberalization, high income growth, high R&D 
spending and enhanced irrigation. We summarize the main findings for each of these, reiterating 
that the baseline scenario assumptions, although exogenous in the model, can to a large extent be 
interpreted as findings, in the sense that they distill an integrated perspective on future 
developments from the literature available. Our summary relates to prospects, policy challenges 
raised and topics for further research. 
 
Likely future trends of exogenous driving forces 
On the demand side, we envisage the following trends in demography and lifestyles: • China’s population will grow to about 1460 million people in 2030, which is 15% higher than 
the 2000 level. In absolute numbers this implies a growth of 190 million people in 30 years, 
only around 40% of the increase that has occurred during the previous 30 years, from 1970 to 
2000. • Important changes in lifestyles are expected to result from income growth and urbanization. 
We project the level of urbanization to reach around 60% in 2030, compared to 36% in 2000. 
This means that the urban population, totaling 460 million in the year 2000, will almost 
double in three decades. With a projected average annual non-agricultural GDP growth of 6% 
to 7%, per capita incomes will increase at least fivefold. These changes in income and 
urbanization will have profound impacts on demand structure and levels. • Total human consumption of cereals is projected to remain close to current levels, due to two 
factors. First, food energy consumption levels are already high and wealthier consumers tend 
to replace staples by higher value foods such as livestock products and vegetables. Second, 
urban consumers have lower per capita consumption levels of cereals than rural people, 
implying that urbanization will result in overall lower average per capita consumption of 
cereals. • While urbanization is slowing down cereal consumption, it will likely accelerate the increases 
in meat consumption that result from higher incomes. Urban diets include higher 
consumption of meat than rural diets and per capita meat consumption is responding strongly 
to income growth. We project consumption of livestock and fish products to double almost. 
At the projected level of per capita consumption, urban China would in 2030 (with 75 kg 
meat and 27 kg eggs) be approaching the current levels of industrialized countries. Also dairy 
consumption rises fast, reaching 62 kg of milk equivalent per urban inhabitant in 2030, as 
opposed to only 7.5 kg in rural areas.  
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On the supply side, we see the following prospects for agricultural resource availability and 
technical progress: • Economic growth and urbanization will forcefully compete for agricultural resources of land 
and water. We estimate that another 7 to 9 million hectares of farmland will be converted to 
built-up land between 2000 and 2030, i.e. 5% to 7% of its 2000 size. The effect will be much 
larger for the South and the East regions, with decreases of at least 10% and 15%, 
respectively. • We expect that, despite current legislation and policy efforts, not all conversion to built-up 
land can be compensated by land reclamation and restoration. It is estimated that the stock of 
farmland in 2030 (excluding orchard land) would be in the range of 115 to 117 million 
hectare, hence significantly lower than the 128 million hectare in 2000. • Irrigation water is essential for China’s high grain output from limited farmland. Currently, 
almost all rice, more than 80% of wheat and 45% of maize are grown on irrigated land. We 
project the share of irrigated land to increase slightly between 2000 and 2030, from 47% to 
48% of annual cropland, mainly due to expansion in the Northeast. However, with additional 
efforts a higher increase would be possible, up to over 50%.   • Intensified livestock systems will play the leading role in meeting the increased demand for 
meat in the future. Pig, broiler and layer stocks in intensified systems are expected to increase 
on average at least 2.5 times between 2000 and 2030, with a geographic distribution across 
counties largely reflecting population density. • With respect to ruminants, pastoral livestock will grow much less than confined livestock. 
For grazing herds, we project an estimated growth of around 20% between 2000 and 2030, 
whereas the stock of confined ruminant meat cattle is foreseen to double and the stock of 
specialized dairy to become even 5 times as large, while for large animals used for work and 
transportation a reduction of close to 40% is foreseen. • Even after the yield increases of the last decades, significant technical progress seems 
feasible. Although hard to quantify, steady yield increases of about 0.5% annually in cropping 
and ruminant farming and of even 1% in pig and poultry may be attainable, with sufficient 
levels of R&D financing and effective implementation. 
Finally, with respect to agricultural market developments, we have projected the following trends 
for world prices and government policies: • Considering the whole period until 2030, international agricultural prices are assumed to 
show a steady decline compared to the high levels reached at the end of the twentieth century. 
However, world prices for agricultural products are known to be relatively volatile, as 
illustrated by the overall price fall in 2000-2003 with recovery after 2003 that is currently 
turning into a price upsurge for grain and dairy, partly for structural reasons including the 
demand for meat and feedgrains by China itself and the emergence of biofuels, partly for 
transient reasons such as droughts and crop failures. • The agricultural trade policies of Chinese government are expected to follow a path of steady 
general reduction of tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, leading to effective tariff rates being 
halved in the period 2000-2030. Similar reductions are projected for domestic producer taxes, 
including prevailing local fees. 
 
Prospects under baseline 
The baseline scenario simulations seem reassuring with respect to the size of foreign import 
requirements that remain moderate relative to China’s size, though large when looked at from the 
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world market. It would be possible to feed people as well as animals without excessive imports. 
In fact, the trade in food and feed between China and the rest of the world will most likely be a 
busy two-way traffic since, in close match with feed and meat imports, China has the potential to 
export large amounts of fruits and vegetables. Although its agricultural trade deficit will rise, the 
deficit is very minor as a fraction of total exports. Major concerns would rather be the 
development of agricultural value added per farm inhabitant that, although steadily increasing, 
stays behind per capita value added outside agriculture in all regions, the continuing disparity in 
per capita incomes across regions and the environmental pressure from fertilizer losses and 
unused manure surpluses that are currently already high in densely populated areas and will not 
diminish. More specifically, we may summarize the outcomes of the baseline simulation as 
follows: 
• Most food can be produced domestically in the coming thirty years, but the country will have 
to import large amounts of animal feeds. These feed imports are significant on the world 
market but not excessive as share of domestic use in China. The shift to intensified sectors, 
the steady rate of technical progress and the continued important contribution of local feed 
sources keep the increases in commercial feed demand moderate compared to the rise in meat 
output. • The country will remain largely self-sufficient in food grains. Wheat will be in autarky, 
whereas for rice there will even be 4 million ton exports by 2030. To achieve this, 
disregarding the steps to assure recovery after the output dip of 2003, no dramatic measures 
to augment supply will be called for.  • Feed imports grow steadily, reaching in 2030 shares of 16%, 17% and 35% of domestic use 
for respectively maize, carbohydrate and protein feed. The amounts concerned are significant 
on the world market: 22 million ton maize, 17 million ton grain equivalent, and 38 million ton 
cake/bran equivalent. • For meat, import requirements are initially negligible, largely thanks to China’s comparative 
cost advantages in livestock production. However, through its assumed trends on stable 
capacities the scenario simulation sees such comparative advantages weaken gradually, 
following changes in relative prices of major production factors and the increasing 
environmental pressure caused by intensive livestock production. This causes white meat 
imports to rise, especially after 2020, reaching 6 million ton pork (10% of consumption) and 
3 million ton poultry meat (16% of consumption) in 2030, which, as for animal feeds, amount 
to significant flows on the world market. • Exports of fruits and vegetables increase significantly (to close to 20 million ton, together), 
and so do imports of vegetable oil, sugar and, especially, dairy products. • The resulting agricultural trade deficit of 29 billion US dollars (of 1997) in 2030 can easily be 
financed from the non-agricultural trade surplus that is currently already over 100 billion 
dollars and projected to become even much larger. • Consumer welfare goes up considerably throughout the country, mainly because of 
exogenous scenario assumptions on income growth outside agriculture but also because food 
prices do not rise much, though domestically somewhat more than internationally, due to the 
demand pressure. The highest rates are found for meat with about 50% real price increase by 
2030. • Regional production trends to a large extent maintain the existing output distribution. As 
special cases, we note the increase in rice output in Northeast following enlargement of the 
irrigated area, the large meat output increases in South in response to the strong growth of the 
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urban agglomerations, and the massive increases in dairy in North, Northwest and Plateau 
where milk output becomes about 3 times as large, albeit starting from a low base. • Despite the rather uniform growth rates of production across the regions, the changes in 
demand in response to migration and changes in life style generate significantly larger 
domestic trade flows and, thereby, higher pressure on the transportation system. • With respect to domestic grain trade, the Central, Northeast and East region remain the 
leading sellers of rice, and the East, Southwest and North region the leading sellers of wheat. 
For maize, the three major exporting regions (Northeast, Northwest and North) do not expand 
their role as suppliers of the national market, due to the rising demand in the own region and, 
in Northeast, also to supply shifts to rice on newly irrigated areas. The North region even 
becomes a maize importer. Net exports of Northeast and Northwest stay more or less at their 
current levels. They remain the major maize exporting regions, especially Northeast. • In spite of significant rise in their own output, the coastal regions North, East and South see 
meat inflows becoming large, with 2.0, 4.1 and 5.5 million tons, respectively, in 2030. The 
main domestic net sellers are Northeast and Central, with respectively 1.1 and 1.9 million 
tons. Considering just beef and mutton, Northwest will be the largest exporter, with close to 1 
million tons in 2030.  • Value added from farming is rising, on average at a rate of 3.2% annually, whereas labor 
input in farming is falling, on average at 1% annually. Hence, value added per manyear is 
going up by more than 4% annually. While this would seem to be a fair pace, the gap with 
non-agriculture keeps on mounting, witness the rate of total per capita income of 6% until 
2030. This tendency would seem cause of concern, especially for crop farming, whose per 
capita value added rises at 3.6% against 4.7% in livestock.  • With respect to interregional disparities, such concerns appear to apply to all regions: the 
increasing gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes is a nationwide problem, 
although, evidently, there are differences across counties within each region. Furthermore, the 
projected development will not reduce current differences in agricultural incomes across 
regions or provinces. • Intensified livestock sectors become dominant in producing white meat and eggs, with in 
2030 a share of 52% of pork output and more than 75% of poultry meat and eggs.  • Serious environmental problems may be caused by unused animal manure as well as losses in 
the application of fertilizer, especially in densely populated regions. Currently, the nutrient 
pressure is already strong in many counties, and it will not diminish in the future. Although 
on average the increases over time are moderate, with in 2030 per hectare of cropland about 
10% more chemical fertilizer applied and 20% more manure nutrient available, the amounts 
are more and more concentrated in specific areas following the escalating strain on crop land, 
requiring further yield increases, and the intensification of livestock production. 
 
Prospects under scenario variants 
The trade liberalization scenario appears to hurt farm incomes and to raise the gap with non-
agriculture, also because food becomes cheaper in urban areas. Thus, the scenario illustrates the 
difficult choice between economic efficiency and poverty alleviation that agricultural policy 
makers often face. In terms of national food self-sufficiency, the scenario does not give rise to 
concern. Environmentally, there are only minor changes compared to the baseline. We mention 
the following specifics: • Liberalization stimulates foreign trade volumes, as imported commodities (maize, vegetable 
oil, sugar, dairy and, after 2020, meat) become cheaper and exported commodities (rice, 
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fruits, vegetables) more rewarding. Trade volumes do not change much for commodities in 
autarky (wheat, eggs) in the baseline and for highly imported commodities such as composite 
feeds (carbohydrate feed, protein feed).  • Import volumes do not become excessive and can easily be financed. In all, the agricultural 
trade deficit rises a little only.  • Consumers benefit from the increased economic efficiency. Per capita meat intake becomes 
higher, in both rural and urban areas (with 5% and 3%, respectively, by 2030).  • The supply reactions are rather uniform across the country, since farmers respond everywhere 
to the changes in relative prices. However, specific local conditions with respect to trade and 
transport costs or substitution possibilities create differences. For example, pork production 
falls in coastal areas that are more under the direct influence of price reductions at the border, 
while it increases in more remote areas, where higher trade and transport margins isolate the 
farmers more from the world market.   • The overall effects on farm incomes are negative by 2030, but differ across land use types 
and regions. For cropping, a mixed pattern of increases and decreases results, with nationwide 
about the same value added as in the absence of liberalization. For livestock, the changes are 
mainly negative, especially in coastal regions. 
The high income growth scenario confirms the reassuring conclusion about national food self-
sufficiency that emerged from the baseline simulation. Even with higher meat demand than under 
the baseline, levels of imports remain manageable. Furthermore, due to better relative prices, 
livestock farming becomes relatively more attractive. Specifically, we observe the following: • In response to higher prices, domestic meat output is raised by attracting more labor to the 
livestock sector. However, since the scenario keeps stable capacities unchanged, the output 
increases remain moderate. Therefore, the additional meat demand is met mainly through  
meat imports, whose share in domestic demand goes up from 11% to 16% in 2030, whereas 
the shares of feed imports in domestic demand increase only marginally.  • The agricultural trade deficit in 2030 will be about 50% higher but financing problems do not 
occur given the size of the non-agricultural trade surplus that is even higher than in the 
baseline scenario.  • In the livestock sector, value added per manyear becomes significantly higher, with on 
average 5.1% growth annually, instead of 4.7%, whereas it hardly increases in the crop sector, 
with on average 3.7% growth instead of 3.6%. • Environmentally, there are no big changes compared to the baseline outcomes. The pressure 
from losses in the application of fertilizer is a bit lower and the pressure from unused manure 
surpluses a bit higher, due to the labor shifts from the crop to the livestock sector. • The assumed growth of stable capacities possibly is on the conservative side in this scenario. 
Higher rates would lead to substitution of meat imports by feed imports, whereas farm 
incomes in the livestock sector would be higher, but obviously, manure disposal also. 
The high R&D scenario shows that a considerable reduction in dependence on agricultural 
imports is possible, jointly with an alleviation of environmental pressures, provided that the 
additional R&D expenditures are successful in generating innovations that farmers can adopt. 
However, a substantial part of the gains will accrue to consumers rather than to farmers, because 
of drops in prices. Some details: • Technical progress leads to significantly higher output of both crops and livestock products. 
Since non-agricultural incomes and urbanization rates remain unchanged, only a small part of 
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the additional output is consumed domestically and, hence, foreign trade must absorb most of 
the differences. • Higher export levels result for, especially, rice, fruits and vegetables and lower import levels 
for, especially, sugar, vegetable oil, pork and feed. In all, the agricultural trade deficit falls 
with more than 50%. • Commodities not absorbed through additional exports see their prices diminish. This applies 
particularly to wheat and vegetables. • Drops in prices limit the gains for crop farmers. Their value added per manyear goes up by 
3.7% annually against 3.6% in the baseline scenario. Livestock farmers do not face such price 
decreases, and their value added per manyear goes up by 4.9% against 4.7% in the baseline. 
Finally, the enhanced irrigation scenario shows outcomes similar to those of the high R&D 
scenario. Here also the agricultural trade balance improves and consumer welfare improves, 
while farmers themselves have to cope with the ‘price trap’, this time even with sharper 
geographic differences because of the location-specific nature of the added irrigation. Therefore, 
large groups of farmers who do not participate in the land improvement merely experience the 
disadvantages of falling prices. The scenario operates as follows: • Output is reallocated towards crops that dominate the crop mix on irrigated land, especially 
towards rice, wheat and vegetables, and also to maize. For wheat and vegetables the output 
increases are lower than expected due to similar price declines as in the high R&D scenario, 
whereas maize (of which more than half grows on rainfed land in the baseline) benefits from 
the declines in these competing crops. • Higher export levels result for rice and vegetables, and lower export levels for fruits, whereas 
food imports remain largely unchanged and feed imports become less. The agricultural trade 
deficit falls with about 15%. • Only part of the benefits from the additional irrigation works accrues to crop farmers. Their 
value added is in 2030 about 0.5% higher than in the baseline scenario, but without price falls 
it would have been 1% higher. The remainder of the benefits ends up with the consumers. • Effects on per capita incomes differ strongly across regions. Despite the nationwide rise in 
per capita incomes by 0.5%, crop farmers are worse off in many counties, especially those in 
the regions North, South and Plateau. • The environmental pressures are higher, as fertilizer use is higher on irrigated land than on 
rainfed land. 
 
Key questions in agricultural development  
Against the background of these scenario results we now return to the key agricultural 
development issues raised in section 2, and discuss these in the same order.  
1) Import dependence. China’s feed grain imports remain manageable, in spite of the higher 
meat demand generated by continued income growth and urbanization. Import flows are 
largest in the high income scenario, with in 2030 maize imports of 26 million ton, 
carbohydrate feed imports of 19 million ton grain equivalent and protein feed imports close to 
40 million ton cake/bran equivalent, amounting to, respectively, 16%, 18% and 35% of 
domestic use. Hence, China becomes a major feed importer on the world market, but it can 
afford this because of its massive export surplus outside agriculture. Meat imports themselves 
also gain in importance. Under the high income scenario, a total import of 15.5 million ton 
results, one sixth of domestic consumption. The eventual ratio of feed to meat imports will 
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strongly depend on how much stable capacities are permitted to grow, which is in part guided 
by environmental and health concerns. The scenarios suppose that initially high rates 
gradually slow down, especially after 2020. 
2) Grain surplus. The shift to luxury food, combined with technical progress in agriculture, will 
result in limited surpluses of food grains, particularly rice with exports of around 3 to 5 
million ton in 2030. Wheat remains in autarky under most scenarios. However, under 
additional technical progress or enhanced irrigation efforts, the rice export flows tend to 
become much larger, even up to 10 million ton or more. This would undoubtedly cause the 
world price to decline, inducing downward pressure on the domestic price and triggering 
substitution away from rice. The current scenarios abstract from such feedbacks and, 
consequently, tend to overestimate the rise in export volumes. 
3) Meat and feed supply by poor farmers. The question whether the rising meat demand is an 
opportunity for poor farmers, particularly those in disadvantaged areas needs a more detailed 
answer. 
First, let us consider meat itself. Total demand in the coastal regions North, East and South 
increases between 2003 and 2030 with about 25 million ton of which foreign imports provide 
9 million ton. Hence, a fair share is provided by domestic farmers. Who are these? Looking at 
the interregional trade flows, as indicators of ‘long-distance’ trade, we observe increases of 
meat surpluses exported from Northeast (from 0.8 to 1.1 million ton), Central (from 1.5 to 1.9 
million ton), Plateau (from 0.1 to 0.3 million ton of meat) and Northwest (from 0.5 to 0.6 
million ton meat), or 1.1 million ton in total. Southwest, with fast growing population 
concentrations, turns into a minor importer. Hence, most of the additional meat demand in 
North, East and South originates from within the own region. Although the model is not 
explicit about the pattern of trade flows inside the same region, the distribution of rise in meat 
supply over the counties, as reflected e.g. in the increase of livestock value added in Figure 
5.3, strongly suggests that farmers in the hinterland of the coastal population concentrations 
benefit significantly.  
Second, the question comes up to what extent farmers in remote inland regions benefit 
indirectly, i.e. by supplying more feed to the coastal regions. For maize, there are substantial 
flows from Northeast and Northwest to the other regions but they remain more or less 
constant. For carbohydrate feed, there is a substantial flow from the Central region, but also 
this flow remains more or less constant. The third tradable feed commodity, protein feed, is 
imported by all regions, at increasing amounts. Hence, we may conclude that the increases in 
feed deficits in the regions North, East and South are mainly met by imports from abroad 
rather than by imports from remote inland regions.    
Hence we conclude that the main domestic suppliers of the increased amounts of meat to the 
industrialized coastal areas are the livestock farmers in the direct vicinity of these areas. More 
remote farmers benefit only to a limited extent via increased meat deliveries, and are not able 
to expand their current sales of feed.  
A final question is whether the livestock farmers who benefit are traditional farmers, 
specialized households, or industrial companies. In this respect, the simulation outcomes 
show that they are definitely not the traditional farmers, who see their output share declining 
significantly. Although the model itself does not make a further distinction between 
specialized households and industrial companies, the trends in Figure 2.5, that underlie the 
scenario specification, safely indicate that specialized households play a large role in 
supplying the additional meat.  
4) Northeast. Northeastern China’s role as feed supplier was already covered extensively. The 
region is a large maize seller at present and maintains this role in the baseline scenario but it 
  
 
116
does not succeed in extending its surplus, not even under high R&D spending or enhanced 
irrigation efforts. Although its maize farm gate prices are among the lowest, the differences 
with other regions are small whereas the trade and transportation costs to bring maize to the 
neighboring North region are relatively high, with 0.07 Yuan/kg, about 7% of the product 
price. Reducing these trade and transport costs would help the expansion of these sales, as 
would higher international feed prices, especially if the world price of rice went down in 
parallel, in response to China’s increased exports to the world market. Unless this happens, 
the region should focus on further reduction of production costs, for example by increased 
mechanization, as labor supply seems fairly limiting in this region.  
5) North. In the baseline scenario the irrigated area in the whole North region declines with 
about 1.5 million hectare, and rainfed land with a similar amount. These reductions, jointly 
with the increased own feed demand, cause the region to lose its maize exports. Additional 
irrigation efforts would definitely help pushing up maize supply but a land conversion of 1.1 
million hectare as in the enhanced irrigation scenario, from 15.5 to 16.6 million hectare in 
2030, out of a total of 25.9 million hectare annual cropland, is by far insufficient to bring 
back maize exports. Instead, major efforts such as those of the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project will be required to restore the maize-surplus in the North region, and even then only if 
maize prices remain sufficiently attractive to farmers compared to other crops. 
6) South. On the basis of the simulations, the agricultural development in South, with as main 
crops rice, vegetables, fruits and sugar, and as main livestock products pork and poultry meat, 
does not appear particularly alarming compared to other regions, in terms of value added per 
manyear. Its 2003 levels are among the highest for crops as well as livestock, and so are the 
rates of increase. While over time the region loses in self-sufficiency, it can definitely afford 
this. As in other regions, the main concerns relate to the pressure on the environment, which 
is indeed very high in many Southern counties, and to the rising income gap compared to the 
non-agricultural sector. 
7) Trade liberalization. As summarized already earlier in this section, enhanced trade 
liberalization causes price falls for imported commodities and price increases for exported 
commodities, compared to the baseline scenario. Farmer responses lead to higher supply of 
rice, fruits and vegetables, and lower supply of maize, sugar, vegetable oils and dairy. For 
wheat and eggs (in autarky) supply remains about the same, as well as for composite feeds 
(carbohydrate and protein feed) and also for meat (although meat prices fall somewhat). With 
respect to earnings from cropping, a mixed pattern of increases and decreases emerges, with a 
near balance on average. However, livestock farmers are worse off as their incomes are 
reduced, especially in coastal regions. In all, farm incomes go down on average. Clearly, 
consumers benefit through lower prices from the increased efficiency and see their welfare 
rise.  
8) Environment. The simulations emphasize the pressure from fertilizer losses and unused 
manure. The pressure is already high at present, due to the high levels of fertilizer application 
and the large amounts of manure produced per hectare in several densely populated areas. 
Further intensification of agricultural production in both crop and livestock sectors, will only 
make it higher, on average at moderate rates but with the highest increases in the areas that 
are already vulnerable. Therefore, improving fertilizer use efficiency and opting for 
environmentally sustainable modes of manure disposal, treatment and recycling emerge as 
essential and key challenges. 
 
Comparison with other models 
In the beginning of the 1990s, when the country still had sizeable wheat imports whereas the rise 
in meat consumption had only just begun, the literature offered a wide range of projections about 
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China’s future grain demand on the world market. Several studies were published with diverging 
forecasts for the year 2000, as summarized in Huang, Rozelle and Rosegrant (1999). At one 
extreme, China was predicted to have the capacity of becoming a large net exporter of grain, 
possibly even up to 50 million ton. At the other extreme, there were analysts who believed that 
China would be a major grain importer in 2000, with amounts that even came close to 100 
million ton. The country in fact turned out to become a net exporter of grain in 2000, with about 
10 million ton, albeit largely due to the disposal of stocks built up in earlier years. By 2005, the 
situation was essentially still the same, with a net export of 4 million ton (NSBCa, various 
issues). Since the beginning of the new century, the publication of alternative forecasts has 
calmed down somewhat. The study of Huang, Rozelle and Rosegrant itself predicts net grain 
imports to increase to about 30 million ton by the year 2020, consisting mainly of feed grain, 
whereas simulations with IFPRI’s IMPACT model point to imports of close to 50 million ton for 
the same year (Rosegrant et al., 2001). Compared to these estimates, our baseline projection has 
moderate imports of about 20 million ton maize in 2020 and 22 million ton in 2030. 
 
Also with respect to the effects of trade liberalization, a comparison with the literature is possible. 
As mentioned earlier, we are less optimistic than most other studies about, especially, the effects 
on the livestock sector in the coastal areas. Yet, our results are less pessimistic on farm incomes 
than those of Diao, Fan and Zhang (2003). The differences with the other studies are mainly due 
to differences in resulting trade regime and assumed baseline tariff levels and to the impact of 
labor outflow on agricultural output.  
 
Policy implications 
The findings presented suggest challenges to farmers and traders as well as to government that in 
the new liberalized context has, apart from the task to provide the necessary infrastructural 
improvements, also the duty to ensure a proper functioning of markets, supported by adequate 
legal and financial systems, and to watch carefully over the social balance in the country. 
Furthermore, where markets do not or only partly exist, such as is the case for ecosystem services 
and environmental goods, government has a crucial role to play in combating negative 
externalities. 
 
The concerns that emanate from the simulations with respect to farm incomes, regional 
development and environmental dangers are not new to government. They confirm the worries 
featuring prominently in recent strategic documents, such as the 2003 report on improvement of 
the socialist market system quoted in the introductory section (CPC, 2003) and the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan launched in March 2006 (NDRCb, 2006). In particular, the second chapter of the latter 
on ‘Building a new socialist countryside’ (essentially coinciding with the New Rural 
Development Program issued just one month earlier) emphasizes the need for a broad package of 
measures that will reduce the income gap between farmers and  non-farmers.  
 
However, to ensure the nation’s food security in the future, to cater to the food preferences of 
richer and more urbanized consumers, to mitigate widening rural-urban as well as regional 
income disparities, and to prevent massive environmental pollution, China needs to make 
fundamental choices in the further elaboration of these strategic policy directions. Simulations 
like those presented in the current report may contribute to this process by providing quantitative 
background on the problems and the effects of alternative measures. In this respect, the following 
policy implications would seem to emerge: • In the coming decades, importing 5% or even 10% of grain (dominantly feed) is feasible and 
should not be considered as a threat to national grain security. The main directions for China 
to follow to protect its future grain security are to continue investing in agricultural 
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technology, to maintain at least the current share of irrigated land and to improve the 
efficiency of agriculture in general and of its water use in particular. • Simultaneously with import needs, there is a large export potential, may be up to 40-50 
million ton of fruits and vegetables. If such a two-way traffic can be facilitated by 
corresponding investments in transportation and logistics, this would help making better use 
of China’s comparative advantages in advancing labor-intensive and high value-added 
production of fruits and vegetables, avoiding China’s comparative disadvantage in land-
intensive production of maize and other feeds. • With respect to national grain security policies, a shift in emphasis from all grain to food 
grain suggests itself. Government could redefine its grain security goals in terms of rice and 
wheat, the two major food grains, and accept a moderate level of feed imports. This would 
provide considerable protection against external political-economic threats, while being 
attainable without major distortions. • In view of China’s strong position on an increasing number of international non-agricultural 
markets, household food security will gradually become more of a concern than national food 
security. While China’s aggregate supply of food grains is not expected to encounter serious 
problems, there will be millions of farm workers in rural areas, especially crop farmers in 
inland regions, who will without additional measures have an income of less than 1250 USD 
(of 1997) even in 2030, which is less than one quarter of the country’s per capita GDP. 
Therefore, household food security is part of the policy agenda, in particular for farm workers 
with limited land holdings of their own. • However, to improve farm incomes and reduce the gap with non-agriculture, supply side 
measures such as improvement of technology, increase of efficiency and extension of 
irrigated land are not sufficient, as part of the benefits will leak away to consumers. Such 
measures must be embedded in broader programs that will allow poor farmers to increase 
their incomes by participating in non-agricultural activities, thereby reducing labor surpluses 
in agriculture. • The simulation results highlight that the economic costs of trade and transportation have 
effects similar to protection and taxation, even after full removal of border protection. Their 
reduction improves efficiency but will also reduce the insulation of farmers from competition. 
This effect is critical for the income position of farmers in regions with limited scope for 
improved agricultural productivity and lack of off-farm opportunities. • As water supply available for agriculture will be stagnant or even declining in the future, the 
key to maintaining or even expanding irrigated areas lies in more rational and efficient use of 
water. This applies especially to the Northern region, where current groundwater levels seem 
extremely worrying. Furthermore, the enormous costs of the large diversion schemes of the 
South-to-North Water Transfer Project call for considerate use of the new water supplies and 
careful, albeit not full cost, water pricing of their use. • The quantitative assessment of current and future nutrient loads associated with crop and 
livestock production shows various hot-spots of agro-environmental pressures, especially in 
densely populated areas, where irreversible ecological damage is looming and human health 
is at risk. To mitigate these pressures, fertilizer use efficiency will have to be improved and 
environmentally adequate ways of manure disposal, treatment and recycling to be found. For 
this, a mix of technological improvements, legislative measures and monitoring systems will 
be required, as well as economic incentives in the form of charges for negative externalities to 
enforce improved management practices and to relocate livestock activities to areas where the 
environmental dangers are best manageable. 
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• Geography plays a major role as determinant of both the difference in prospects between 
farmers and environmental impacts. This needs to be reflected in policy analysis and 
formulation that should, therefore, be geographically explicit and differentiated. This applies 
throughout but in particular to the interconnection between, on one hand, improved varieties 
and farming practices and, on the other hand, investments in land development and irrigation. 
At the same time, policy makers cannot be warned enough that technological measures that 
improve supply capacity will not help the farmers and often hurt them, if they lead to 
congestion in the transport infrastructure or other elements of the marketing chain. Even 
improved transportation infrastructure can hurt farmers. It is important for policy makers to 
anticipate such occurrences, and react with sufficient preparation. This is where spatially 
explicit modeling studies can contribute. 
 
Future research 
The Chinagro-model has produced a comprehensive quantitative assessment of future 
developments of China’s agricultural economy, under alternative scenarios about exogenous 
driving forces. So far, the scenarios formulated are oriented more towards a subject area than to a 
specific policy. In the future, we intend to turn the model into a tool for the assessment of more 
specific and elaborate policy packages. To make this possible, the model and the scenario 
assumptions, also those not directly related to domestic policies, will have to be updated regularly 
in order to maintain the relevance of the outcomes. Also, changes in model specification will be 
needed, to address some of the shortcomings discovered so far. We mention some. 
 
First, it will be necessary to allow for some form of endogenous representation of international 
prices faced by China. Second, the developments outside agriculture should not be treated fully 
exogenously, particularly in rural areas, where farmers and their relatives are directly involved in 
agricultural processing and other forms of off-farm employment that can critically contribute to 
farm income. This will make it possible to trace better the social implications of various trends 
and interventions. Third, the trade and transportation margins between domestic markets and 
between farmgate and local market are kept fixed under the scenarios studied. This keeps prices 
relatively rigid, though not fixed because of the endogenous routing of flows between regions. In 
practice the price transmission is known to depend on the flexibility of the segments along the 
chain. A processor who is relatively inflexible in determining his output level, as is often the case 
in dairy and sugar processing, will be more inclined to buffer price shocks, particularly when 
farmers are flexible in their choice of alternative crops, or can work off-farm at good wages. 
Consequently, a good assessment of this relative flexibility is critical both to obtain a realistic 
description of the impacts of price changes, and to develop adequate policy interventions that 
may strengthen the negotiation power of the socially weaker segments in the food chain. Finally, 
the various techniques to make more efficient and more sustainable use of scarce water and 
nutrients and to address health risks will have to appear more explicitly. Such are the topics on 
the agenda of the CATSEI-project, Chinagro’s successor. 
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Appendix A. Crop and livestock activities and their correspondence to commodities 
 
This appendix describes crop and livestock activities and how these map to commodities as 
traded on markets. In the Chinagro model this structure is represented by a matrix of fixed 
coefficients, denoted by B that maps from activities to commodities. Many of its coefficients vary 
across provinces and may be adjusted under a model scenario. To clarify the role of the B-matrix 
in the model, we repeat the steps (see Keyzer and Van Veen, 2005) according to which cropping 
and livestock outputs are being generated: 
 
- for each land use type the aggregate yield per hectare or per animal place depends on the input 
of equipped labor and fertilizer or feed, as shown in Figure 3 of the main text, 
- the aggregate output of a land use type is distributed over activities (crops respectively animals) 
via a Constant Elasticity of Substitution function,  
- the activity levels are transformed into tradable model commodities via the mapping matrix B.  
 
For crop activities the B-matrix is built up from three submatrices: one for direct food use, one for 
direct feed use and one for crop processing into main product and byproducts. These submatrices 
are aggregated using the shares of the three destinations as weights, taking into account also the 
shares of output reserved for seed and lost on the farm. For livestock activities such submatrices 
are not relevant and the commodity mapping can be stated directly.  
 
Chinagro distinguishes 14 crops. Their definitions follow the yearbooks of the China Statistical 
Bureau. It expresses roots and tubers in grain equivalent by taking 20% of the actual weight. 
‘Other nonfood crops’ are mainly tobacco and hemp. Chinagro includes melons in vegetables and 
not in fruits. All crops are measured in kg, with two qualifications: (i) roots and tubers are 
expressed in kg grain equivalent, and (ii) cotton is expressed in kg of fiber. Table A.1 shows the 
destinations of the crops, as assumed for the base year. The shares are the same across provinces 
and land use types.  
  
 
Table A.1 Destination of crops, 1997 (in percentages) 
 
Crop Direct food Direct feed Processing Seed On-farm waste 
Paddy - 10 85 3 2 
Wheat - 8 87 3 2 
Maize 15 80 - 3 2 
Other grains - 55 40 3 2 
Root crops 35 50 10 2 3 
Soybean 20 - 75 3 2 
Groundnuts 30 - 65 3 2 
Oilseeds - 10 85 3 2 
Sugarcane - 12 85 1 2 
Sugar beets - 12 85 1 2 
Fruit 95 - - - 5 
Vegetables 70 20 5 - 5 
Cotton - - 95 3 2 
Other nonfood - - 95 3 2 
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As mentioned above, crop output is mapped to the Chinagro commodities separately for direct 
food, direct feed and processing. The mappings are shown in Tables A.2 – A.4, respectively. 
Before mentioning the three tables, the list of tradable Chinagro commodities and their unit of 
measurement is given. 
 
 
1. Rice   (kg milled)     10. Pork   (kg carcass weight) 
2. Wheat   (kg flour)   11. Poultry meat   (kg carcass weight) 
3. Maize    (kg grain)            12. Milk   (kg)              
4. Other staple food   (kg soybean equivalent)  13. Eggs   (kg)   
5. Vegetable oil   (kg)        14. Fish   (kg)         
6. Sugar    (kg refined)   15. Nonfood excl feed (ten constant 1997 Yuan)    
7. Fruits    (kg)     16. Carbohydrate feed (megacal)             
8. Vegetables   (kg)    17. Protein feed   (megacal)         
9. Ruminant meat   (kg carcass weight)     
 
.             
 
Table A.2 Crop-to-commodity mapping: direct food use 
 
Crop Commodity Coefficient* 
Maize Maize 1.00 
Root crops Other staple food 0.83 
Soybean Other staple food 1.00 
Groundnuts Other staple food 1.17 
Fruit Fruit 1.00 
Vegetables Vegetables 1.00 
        * expressed in commodity units per crop unit 
 
 
 
Table A.3 Crop-to-commodity mapping: direct feed use 
 
Crop Commodity Coefficient* 
Paddy Carbohydrate feed 3.60 
Wheat Carbohydrate feed 3.34 
Maize Maize 1.00 
Other grains Carbohydrate feed 3.40 
Root crops Carbohydrate feed 4.50 
Oilseeds Protein feed 4.50 
Sugarcane Carbohydrate feed 0.30 
Sugar beets Carbohydrate feed 0.70 
Vegetables Carbohydrate feed 0.25 
         * expressed in commodity units per crop unit 
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Table A.4 Crop-to-commodity mapping: processing 
 
Crop Commodity Coefficient* Explanation 
Paddy Rice 0.73 Extraction rate milled rice 
 Protein feed 0.36 Extraction rate bran 0.12, with 3.02 mcal/kg 
    
Wheat Wheat 0.75 Extraction rate wheat flour 
 Protein feed 0.48 Extraction rate bran 0.18, with 2.65 mcal/kg 
    
Other grains Other staple food 0.20 – 0.40 Extraction rate flour 0.80, with price-based 
conversion 
 Protein feed 0.27 Extraction rate bran 0.10, with 2.70 mcal/kg 
    
Root crops Other staple food 0.62 Extraction rate flour 0.75, with price-based 
conversion 
 Carbohydrate feed 0.30 Extraction rate 0.20, with 1.50 mcal/kg 
    
Soybean Vegetable oil 0.15 Extraction rate oil 
 Protein feed 2.59 Extraction rate cake 0.82, with 3.16 mcal/kg 
    
Groundnuts Vegetable oil 0.30 Extraction rate oil 
 Protein feed 1.33 Extraction rate cake 0.385, with 3.46 mcal/kg 
    
Oilseeds Vegetable oil 0.35 Extraction rate oil 
 Protein feed 1.86 Extraction rate cake 0.55, with 3.39 mcal/kg 
    
Sugarcane Sugar, refined 0.09 Extraction rate refined sugar 
 Carbohydrate feed 0.05 Residual rate 0.025, with 1.94 mcal/kg 
    
Sugar beets Sugar, refined 0.10 Extraction rate refined sugar 
 Carbohydrate feed 0.14 Residual rate 0.334, with 0.42 mcal/kg 
    
Vegetables Vegetables 0.85 Extraction rate processed vegetables 
 Carbohydrate feed 0.08 Residual rate 0.14, with 0.60 mcal/kg 
    
Cotton Vegetable oil 0.27 Oil rate relative to fiber 
 Nonfood 0.80 - 1.20 Price-based conversion of cotton fiber 
 Protein feed 2.72 Cake rate relative to fiber 1.07, with 2.54 mcal/kg 
    
Other nonfood Nonfood 0.10 - 0.80 Price-based conversion of tobacco or hemp 
 
* expressed in commodity units per crop unit (in case of provincial variation, the range is indicated)   
 
 
Tables A.1 – A.4 show that most crop coefficients are established at national level, hence without 
provincial differences. Only in case of price-based conversion factors, provincially different 
coefficients may result. In these cases, the tables report the range of the provincial coefficients.  
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For livestock activities, the output structure is summarized in Table A.5. Most coefficients differ 
by livestock system and by province. In fact, the table rather than showing the coefficients 
themselves, for ease of presentation lists the base year information from which the coefficients 
were derived. The actual coefficients are expressed relative to the 1997 meat output (following 
the choice of the output unit of the activities in the model), which means that they can be obtained 
by dividing each element in the table by the corresponding meat output per animal place. 
Logically, then all meat coefficients in the initial B-matrix become one, but they can be increased 
over time in order to represent productivity increases. 
 
 
Table A.5 Commodity output of livestock activities (ranges of regional averages) 
 
1997 output in commodity units  
per animal place of the activity* 
 
Livestock system 
 
Activity 
Meat  Milk Eggs Nonfood  
Buffaloes 8 90 - 17 – 50 
Draught cattle 6 – 9 - - 8 – 31 
Draught animals 
Other  8 – 9 - - 7 – 23 
      
Grazing Milk cattle 16 – 27 1176 – 1869 - 11 – 22 
 Meat cattle 27 – 75 - - 1 - 3 
 Sheep and goat 2 – 5 7 – 9 - 1 – 2 
 Yaks 7 20 - 2 – 3 
      
Milk cattle 17 – 25 1624 - 2623 - 34 – 62 
Meat cattle 32 – 91 - - 4 – 9 
Traditionally mixed 
ruminants 
Sheep and goat 4 – 7 7 – 9 - 1 – 2 
      
Specialized dairy Milk cattle 17 – 25 2286 - 4237 - 4 - 9 
      
Pigs 53 – 96 - - - Traditionally mixed  
non-ruminants Poultry 2 – 3 - 1 – 8 - 
      
Pigs 81 – 130 - - - Intensified non-
ruminants Poultry 3 – 5 - 4 – 13 - 
 
* In fact, the model knows the concept of ‘animal place’ only for livestock systems and not for activities; here, it 
is merely used to facilitate the interpretation of the figures; actual model coefficients are expressed relative to 
the 1997 meat output, hence obtained by dividing each figure by the corresponding meat output. 
 
 
The intervals in Table A.5 indicate the range of the regional differences of the yields per animal 
place. The table shows that these differences may be quite large. They are actually even larger 
since the model uses provincial information. Different species of animals, different production 
habits within mixed systems and different degrees of intensification cause this variation across 
provinces. For example, the number of chicken layers versus broilers may be rather diverse 
across provinces, and creates the wide ranges for poultry meat and eggs.  
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In addition to the output mentioned in Tables A.1 – A.5, crop and livestock activities produce 
local outputs that are hardly tradable: crop residuals, manure and draught power. These outputs 
are directly used on-farm within the same county. Only to the extent that they are considered 
tradable, they are added to the B-matrix, as carbohydrate feed or nonfood. The model assumes 
that 5% of crop residuals and 10% of manure is tradable. Compared to the tables above, the 
resulting coefficients are rather small. They are not presented separately.  
 
Finally, the coefficients are reported that are used to calculate manure nutrient discharges from 
the feed intake of animals. Table A.6 shows the nutrient content by type of feed. Local feed is 
being distinguished by animal system, with the content following the system-specific 
composition in terms of crop residuals, grass, green fodder and household waste. Table A.7 
shows the discharge rates assumed for each livestock system. The smaller the share of growing 
animals, the closer to one the discharge rates will be. These rates have been established by 
calibration to the nutrient discharge rates of Ermolieva et al. (2005). As last step in the 
calculations, the amounts of P and K are converted into the oxides P2O5 and K2O, following the 
standard way of measurement in fertilizer application. The conversion factors are 2.290 
respectively 1.205, determined on the basis of physical weights. 
 
 
Table A.6 Nutrient contents of feed, in kg N, P or K per Gcal 
  
 Nitrogen (N) Phosphorus (P) Potassium (K) 
Tradable feed    
  Maize 4.30 0.70 0.85 
  Carbohydrate feed 4.00 0.70 2.00 
  Protein feed 16.00 2.75 6.00 
    
Local feed of    
  Draught animals 6.50 1.75 3.50 
  Grazing animals 7.50 1.25 8.00 
  Traditional ruminants 6.50 1.75 3.50 
  Specialized dairy 6.00 1.50 2.00 
  Traditional pork and poultry 5.00 0.75 2.50 
  Intensified pork and poultry 5.00 0.75 2.50 
 
 
 
  Table A.7 Nutrient discharge rates by livestock system 
 
Draught animals 98% 
Grazing animals 95% 
Traditional ruminants 90% 
Specialized dairy 85% 
Traditional pork and poultry 80% 
Intensified pork and poultry 65% 
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Appendix B. Tables with outcomes of the different scenarios 
 
 
 
Contents: 
 
Table B.1 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of major crop food items 
 
Table B.2 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of livestock products 
 
Table B.3 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of tradable feeds 
 
Table B.4 Per capita consumption of grain and meat 
 
Table B.5 Market prices of main crop products in selected regions 
 
Table B.6 Market prices of main livestock products in selected regions 
 
Table B.7 Allocation of on-farm labor to land use types 
 
Table B.8 Farming value added and its share in total GDP 
 
Table B.9 Farming value added by region 
 
Table B.10 Farming value added per laborer and its annual growth rate, by region 
 
Table B.11 Organic and chemical fertilizer used per hectare, by region 
 
Table B.12 Total organic and chemical fertilizer used, by region 
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Table B.1 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of major crop food items under different scenarios (million tons) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Supply                
Rice (milled) 129.8 136.5 136.0 129.9 138.1 137.5 130.3 137.8 137.2 131.4 144.2 147.5 131.1 145.4 151.4 
Wheat flour 83.5 85.2 84.1 83.6 85.5 84.4 83.9 84.8 83.0 84.6 86.8 87.8 84.0 86.2 85.9 
Vegetable oil 9.8 10.1 10.2 9.7 9.9 10.0 9.9 10.2 10.3 10.2 10.8 11.2 9.9 10.2 10.4 
Sugar 9.0 9.5 9.5 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.5 9.5 9.3 10.0 10.2 8.9 9.3 9.2 
Fruit 69.2 74.7 78.3 69.6 75.5 79.1 69.4 74.4 77.3 70.0 75.9 80.1 68.9 73.7 76.7 
Vegetables 253.7 268.3 278.7 255.4 272.7 284.2 257.0 269.9 279.5 258.1 276.9 287.3 255.7 271.8 282.0 
Demand                
Rice (milled) 129.8 132.1 131.7 129.9 131.8 131.4 130.3 130.7 129.2 131.4 132.2 131.9 131.1 132.2 131.9 
Wheat flour 83.4 85.2 84.1 83.5 85.5 84.4 83.8 84.8 83.0 84.5 86.8 85.8 83.9 86.2 85.8 
Vegetable oil 16.6 18.3 19.4 16.7 18.8 19.8 16.7 18.7 20.3 16.6 18.3 19.4 16.6 18.3 19.4 
Sugar 10.7 11.7 12.6 10.8 12.5 13.4 11.0 12.3 13.3 10.7 11.7 12.6 10.7 11.7 12.6 
Fruit 65.2 70.8 73.6 64.7 70.0 72.9 66.6 73.6 76.6 65.3 70.9 73.7 65.1 70.8 73.6 
Vegetables 246.1 260.5 265.4 245.9 259.9 264.3 248.6 263.7 267.4 249.2 264.2 271.9 246.7 260.9 267.4 
Net outflow                
Rice (milled) 0.0 4.4 4.3 0.0 6.3 6.1 0.0 7.1 8.0 0.0 12.0 15.6 0.0 13.3 19.5 
Wheat flour 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Vegetable oil -6.8 -8.2 -9.1 -7.0 -8.9 -9.7 -6.8 -8.5 -10.1 -6.3 -7.5 -8.2 -6.7 -8.1 -9.0 
Sugar -1.7 -2.2 -3.1 -2.0 -3.8 -4.7 -1.9 -2.8 -3.9 -1.4 -1.7 -2.4 -1.7 -2.3 -3.3 
Fruit 4.0 3.8 4.7 5.0 5.5 6.2 2.8 0.8 0.7 4.8 5.0 6.4 3.8 2.9 3.1 
Vegetables 7.6 7.8 13.3 9.6 12.8 20.0 8.4 6.2 12.1 9.0 12.7 15.4 9.0 10.9 14.6 
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Table B.1 continued 
 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Self-sufficiency (%)                
Rice (milled) 100 103 103 100 105 105 100 105 106 100 109 112 100 110 115 
Wheat flour 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 102 100 100 100 
Vegetable oil 59 55 53 58 53 51 59 55 51 62 59 58 60 56 54 
Sugar 84 81 75 81 70 65 82 77 71 87 86 81 83 79 73 
Fruit 106 105 106 108 108 109 104 101 101 107 107 109 106 104 104 
Vegetables 103 103 105 104 105 108 103 102 105 104 105 106 104 104 105 
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Table B.2 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of livestock products under different scenarios (million tons) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Supply                
Beef and mutton 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.5 
Pork 40.9 49.0 53.3 41.1 48.8 53.1 41.8 50.7 55.3 41.6 50.3 56.2 41.0 49.0 53.4 
Poultry meat 10.2 12.6 14.6 10.1 12.6 14.5 10.4 12.9 15.1 10.4 13.2 15.3 10.2 12.7 14.6 
Milk 18.8 24.5 28.7 18.6 23.6 27.9 18.9 24.7 29.4 19.0 25.1 29.8 18.8 24.5 28.7 
Egg 20.3 25.4 29.2 20.1 25.5 29.1 20.5 26.0 30.1 20.6 26.4 30.5 20.3 25.4 29.2 
Demand                
Beef and mutton 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.7 6.0 7.4 9.3 6.0 7.4 8.5 6.0 7.4 8.5 
Pork 40.9 49.0 59.5 41.1 50.1 61.9 41.8 50.7 64.9 41.6 50.3 60.1 41.0 49.0 59.5 
Poultry meat 10.2 13.2 17.5 10.5 13.7 18.5 10.8 14.2 20.2 10.4 13.5 17.5 10.2 13.2 17.5 
Milk 22.7 36.6 57.6 23.2 39.6 61.7 24.1 42.2 69.2 22.7 36.6 57.6 22.7 36.6 57.6 
Egg 20.3 24.6 29.2 20.1 24.5 29.1 20.5 26.0 30.1 20.6 24.7 30.5 20.3 24.6 29.2 
Net outflow                
Beef and mutton 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pork 0.0 0.0 -6.2 0.0 -1.3 -8.8 0.0 0.0 -9.7 0.0 0.0 -4.0 0.0 0.0 -6.2 
Poultry meat 0.0 -0.6 -2.9 -0.3 -1.1 -4.0 -0.4 -1.2 -5.1 0.0 -0.3 -2.2 0.0 -0.6 -2.9 
Milk -3.9 -12.1 -28.9 -4.6 -15.9 -33.7 -5.2 -17.5 -39.8 -3.6 -11.5 -27.8 -3.9 -12.1 -28.9 
Egg 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Self-sufficiency (%)                
Beef and mutton 100 100 100 100 100 98 100 100 92 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Pork 100 100 90 100 97 86 100 100 85 100 100 93 100 100 90 
Poultry meat 100 96 84 97 92 78 96 91 75 100 98 87 100 96 83 
Milk 83 67 50 80 60 45 78 59 43 84 69 52 83 67 50 
Egg 100 103 100 100 104 100 100 100 100 100 107 100 100 103 100 
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Table B.3 Supply, demand, net outflow and self-sufficiency rate of tradable feeds under different scenarios 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Supply                
Maize 113.1 118.9 118.8 111.4 114.8 114.9 114.4 119.1 119.0 118.1 126.7 129.8 113.9 119.6 120.5 
Carbohydrate feed 297.8 289.8 275.8 297.3 289.2 275.3 299.2 289.3 274.6 304.8 303.6 295.6 297.7 291.2 278.8 
Protein feed 203.6 212.3 213.4 203.4 211.8 213.0 205.3 213.1 213.7 209.0 222.7 229.5 205.3 217.7 222.9 
Demand                
Maize, food 18.4 18.3 17.8 18.6 18.8 18.2 18.3 17.9 17.1 18.4 18.4 17.9 18.4 18.4 17.8 
Maize, feed 108.0 120.6 123.0 108.0 120.2 122.4 109.0 122.4 124.3 107.7 120.2 123.1 108.1 120.5 122.9 
Carbohydrate feed 336.6 348.3 332.4 336.6 347.3 331.2 339.0 353.3 336.7 335.7 347.2 332.6 336.6 348.1 332.3 
Protein feed 284.4 320.1 327.0 284.3 319.0 325.3 286.7 324.7 330.3 283.4 319.0 327.2 284.5 319.9 326.9 
Net outflow                
Maize -13.3 -20.0 -22.0 -15.2 -24.2 -25.7 -12.9 -21.2 -22.4 -8.0 -11.9 -11.1 -12.6 -19.3 -20.2 
Carbohydrate feed -38.8 -58.5 -56.6 -39.3 -58.1 -55.9 -39.8 -64.0 -62.1 -30.9 -43.6 -37.0 -38.9 -56.9 -53.5 
Protein feed -80.8 -107.8 -113.6 -80.9 -107.2 -112.3 -81.4 -111.6 -116.6 -74.4 -96.3 -97.7 -79.1 -102.2 -104.0 
Self-sufficiency (%)                
Maize 89 86 84 88 83 82 90 85 84 94 91 92 90 86 86 
Carbohydrate feed 88 83 83 88 83 83 88 82 82 91 87 89 88 84 84 
Protein feed 72 66 65 72 66 65 72 66 65 74 70 70 72 68 68 
 
Note: the unit for maize is million tons, and the unit for carbohydrate feed and protein feed is million Gcal. 
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Table B.4 Per capita consumption of grain and meat under different scenarios (kg/person/year) 
 
Grain Meat and egg 
 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Baseline            
    Rural  194.0 196.8 193.3 192.0 192.4 26.7 31.3 34.8 38.4 44.0 
    Urban 130.8 129.6 128.3 127.8 127.3 67.5 74.1 81.5 90.3 101.4 
    National 172.5 170.8 164.8 159.8 155.0 40.5 47.9 55.3 64.4 77.0 
Liberalization           
    Rural  194.0 196.8 193.7 192.3 192.7 26.7 31.3 34.9 39.3 45.9 
    Urban 130.8 129.6 128.5 128.0 127.5 67.5 74.1 81.7 91.4 104.2 
    National 172.5 170.8 165.1 160.1 155.2 40.5 47.9 55.5 65.4 79.5 
High growth           
    Rural  194.0 196.8 195.3 193.3 193.4 26.7 31.3 35.2 38.5 45.7 
    Urban 130.8 129.6 129.5 128.7 128.0 67.5 74.1 82.4 90.9 105.0 
    National 172.5 170.8 165.5 158.0 151.6 40.5 47.9 56.6 67.1 83.6 
High R&D           
    Rural  194.0 196.8 195.9 193.6 194.3 26.7 31.3 35.5 39.5 45.0 
    Urban 130.8 129.6 129.6 128.6 128.1 67.5 74.1 82.5 91.7 103.0 
    National 172.5 170.8 166.8 161.0 156.2 40.5 47.9 56.1 65.6 78.3 
Irrigation up           
    Rural  194.0 196.8 195.0 193.0 194.3 26.7 31.3 34.8 38.4 44.0 
    Urban 130.8 129.6 129.1 128.3 128.1 67.5 74.1 81.5 90.3 101.5 
    National 172.5 170.8 166.1 160.6 156.2 40.5 47.9 55.3 64.4 77.1 
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Table B.5 Market prices of main crop products in selected regions under different scenarios (Yuan/kg) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
North                
Rice (milled) 2.06 2.12 1.96 2.06 2.14 1.99 2.03 2.11 1.96 1.94 2.11 1.96 1.96 2.11 1.96 
Wheat flour 1.38 1.33 1.23 1.37 1.31 1.21 1.35 1.29 1.16 1.28 1.20 1.10 1.33 1.25 1.10 
Maize 1.05 1.09 1.04 1.01 0.99 0.96 1.05 1.09 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.05 1.08 1.04 
Vegetable oil 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.28 4.67 4.42 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 
Sugar 2.71 2.73 2.54 2.60 2.26 2.13 2.71 2.73 2.54 2.71 2.73 2.54 2.71 2.73 2.54 
Fruit 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.59 1.61 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.51 1.52 1.54 
Vegetables 0.94 0.99 1.04 0.94 1.00 1.05 0.94 0.99 1.04 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.98 0.97 
Central                
Rice (milled) 1.50 1.55 1.40 1.49 1.58 1.42 1.46 1.55 1.39 1.37 1.54 1.39 1.40 1.54 1.39 
Wheat flour 1.33 1.29 1.18 1.32 1.26 1.16 1.30 1.24 1.12 1.23 1.15 1.05 1.28 1.20 1.05 
Maize 1.15 1.18 1.13 1.11 1.08 1.05 1.15 1.18 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.13 
Vegetable oil 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.27 4.67 4.41 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 
Sugar 2.72 2.74 2.55 2.61 2.27 2.14 2.72 2.74 2.55 2.72 2.74 2.55 2.72 2.74 2.55 
Fruit 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.79 1.83 1.84 1.75 1.76 1.78 1.74 1.75 1.77 1.74 1.76 1.78 
Vegetables 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.84 
Southwest                
Rice (milled) 1.93 1.98 1.83 1.92 2.01 1.85 1.89 1.97 1.82 1.80 1.97 1.82 1.83 1.97 1.82 
Wheat flour 1.40 1.36 1.25 1.39 1.33 1.23 1.37 1.31 1.19 1.30 1.22 1.12 1.35 1.27 1.12 
Maize 1.12 1.15 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.02 1.12 1.15 1.10 1.12 1.15 1.10 1.12 1.15 1.10 
Vegetable oil 5.43 5.23 4.89 5.27 4.67 4.41 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 5.44 5.23 4.89 
Sugar 2.69 2.71 2.52 2.58 2.25 2.13 2.69 2.71 2.52 2.69 2.71 2.52 2.69 2.70 2.52 
Fruit 1.77 1.79 1.81 1.82 1.86 1.87 1.78 1.79 1.81 1.77 1.78 1.80 1.77 1.79 1.81 
Vegetables 1.05 1.10 1.10 1.06 1.11 1.15 1.05 1.11 1.09 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.09 
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Table B.6 Market prices of main livestock products in selected regions under different scenarios (Yuan/kg) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
North                
Beef and mutton 15.39 17.45 21.44 15.36 17.40 20.47 17.19 22.34 23.94 15.38 17.42 21.40 15.39 17.45 21.44 
Pork 14.78 19.02 21.81 14.69 18.18 20.63 15.35 21.01 23.59 14.26 17.97 21.51 14.76 19.01 21.78 
Poultry meat 14.16 18.06 20.43 13.37 17.65 19.52 14.26 21.17 22.49 13.57 16.78 20.42 14.14 18.06 20.43 
Milk 2.82 2.63 2.46 2.69 2.27 2.14 2.82 2.63 2.46 2.82 2.63 2.46 2.82 2.63 2.46 
Egg 4.85 5.44 5.91 4.92 5.50 5.93 5.01 5.44 6.27 4.69 5.44 5.38 4.85 5.44 5.91 
Central                
Beef and mutton 14.81 16.87 20.86 14.78 16.82 19.90 16.61 21.77 23.36 14.80 16.84 20.82 14.81 16.87 20.86 
Pork 14.35 18.59 21.39 14.26 17.75 20.20 14.92 20.58 23.16 13.83 17.54 21.08 14.33 18.58 21.35 
Poultry meat 16.26 20.16 22.52 15.47 19.75 20.50 16.36 23.26 23.22 15.67 18.88 22.51 16.24 20.16 22.52 
Milk 2.60 2.43 2.27 2.47 2.07 1.96 2.60 2.43 2.27 2.60 2.43 2.27 2.60 2.43 2.27 
Egg 6.72 7.31 7.78 6.79 7.36 7.80 6.88 7.31 8.14 6.56 7.28 7.25 6.72 7.31 7.78 
Southwest                
Beef and mutton 14.36 16.41 20.41 14.33 16.37 19.44 16.16 21.31 22.91 14.34 16.39 20.36 14.36 16.41 20.41 
Pork 13.52 17.76 21.15 13.43 16.93 20.80 14.09 19.75 22.79 13.00 16.71 20.26 13.50 17.75 21.13 
Poultry meat 19.18 20.68 21.80 18.29 18.74 19.18 19.19 21.60 21.81 18.59 20.68 21.80 19.16 20.68 21.80 
Milk 2.48 2.31 2.21 2.35 1.96 1.90 2.48 2.34 2.21 2.48 2.31 2.21 2.48 2.31 2.21 
Egg 6.94 7.52 8.00 7.01 7.57 8.02 7.10 7.53 8.36 6.77 7.31 7.47 6.94 7.53 7.99 
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Table B.7 Allocation of on-farm labor to land use types under different scenarios (million full-time equivalent year) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Crop sector 190.9 171.6 144.1 190.8 172.0 144.8 188.2 163.8 134.4 191.1 172.0 144.0 191.0 172.1 144.8 
   Irrigated land 101.5 89.5 73.6 101.6 90.0 74.2 100.0 85.7 68.9 101.0 89.6 73.6 102.9 93.7 79.4 
   Rain-fed land 79.7 72.4 61.2 79.6 72.3 61.2 78.5 68.5 56.3 80.4 72.7 61.1 78.4 68.8 56.1 
   Tree cropping land 9.7 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.6 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.7 9.3 
Livestock sector 44.3 47.1 45.0 44.3 46.7 44.3 44.9 48.2 45.3 44.0 46.6 45.1 44.3 47.1 45.1 
   Draught animal 4.2 3.3 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.4 
   Grazing system 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 
   Trad. mixed ruminant 5.3 6.3 6.6 5.3 6.3 6.6 5.3 6.3 6.6 5.3 6.3 6.6 5.3 6.3 6.6 
   Intens. dairy  0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 
   Trad. mixed 
nonruminant 25.8 25.4 22.1 25.9 25.2 21.8 26.2 26.1 22.3 25.6 25.1 22.1 25.9 25.4 22.2 
   Intens. nonruminant 7.0 10.0 11.8 7.0 9.9 11.5 7.2 10.4 11.9 6.9 9.9 11.8 7.0 10.1 11.8 
Total on-farm labor 235.1 218.7 189.1 235.1 218.7 189.1 233.1 212.0 179.7 235.1 218.7 189.1 235.4 219.3 189.9 
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Table B.8 Farming value added and its share in total GDP, under different scenarios (billion Yuan) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping sector 1250.3 1481.1 1525.6 1243.9 1467.9 1523.1 1253.2 1452.8 1474.7 1246.4 1515.8 1564.8 1239.0 1492.6 1538.3 
  Irrigated cropping 699.7 819.2 827.4 696.0 818.3 830.1 700.4 810.9 809.4 685.4 838.6 851.1 693.8 858.1 890.8 
  Rainfed cropping 477.7 582.5 614.2 472.5 566.5 605.0 479.8 563.0 582.7 488.1 598.0 629.8 472.3 555.2 563.4 
  Tree cropping 73.0 79.4 84.1 75.4 83.2 88.0 73.0 79.0 82.7 73.0 79.2 83.9 72.9 79.4 84.1 
Livestock sector 568.4 987.0 1339.8 559.3 929.7 1223.8 621.9 1185.5 1492.5 551.6 965.9 1387.2 568.0 987.6 1340.4 
  Draught animal -24.2 -20.9 -14.0 -24.1  -20.7  -14.2  -23.2  -18.7  -13.2  -24.2  -20.9  -14.0  -24.2 -20.9 -14.0 
  Grazing ruminant  19.7 24.7 34.0 19.3 23.8 32.0 21.9 31.7 38.2 19.7 24.7 34.0 19.7 24.8 34.1 
  Trad. ruminant  32.4 54.0 91.9 31.9 52.5 85.0 39.8 80.1 106.8 32.3 53.9 91.7 32.4 54.0 91.9 
  Intens. dairy  14.0 17.9 20.9 12.5 12.2 15.7 14.4 19.3 23.8 14.5 19.1 23.0 14.0 17.9 21.0 
  Trad. nonruminant 323.1 481.3 549 320.5 457.4 509.9 347.5 560.7 602.5 313.4 467.6 567.5 323.0 481.8 549.8 
  Intens. 
nonruminant 203.5 430.0 658 199.1 404.7 595.6 221.5 512.3 734.5 195.9 421.6 685.0 203.2 430.1 657.8 
Related sectors 14.0 8.9 5.3 14.0 8.9 5.3 13.8 8.5 4.9 14.0 8.9 5.3 14.0 8.9 5.3 
                
Farming GDP 1833 2477 2871 1817 2407 2752 1889 2647 2972 1812 2491 2957 1821 2489 2884 
Total GDP  21326 39680 64769 21311 39612 64653 21802 43438 78030 21305 39693 64854 21314 39692 64782 
Farming share (%) 8.6 6.2 4.4 8.5 6.1 4.3 8.6 6.1 3.8 8.5 6.3 4.6 8.5 6.3 4.5 
 
Note: related sectors cover collection of household waste, nightsoil and green feed 
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Table B.9 Farming value added by region under different scenarios (billion Yuan) 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
  Regions 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping sector                
  North 264.5 296.6 299.5 263.0 292.3 297.4 264.7 290.2 289.5 263.8 299.8 300.7 263.5 297.9 298.5 
  Northeast 84.4 93.2 86.6 82.9 89.7 85.2 84.6 91.4 83.9 84.5 96.9 91.7 83.5 94.7 89.8 
  East 196.6 229.5 232.5 196.0 229.1 234.0 199.6 228.9 226.9 195.3 235.8 239.7 193.8 230.5 232.9 
  Central 177.0 204.1 212.6 176.5 204.4 213.6 176.4 201.8 209.8 174.9 210.7 219.6 174.1 207.0 215.8 
  South 221.5 277.7 282.4 221.2 276.9 283.1 223.8 272.2 269.8 221.3 284.0 289.1 219.1 277.4 280.3 
  Southwest 203.6 258.0 282.8 202.3 255.9 282.6 201.2 248.5 268.7 203.3 264.1 291.6 201.4 259.4 286.3 
  Plateau 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.8 3.9 
  Northwest 99.3 118.2 125.2 98.6 115.9 123.2 99.5 116.1 122.3 99.9 120.7 128.3 100.2 122.0 130.9 
  China 1250.3 1481.1 1525.6 1243.9 1467.9 1523.1 1253.2 1452.8 
1474.
7 
1246.
4 
1515.
8 
1564.
8 
1239.
0 
1492.
6 1538.3 
Livestock sector                
  North 117.1 205.4 283.5 115.4 197.5 266.0 130.1 253.3 329.6 113.2 201.3 292.9 116.9 205.7 283.5 
  Northeast 52.2 89.0 119.6 51.0 85.2 113.3 57.0 108.9 134.3 50.6 86.5 123.2 52.2 89.2 119.9 
  East 73.5 121.4 160.2 71.9 115.6 133.9 80.0 146.6 168.2 71.3 118.1 168.9 73.4 121.4 160.3 
  Central 85.9 147.7 193.8 85.1 140.1 180.1 93.4 176.0 220.5 83.5 143.2 202.8 86.0 147.9 194.0 
  South 102.6 184.2 240.9 100.3 166.6 201.1 109.7 208.4 251.1 100.3 183.2 255.7 102.5 184.3 241.2 
  Southwest 82.5 148.3 206.0 81.8 138.8 199.1 91.2 178.9 233.6 79.2 144.2 208.9 82.4 148.2 205.9 
  Plateau 5.7 9.1 14.2 5.6 8.5 12.9 6.4 11.8 15.9 5.7 9.1 14.3 5.7 9.1 14.2 
  Northwest 48.9 82.0 121.6 48.1 77.4 117.4 54.2 101.6 139.2 47.9 80.5 120.6 48.8 81.9 121.6 
 China  568.4 987.0 1339.8 559.3 929.7 1223.8 621.9 1185.5 
1492.
5 551.6 965.9 
1387.
2 568.0 987.6 1340.4 
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Table B.10 Farming value added per laborer and its annual growth rate, by region, under different scenarios 
 
Baseline Liberalization High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
Regions 2003 
(Yuan) 
2030 
(Yuan) 
Growth
 (%) 
2003 
(Yuan) 
2030 
(Yuan) 
Growth
 (%) 
2003 
(Yuan) 
2030 
(Yuan) 
Growth
(%) 
2003 
(Yuan) 
2030 
(Yuan) 
Growth
(%) 
2003 
(Yuan) 
2030 
(Yuan) 
Growth 
 (%) 
Cropping sector                
  North 3571 8862 3.42 3571 8771 3.38 3571 9197 3.57 3571 8919 3.45 3571 8737 3.37 
  Northeast 5880 14389 3.37 5880 14103 3.29 5880 15207 3.58 5880 15224 3.59 5880 14718 3.46 
  East 4436 11275 3.52 4436 11258 3.51 4436 11797 3.69 4436 11638 3.64 4436 11278 3.52 
  Central 4532 11368 3.46 4532 11369 3.47 4532 12014 3.68 4532 11769 3.60 4532 11579 3.54 
  South 5375 13303 3.41 5375 13223 3.39 5375 13728 3.53 5375 13648 3.51 5375 13253 3.40 
  Southwest 3351 9558 3.96 3351 9540 3.95 3351 9708 4.02 3351 9845 4.07 3351 9654 4.00 
  Plateau 2490 5479 2.96 2490 5411 2.92 2490 5696 3.11 2490 5479 2.96 2490 5301 2.84 
  Northwest 3527 9289 3.65 3527 9139 3.59 3527 9634 3.79 3527 9507 3.74 3527 9546 3.76 
  China 4127 10584 3.55 4127 10521 3.53 4127 10973 3.69 4127 10864 3.65 4127 10623 3.56 
Livestock sector                
  North 7450 24784 4.55 7450 23518 4.35 7450 28409 5.08 7450 25465 4.66 7450 24736 4.54 
  Northeast 12964 45824 4.79 12964 43737 4.61 12964 51665 5.25 12964 47388 4.92 12964 45586 4.77 
  East 11846 39066 4.52 11846 33992 3.98 11846 40932 4.70 11846 40985 4.70 11846 38995 4.51 
  Central 9739 36030 4.96 9739 34114 4.75 9739 40685 5.44 9739 37479 5.12 9739 35928 4.95 
  South 12957 36943 3.96 12957 31715 3.37 12957 38166 4.08 12957 38924 4.16 12957 36711 3.93 
  Southwest 4803 23021 5.98 4803 22343 5.86 4803 26011 6.46 4803 23415 6.04 4803 23002 5.97 
  Plateau 8378 19944 3.26 8378 18225 2.92 8378 22771 3.77 8378 20085 3.29 8378 19944 3.26 
  Northwest 8182 23162 3.93 8182 22368 3.80 8182 26417 4.44 8182 23109 3.92 8182 23197 3.94 
 China  8578 29800 4.72 8578 27607 4.42 8578 32976 5.11 8578 30785 4.85 8578 29727 4.71 
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Table B.11 Organic and chemical fertilizer used per hectare, by region, under different scenarios (kg/ha) 
 
 
Baseline Liberal High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Organic fertilizer                
North 84 89 90 84  89  90  83  89  90  84  89  90  84 89 90 
Northeast 32 33 32 32  33  32  32  32  31  32  33  32  32 33 32 
East 63 65 63 63  65  63  64  64  62  63  65  63  63 65 63 
Central 99 98 90 99  98  90  98  96  89  99 98  90  99 98 90 
South 123 143 155 123  143  155  125  142  156  123  143  155  123 143 156 
Southwest 106 106 100 106  106  100  105  105  98  106  106  100  106 106 100 
Plateau 42 49 52 42  49  52  41  49  51  42  49  52  42 49 52 
Northwest 34 40 44 34  40  44  34  40  44  34  40  44  34 40 44 
China  71 75 74 71  75  74  71  74  73  71  75  74  71 75 74 
Chemical fertilizer                
North 479 492 495 479  493  497  477  483  482  468  466  453  485 507 520 
Northeast 203 211 215 203  211  216  202  208  210  200  205  205  205 220 231 
East 543 561 568 544  562  571  543  556  560  530  530  518  548 573 588 
Central 494 525 551 494  527  554  490  515  538  481  496  500  502 549 592 
South 520 576 601 520  579  605  521  567  587  506  542  544  523 588 620 
Southwest 294 313 330 294  314  331  292  307  322  290  303  312  296 319 340 
Plateau 84 83 84 84  83  84  84  84  85  84  83  83  84 84 84 
Northwest 151 154 154 151  154  154  151  151  150  149  148  144  154 162 167 
China  354 369 376 354  370  377  352  362  366  347  351  346  358 380 395 
 
Note: fertilizer use is measured in terms of its nutrient content, i.e. N, K2O and P2O5. 
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Table B.12 Total organic and chemical fertilizer used, by region, under different scenarios (1000 tons) 
 
Baseline Liberal High growth High R&D Irrigation up 
 
2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Organic fertilizer                
North 2275 2370 2335 2275  2370  2335  2265  2334  2285  2275  2370  2335  2275 2370 2337 
Northeast 682 691 657 682  691  657  678  676  638  682  691  657  682 690 654 
East 825 812 758 825  812  758  820  794  728  825  812  758  825 812 759 
Central 1103 1073 977 1103  1073  977  1096  1052  949  1103  1073  977  1103 1073 980 
South 1137 1214 1208 1137  1214  1208  1132  1191  1171  1137  1214  1208  1137 1214 1209 
Southwest 1874 1854 1723 1874  1854  1723  1863  1825  1685  1874  1854  1723  1874 1854 1724 
Plateau 43 51 53 43  51  53  43  49  51  43  51  53  43 51 53 
Northwest 734 867 936 734  867  936  730  853  917  734  867  936  734 867 936 
China  8673 8931 8646 8673  8931  8646  8627  8775  8424  8673  8931  8646  8672 8931 8651 
Chemical fertilizer                
North 13049 13048 12834 13050  13067  12871  12934  12679  12258  12756  12351  11729  13203 13453 13471 
Northeast 4293 4414 4444 4293  4418  4456  4268  4321  4304  4240  4290  4233  4341 4589 4777 
East 7064 7042 6867 7067  7053  6903  6997  6850  6530  6892  6647  6256  7120 7192 7101 
Central 5528 5774 5971 5529  5794  5998  5471  5622  5759  5386  5449  5419  5618 6033 6417 
South 4804 4901 4673 4807  4922  4704  4731  4750  4392  4678  4611  4233  4835 5003 4822 
Southwest 5208 5447 5674 5209  5464  5684  5169  5344  5519  5136  5279  5371  5235 5549 5848 
Plateau 87 86 86 87  86  86  87  85  85  87  85  85  87 86 86 
Northwest 3303 3307 3258 3300  3308  3254  3278  3226  3138  3245  3167  3039  3366 3476 3531 
China  43336 44018 43807 43342  44113  43958  42935  42877  41985  42419  41881  40367  43805 45381 46054 
 
Note: fertilizer use is measured in terms of its nutrient content, i.e. N, K2O and P2O5. 
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